Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Captain Van Lanen saw apparent contraband in Jackson’s cell and ordered a search, which uncovered prohibited items: bottles of unknown liquids, a hair pick, and documents containing the names and health information of other inmates. Van Lanen ordered the confiscation of the records, some of which belonged to inmate Jones. Jackson had the records because he was helping Jones prepare a civil rights lawsuit against Van Lanen and others. Jones sought to retrieve the paperwork, claiming the documents were privileged, confidential legal materials. Prison officials denied each request. Jones claims Van Lanen said: “you won’t get to use it to sue me with!” Jackson declined to support Jones’s claim. Captain Wickman found that much of the confiscated paperwork consisted not of legal materials but rather other inmates’ medical records, constituting contraband under prison policy, and ordered most of them destroyed. Jones invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated the First Amendment by confiscating and destroying the documents in an effort to retaliate against Jones for filing administrative grievances and taking steps to sue Van Lanen and that the document destruction deprived him of his right to access the courts.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the access to courts claim, agreeing that Jones had not identified any harm. Jones identified enough facts to get part of his remaining retaliation claim to trial. View "Jones v. Van Lanen" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury found Antonio and his brother guilty of first-degree homicide and a related firearms charge. The charges arose from the 2006 shooting death of a rival gang member. Antonio was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, without the possibility of release. Wisconsin courts affirmed Antonio’s conviction and denied his post-conviction petitions. Antonio sought federal habeas relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate his claim of self-defense, in advising him not to testify in support of that defense, and in neglecting to prepare him to testify, and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue the ineffective assistance claim on appeal.The district court denied Antonio’s petition, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting these claims was not an unreasonable application of “Strickland.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Antonio made the decision not to testify; his attorney warned Antonio that testifying could undermine his self-defense argument by allowing exploration of his actions that indicated guilt, including setting fire to his vehicle and fleeing the state, and would place in his hand the gun that was responsible for the fatal shooting. The court noted that Antonio’s testimony was not essential to his claim of self-defense. View "Shannon v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Rucker is serving a 240-month sentence. While awaiting a jail transfer in 2012, Rucker attacked another prisoner who had testified against him, slamming the man’s head against a concrete wall. In 2020, Rucker sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that he had an extraordinary and compelling reason for release—his medical conditions (obesity, hypertension, pre-diabetes, poor eyesight, possible sickle cell trait, and his then-current COVID-19 infection) and the spread of COVID-19 throughout the prison. He argued that early release was supported by 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, specifically his traumatic childhood during which his mother died and his father abused drugs, and his successful completion of anger management and drug abuse courses while in prison. Rucker’s criminal history included prior convictions for damage to property, battery, home invasion, and drug trafficking.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court’s assessment of Rucker’s COVID-19 risk was cursory but any error was harmless because the court acted within its broad discretion in finding that the 3553(a) factors did not favor release. The court highlighted the need to protect the public from further crimes and the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense and provide just punishment for the offense. "Recent events underscore the need for ... individualized arguments and evidence." View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainees Kemp, Dearborn, Galvez, and Lind-Enriquez had lived together in the cellblock without incident for several months when a fight broke out, with Kemp throwing the first punch. Officer Burget was patrolling the jail but, to avoid being considered a “snitch,” Kemp did not tell Burget about threats made before the fight. The fight ended with Kemp lying motionless on the floor. Officer Williams, conducting her rounds, saw Kemp lying on the floor and called for emergency medical services. The medics responded about eight minutes later. Kemp suffered severe injuries.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Kemp’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit on summary judgment. Although Burget had about 60% hearing loss in one ear and about 40% hearing loss in the other and was not wearing his prescribed hearing aid, the evidence did not indicate that his impaired hearing made any difference in the response to the beating. Nothing in the record would have put a reasonable guard on notice of a substantial risk of harm to Kemp. The court also rejected wrongful hiring and wrongful retention claims. View "Kemp v. Fulton County" on Justia Law

Reck, an Illinois Menard Correctional Center inmate, filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a prison physician (Dr. Trost), the Health Care Unit Administrator (Walls), a prison nurse (Smith), and Wexford Health Sources, which provides medical services to inmates under a contract. Reck developed a “painful perianal abscess with recurrent bloody discharge” because of his Crohn’s disease, which previously had been in remission. His condition caused him considerable pain and he alleges he submitted multiple sick call requests, most of which got no response. The defendants deny having received most of those requests. He suffered several burst abscesses.