Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Watkins was convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. He received a mandatory life sentence based on three prior convictions for “felony drug offenses.” After multiple unsuccessful collateral attacks, Watkins filed this 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision and arguing that two of his prior convictions did not qualify as predicate felony drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), so his enhanced sentence was unlawful. Following enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, Watkins applied for relief under that statute, was resentenced to time served, and was released from prison. He is currently serving a reduced term of supervised release.The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the 2241 petition as moot. Watkins can only speculate that Watkins might benefit from a decision on the merits; the mere possibility that a decision might influence the court’s determination on remand concerning his term of supervised release is not enough to keep the case alive. Intervening case law, combined with the government’s concession, should be more than enough to make clear in any future section 3583(e) proceedings that Watkins was not properly subject to a mandatory life sentence. View "Watkins v. United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois" on Justia Law

N.J., in seventh grade, went to school wearing a T-shirt displaying a Smith & Wesson logo, with an image of a revolver. A.L., a high school student, went to school wearing a T-shirt bearing the logo of a gun-rights group, incorporating an image of a handgun. Administrators at both schools barred the boys from wearing the shirts. Neither school’s dress code expressly bans clothing with images of firearms; the dress codes prohibit “inappropriate” attire, which the administrators interpreted to bar any clothing with an image of a firearm. The students brought separate lawsuits alleging violations of their free-speech rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court consolidated the cases and granted the school administrators summary judgment, declining to apply the Supreme Court’s “Tinker” precedent, which established the legal standard for student-speech cases. The court applied the standard for speech restrictions in a nonpublic forum—the most lenient test— and upheld the administrators’ actions as viewpoint neutral and reasonable.The Seventh Circuit remanded. This is not a speech-forum case. Tinker provides the legal standard: restrictions on student speech are constitutionally permissible if school officials reasonably forecast that the speech “would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school” or invade the rights of others. Although this test is deferential to school officials and is “applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,” it is stricter than the test for speech restrictions in a nonpublic forum. View "N.J. v. Sonnabend" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Seventh Circuit left the door open for prisoners seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the COVID-19 pandemic to show they cannot receive or benefit from vaccines. Newton’s case was remanded before those cases were decided. On remand, the district court found that Newton did not present an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release. Newton, under 70 and serving a sentence for bank robbery, had argued that hypertension, asthma, and its immunosuppressing corticosteroid treatment put him at risk for serious illness if he contracted COVID-19.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Although the vaccine and the Seventh Circuit’s exceptions did not exist in 2020 when Newton filed his motion for compassionate release, and the district court invited no briefing on remand in 2021, Newton has not identified any change in the facts that would have changed the outcome. He points only to the original record but the district court already knew Newton was immunosuppressed. Newton did not show that he is in the small minority of federal prisoners within the exception. Newton was free to file a motion to argue under new facts and new law. View "United States v. Newton" on Justia Law

Westray pleaded guilty to a 1998 murder. He received a death sentence which was later commuted to life imprisonment. In a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, he subsequently challenged his confinement, including its duration, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing and on remand when he moved to withdraw his guilty plea.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his claims. The ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was presented to the Illinois trial court in Westray’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied without comment. It is therefore presumed that the claim was adjudicated on its merits and AEDPA deference applies. Westray has not shown that but for his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance on remand, he would have been sentenced to a term of years. Westray cannot prove prejudice and his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails. No evidentiary hearing was required. View "Westray v. Brookhart" on Justia Law

Over three weeks in 2002, Santiago participated in a string of armed robberies at Pennsylvania hotels. When he was arrested, Santiago was holding the distinctive firearm that he and his co-defendants used in the robberies. Convicted of three Hobbs Act counts of interference with commerce by robbery, two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, (robbery), 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon (prior state felony convictions for criminal trespass and retail theft), Santiago was sentenced to concurrent terms of 42 months' imprisonment on the three Hobbs Act and two felon-in-possession counts. Under then-applicable law, Santiago also received mandatory consecutive 60-month and 300-month terms for the 924(c) counts. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Circuit rejected Santiago’s section 2241 habeas petition in which he argued that the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” decision, required that his convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon be set aside. Santiago cannot show he was actually innocent of those charges as required to invoke the “saving” clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). In order to use section 2241 to avoid the restrictions on successive 2255 motions, he would need to show that no reasonable juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Santiago v. Streeval" on Justia Law

