Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Indiana legislators, lobbyists, and legislative staff enjoy a party on the day the legislature adjourns for the year. The March 2018 celebration was held at AJ’s Lounge in Indianapolis. Hill, the state’s Attorney General, appeared at the party and made passes at several women, moving from verbal to physical harassment, including groping. A special prosecutor concluded that criminal charges were inappropriate. The Indiana Supreme Court suspended Hill’s law license for 30 days, a punishment mitigated by his long, previously unblemished record. His bid for renomination failed. His term as Attorney General ended in January 2021.Women legislative employees filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, other statutes, and Indiana’s common law. The district judge dismissed all claims against Hill without prejudice to their renewal in state court and dismissed all claims against Indiana, ruling that it is not the plaintiffs’ employer. Claims against the House and Senate remain pending in the district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals. Indiana cannot be treated as the plaintiffs’ “employer” under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), e–2(a). They were hired, and are supervised, by the House or Senate, which holds the sole power to discipline, fire, or reward them. The statute requires people to sue their own employers, so it is irrelevant whether the state employs the Attorney General. View "DaSilva v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

In 2014, Franklin was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on six prior convictions, including three for Minnesota burglary and two for Illinois residential burglary. Franklin neither appealed nor pursued 28 U.S.C. 2255 collateral relief within a year. He sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 after the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision clarified that the Minnesota convictions did not qualify as ACCA predicates. Because three qualifying convictions remained, the district judge denied relief. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that Illinois residential burglary convictions do not qualify as ACCA predicates. The government conceded that Franklin’s sentence is unlawful but opposed section 2241 relief, arguing that Franklin could have challenged the use of his Illinois burglary convictions as ACCA predicates on direct appeal or in a timely section 2255 motion.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of relief, citing its “Davenport” holding that a federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus "if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255 motion.” Before the Mathis decision, any challenge to the use of his Minnesota or his Illinois burglaries as ACCA predicates was destined to fail given Eighth Circuit precedent. The limitations period in section 2255(f) blocked a Mathis-based motion in the sentencing court. View "Franklin v. Keyes" on Justia Law

Gaddis cut branches from McCombs’s tree that extended into his yard and threw them into McCombs’s yard. McCombs asked Gaddis to pick up the branches but he ignored her. Upon learning that a neighbor, Winstead, had spoken to McCombs about the branches Gaddis went to Winstead’s home and told Winstead to mind his own business. McCombs called the police. Officers arrived. After talking to neighbors, they told Gaddis through the door that he was being arrested for disorderly conduct. Gaddis refused to come out of his home. He stepped outside after officers stated he could also be charged with resisting arrest. Gaddis was arrested for disorderly conduct. Neighbors claimed that Gaddis was erratic and threatening. Gaddis brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, the city of Marion, and the neighbors, asserting false arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The police report provides ample information from which officers could have reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct. The consensual discussions between the officers and Gaddis did not amount to a “seizure.” At the time of Gaddis’s arrest, it was not clearly established that the officers’ statements that he would be charged with resisting arrest, followed by his choice to come out and face arrest, would violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on routine warrantless arrests inside the home. View "Gaddis v. DeMattei" on Justia Law

Reives, who is Black, worked for the Illinois State Police (ISP) from 1989 until he retired in 2018. In 2016, he had been suspended for 60 days for violating internal rules of conduct prohibiting false statements in connection with his employment. The same year, Reives’s supervisors downgraded his ratings on his performance evaluation, leading him to receive a lower ranking on a list of officers certified for promotion. Reives sued, alleging that these two incidents constituted race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ISP. When a plaintiff alleges that an employer disciplined him more harshly than his comparator, the most relevant similarities are those between the employees’ alleged misconduct, performance standards, and disciplining supervisor. Reives and his comparator, Kim, engaged in different misconduct and were punished for violating different rules. Reives cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Reives’s claim also fails under a more straightforward evaluation of the evidence. Reives was still certified for promotion in 2016 and did not explain how his lower ranking affected his promotion prospects. View "Reives v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

Johnson entered state custody in 2007. His history of prison misconduct led to his transfer in 2013 to serve accumulated segregation (solitary confinement). Johnson suffers from serious mental illness, including depression and bipolar disorder, and he was on crisis watch nine times while in segregation. Mental health professionals regularly monitored his condition and treated him with medication, which was periodically adjusted. Johnson’s misconduct continued in segregation, especially when he refused to take his medication. Many of his violations were serious enough to trigger penalties of 30-90 days of no “yard” access.Johnson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging in his pro se complaint that the cumulative yard restrictions (totaling about three years, with 24 months consecutive) violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He also complained of unsanitary conditions, poor ventilation, summertime heat in his cell, excessive noise, and inadequate mental health treatment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Johnson obtained counsel and cited research on the harmful effects of solitary confinement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson never sought relief for the time he spent in solitary confinement; he sued over his loss of yard access, unhealthy conditions in his cell, and his mental-health treatment. The record is entirely undeveloped on the issue of the effects of prolonged solitary confinement. Claims not raised in the district court are waived. View "Johnson v. Prentice" on Justia Law