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found no indication that Dr. Trost ignored the gravity of Reck’s condition or “slow-walked” his treatment plan; neither Walls nor Smith was deliberately indifferent. Dr. Trost might have been negligent but a mere failure to attend to one’s responsibilities, without more, does not reach the level of deliberate indifference the Constitution prohibits. There is no evidence that Wexford, or any of its employees, had responsibility for the design, monitoring, or maintenance of the system of transmitting a prisoner’s sick call request. The court rejected challenges based on staffing. View "Reck v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Wades live in a second-floor apartment; the first-floor unit is a short flight of stairs up from ground level. Chicago Police officers were seeking Johnson, a purported heroin dealer. A confidential informant had identified the “second floor” of the Wades’ building as Johnson’s place of operations. Johnson actually lived on the first floor. No officer confirmed Johnson’s address, surveilled the building, or checked whether anybody else was living in the second-floor unit. Officers obtained a warrant for that unit, ascended both staircases, and kicked in the door. Wade was out. A family friend, Dotson, was at the apartment. Dotson’s account differs from police accounts. Dotson alleges that an officer planted narcotics on his person The officers say that upon entering the apartment they found Dotson and Nero inside. Both fled. Officers caught them on the back porch. Video evidence of the events was lost. A thorough search of the Wades’ apartment turned up no drugs. Large quantities of narcotics were discovered in the downstairs unit.The district court rejected the Wades' suit on summary judgment. Dotson’s claims were settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Wades have not identified evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to decide in their favor, Given the facially valid warrant and the lack of immediately self-evident ambiguity, the officers were entitled to enter the Wades’ apartment to search. View "Wade v. Ramos" on Justia Law

A John Doe informant stated that Taylor had showed the informant a gun inside Taylor’s apartment. Taylor was a felon. Chicago police officer Hughes secured a warrant to search Taylor’s apartment. On the record, no one knows Doe’s real name, contact information, or why he came forward Doe knew how to get to Taylor’s apartment, but not his address. Hughes made an incorrect guess. Officers entered Taylor’s apartment, which was not the apartment listed on the warrant. Officers found mail addressed in his name from which they learned the correct address. They found a different gun than was described by Doe. Officers found no evidence directly connecting Taylor to the bedroom in which the gun was found. Hughes initiated an alert for Taylor’s arrest. Taylor turned himself in and spent four months in jail before a court found the warrant invalid based on the address error and quashed his arrest. Despite Taylor’s acquittal, the arrest alert remained active. A month later, Taylor was again arrested.Taylor filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendant summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to officers who were not involved in procuring the warrant and affirmed summary judgment for the city on Taylor’s Monell claims relating to the investigative alerts policy and policy with respect to John Doe informants. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment for Hughes and remanded for a determination of damages. Hughes is entitled to good-faith immunity only if he could have “reasonably believed" that the search was authorized by a valid warrant. Hughes told the judge that he knew Taylor’s address; he did not. Hughes stated that there was probable cause to believe drugs would be found in the apartment; there was not. View "Taylor v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In 2003, Gamboa was convicted of seven counts of drug and firearm crimes. The court found that Gamboa had two or more prior convictions for felony drug offenses and was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). After an unsuccessful direct appeal and multiple 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions and 28 U.S.C. 2241 petitions, Gamboa sought habeas corpus relief under section 2241, arguing that, under the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision, his prior state drug convictions did not constitute felony drug offenses for the purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A)'s sentencing enhancement, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802(44). Mathis narrowed the range of state statutes that qualify as violent-felony predicates under the Armed Career Criminal Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Gamboa cannot seek relief under the saving clause gateway to section 2241 because, whether under the categorical approach or a comparison of the straightforward federal definition to the state statute of conviction, the law was not squarely against Gamboa and it would not have been futile for him to raise his arguments in his initial 2255 motion. Precedent did not prevent Gamboa from making an argument that an alternatively phrased statute could be indivisible under the categorical approach at the time of his initial 2255 motion. View "Gamboa v. Daniels" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of USS on plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, concluding that USS carried its burden to show that plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at its Midwest Plant. In this case, USS's judgment was premised on the consideration of adequate evidence, as contemplated by the ADA and supporting regulations. Furthermore, USS's imposition of restrictions was based on information pertinent to plaintiff's personal experience with his seizure disorder. Therefore, the assessment USS conducted was sufficiently individualized. The court agreed with the district court that whether plaintiff's seizure disorder was controlled is a material fact about which there is no genuine dispute.Applying the direct threat analysis and weighing factors such as duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of harm that will occur, and imminence of harm, the court concluded that all the factors weigh in favor of finding that there is a direct threat. Therefore, USS has shown through undisputed evidence that, if hired for the Utility Person position, plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at the Midwest Plant. View "Pontinen v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Barbee sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018. Barbee suffers from Type II diabetes, hypertension, and obesity, and is serving his sentence at a facility that experienced a large outbreak of COVID-19 infections around the time that Barbee filed his motions. He argued that his medical conditions placed him at significant risk of contracting COVID-19 and contended that he had used his time in prison productively, completing a drug abuse program, passing two parts of the GED test, and taking classes. He had one disciplinary incident two years earlier.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Barbee had the burden of establishing extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting release and the request must be consistent with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing considerations. The court noted Barbee’s extensive criminal history, the seriousness of his most recent offense, the relatively small portion of his sentence that he had served, and that Barbee had received two doses of the Moderna vaccine. Although Barbee argued that he remains at risk as the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve, he did not present any evidence establishing that he is more at risk for an adverse outcome in prison than he would be if released. View "United States v. Barbee" on Justia Law