In 2014, Abebe, a Black woman of Ethiopian origin, began working for Eskenazi Health’s Dental Clinic as a dental assistant. Abebe has had a record of behavior issues throughout her employment; one annual review suggested that she “work on her personal issues that are affecting her interaction with co-workers.” Another review noted that “when she gets upset, her attitude turns to shocking.” Abebe’s 2018 performance review led to Abebe not receiving a merit-based raise, noting three incidents during which Abebe made accusations against co-workers. Abebe contacted the EEOC and alleged for the first time that she had experienced race- and national origin-based discrimination. Abebe claims Eskenazi Health placed her on a Performance Improvement Plan after she spoke to the EEOC. The parties dispute whether the Plan was actually issued or merely discussed. Eskenazi Health decided, a month later, not to impose the Plan.Abebe sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Eskenazi. Abebe cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, nor can she demonstrate that Eskenazi’s reason for the low scores on her performance review was pretextual. Abebe fails to establish a causal connection between her contact with the EEOC and the issuance of the Performance Improvement Plan, nor that issuing the Plan was an adverse employment action. View "Abebe v. Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County" on Justia Law

Illinois State University charges tuition and multiple fees; the Mandatory Fee covers the cost of on-campus facilities and programs. In 2020, after the Governor declared an emergency because of COVID-19 and issued an order forbidding many in-person gatherings, ISU shifted to distance learning over a video system. ISU remitted some but not all of the Mandatory Fee, telling students that the remainder includes the expense of facilities that must be supported no matter how educational services are provided. Two students filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Constitution does not ensure that states keep all of their promises, any more than it ensures that states observe all of their laws. A violation of a state law or a state contract is a violation of a state entitlement, for which the remedy lies under state law. . ISU lacked authority to violate the Governor’s orders. There was no due process violation because the students were not entitled to hearings. What the students want is substantive–a full refund. A breach of contract does not violate the Constitution. Suing ISU officials in their individual capacities makes no difference; there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. “Plaintiffs’ counsel should count themselves lucky that [those officials] did not seek sanctions for frivolous litigation. View "Thiele v. Board of Trustees of Illinois State University" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the state holds exclusive title to Lake Michigan and its shores up to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark. The plaintiffs, who own beachfront property on Lake Michigan’s Indiana shores, believed that their property extended to the low-water mark, and filed suit, alleging that the ruling amounted to a taking of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment–a “judicial taking.” The defendants were Indiana officeholders in their official capacities: the Governor, the Attorney General, the Department of Natural Resources Director, and the State Land Office Director.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. None of the named officials caused the plaintiffs’ asserted injury or is capable of redressing it, so the plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Pavlock v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

While imprisoned in Indiana, Lauderdale-El petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the loss of good-time credits resulting from a prison disciplinary conviction. His petition asserts that prison officials violated his due process rights in applying an Indiana Department of Correction policy rescinding previously restored good-time credits.The district court concluded that Lauderdale-El could challenge the restoration policy in state court, so it dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A). Lauderdale-El had exhausted administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that dismissal of a habeas corpus petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is a final and appealable judgment. Indiana law permits state-court review of Lauderdale-El’s claims. Because Lauderdale-El is still on parole, the court concluded that the matter was not moot. View "Lauderdale-El v. Indiana Parole Board" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker issued a series of executive orders that first required Illinois residents to shelter in place at their residences, compelled “non-essential” businesses temporarily to cease or reduce their operations and prohibited gatherings of more than 10 people (later increased to 50 people). Believing that these orders violated numerous provisions of the U.S. Constitution, several individuals joined with some Illinois businesses and sued the Governor in his official capacity. After granting the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, the district court found that they lacked standing to sue. The court also concluded that it would be futile to allow a second amendment because, even if it had erred about the existence of a justiciable case or controversy, the plaintiffs could not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. With respect to five out of six counts, the plaintiffs have not satisfied the criteria for Article III standing to sue. The remaining count attempts to state a claim under the Takings Clause. The business plaintiffs “may have squeaked by the standing bar” for that theory but have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Nowlin v. Pritzker" on Justia Law