Karr was convicted of rape and domestic battery for his assaults on A.P., his former girlfriend. Karr then fired his attorney, hired a new one, and pursued claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Those claims were rejected by the Indiana trial court and on direct appeal. Karr then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. The court rejected an argument that counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate A.P.’s history of medication use, and introduced no evidence about whether Karr used his cellphone during his second assault so that A.P.’s trial testimony could have been impeached. The jury had an ample basis on which to find A.P. credible. There is no reasonable probability that any evidence Karr references would have affected the trial’s outcome. Because Karr did not raise six additional claims in Indiana state court, he procedurally defaulted them. Those procedural defaults are not excusable under a narrow equitable exception delineated by the Supreme Court, which does not apply to “insubstantial defaulted claims such as the ones Karr presents” and does not apply in this procedural posture. View "Karr v. Sevier" on Justia Law

Bayon attempted to rob an Indianapolis gas station, then fled the scene in a vehicle. Numerous police officers gave chase. A high-speed pursuit through residential areas ensued. Officer Brink executed a maneuver that resulted in the Traverse spinning and crashing into a tree. Using a loudspeaker, Officer Myers ordered Bayon to exit the vehicle multiple times. Bayon took several minutes to exit the vehicle, saw 10-15 police officers, and heard commands to put his hands up and to show identification. He claims he reached for his wallet. The officers shot him. Three bullets hit Bayon; he fell face-first to the ground. Bayon claims that after he was rolled over, an officer said, “Oh, my God, he doesn’t have a weapon.” The officers claim that Bayon took several aggressive steps toward Myers and reached for something near his waistband. Two officers saw a black, hard object, and thought it was a gun. Another officer pulled “a car jack handle,” out of his pant leg.In Bayon’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that the facts were in dispute. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The parties’ claims are inseparable from disputed facts. View "Bayon v. Berkebile" on Justia Law

See is a law-enforcement officer for the Illinois Gaming Board, which often hires State Police officers. As a union representative, See expressed concern that the Board’s promotion policies gave State Police employees unfair advantages. See then began to exhibit signs of paranoia. He complained to Board management that his supervisor was spreading malicious rumors about him to intimidate and scare him. He said that his wife was “seriously afraid” that the State Police would harm them. Management became concerned about his mental stability and placed him on administrative leave pending an examination of his fitness for duty. A few weeks later See passed the examination and returned to work.See filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), section 12112, by requiring him to undergo a medical examination without a job-related justification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if See established a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendants offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing him on leave and requiring a fitness-for-duty examination: they were genuinely concerned about his mental health. See presented no evidence that this reason was pretextual. See is an armed law enforcement officer, so the possibility of mental instability posed a serious public-safety concern the examination was job-related and consistent with business necessity. View "See v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

Lange, who is deaf and communicates primarily in American Sign Language (ASL), sued the cities under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (AD”), 42 U.S.C. 12131, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, because their police officers did not provide a qualified ASL interpreter for her during four interactions but relied on written communications and on Lange’s children, ages 14 and 17, to act as interpreters. Lange apparently never requested an ASL interpreter. A jury returned a verdict for the cities. The district court then awarded $1,000 in costs to the cities.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lange was not prejudiced by the jury instructions. The court acknowledged that the ADA generally prohibits the use of minor children as interpreters but instructed the jury that the police could rely on “the decision of a private citizen to use his or her own child to facilitate her communication.” The court upheld the district court’s decisions in allowing testimony about Lange’s encounters with police other than the four interactions at issue and in awarding a reduced amount of costs to the cities despite Lange’s apparent indigency. View "Lange v. City of Oconto" on Justia Law

Garcia was convicted of attempted homicide, recklessly endangering safety, and aggravated battery based on a drive-by shooting that left one victim seriously injured. Garcia’s post-conviction counsel unsuccessfully sought a new trial claiming that trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses amounted to ineffective assistance. Garcia filed a consolidated appeal and post-conviction order. In the meantime, the state acknowledged that the reckless endangerment counts were lesser-included offenses; the judge modified the judgment, which was affirmed as modified.Garcia filed another post-conviction motion, raising new claims of ineffective assistance. Wisconsin rules require a defendant to raise all available claims for relief in his first post-conviction motion or on direct appeal unless the defendant can demonstrate a “sufficient reason.” Garcia needed to allege specific facts that would establish his post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, including allegations showing that the defaulted claims were “clearly stronger” than the issues post-conviction counsel chose to present.After Wisconsin courts rejected his petition, Garcia sought federal habeas relief. The district judge rejected the state’s procedural objection but agreed that even if counsel’s performance was deficient, the mistakes were not prejudicial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The state appellate court rejected Garcia’s second post-conviction motion based on failure to satisfy the pleading standard for overcoming procedural default. That independent and adequate state procedural basis barred federal review unless Garcia can establish cause for and prejudice from his default. He has not done so. View "Garcia v. Cromwell" on Justia Law