Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Olson arrived in Madison, Wisconsin during the second night of violent civil unrest following the death of George Floyd and armed himself with a gun. Three Madison Police officers observed Olson take the gun from the trunk of his car, then apprehended Olson, who was a felon, retrieved the gun, and placed him under arrest, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Olson attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the gun.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. Olson’s initial seizure was a Terry stop, not a de facto arrest. Given the unique circumstances of the night, the officers’ use of force when approaching Olson “was eminently justifiable.” They saw Olson conceal a gun in the waistband of his pants; saw Olson drinking from a “tallboy” style, suggesting Olson could be intoxicated; and saw Olson carefully scrutinize his surroundings, which suggested avoiding detection. The officers reasonably suspected Olson was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity while the city was experiencing an almost complete collapse of civil order. Any omissions or inaccuracies in the officers’ contemporaneous reports are plausibly explained by their sleep deprivation and stress. View "United States v. Olson" on Justia Law

Thurston was convicted of felony rape after his DNA was matched to cigarette butts found in the park that was the scene of the crime. Thurston claimed that his attorney did not object to the admission of a report summarizing the DNA analysis of the cigarettes because the defense attorney did not notice that the report also identified Thurston’s DNA as matching a “sperm fraction” collected in “case IP06051889”—another rape for which Thurston was charged. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, reasoning that the reference to the sperm fraction was “too vague” to “support the forbidden [propensity] inference.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, finding that the Indiana decision was not an “unreasonable application of” the Supreme Court’s Strickland decision. The Indiana Court of Appeals was entitled to presume that the jury would not disobey its instructions and speculate about the reference to case ‐889. View "Thurston v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

Lesiv works for the Illinois Central Railroad. His brother, Lyubomir, had also worked there but left shortly after he filed a discrimination and retaliation charge against Illinois Central. Lyubomir later filed a discrimination suit in state court; Lesiv testified in a 2018 deposition. Almost three months later, his supervisors gave Lesiv a dangerous work assignment and suspended him after he refused to complete it. Lesiv asserts that Illinois Central violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by direct individual retaliation because he testified in his brother’s lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and by third-party retaliation, to harm his brother in retaliation for his brother’s charges.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Illinois Central on both claims. A retaliation claim requires proof that the employer took a “materially adverse” action against an employee because he engaged in protected activity or because another person close to him did so. A jury could find here that the dangerous work assignment and the suspension amounted to materially adverse actions but could not find retaliatory motives. Lesiv had no evidence that his supervisors took these actions against him because of his or his brother’s protected activities. None of the relevant supervisors knew that Lesiv had engaged in protected activity by testifying in his brother’s lawsuit. View "Lesiv v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Green Bay Police Department officers arrested Tubby and transported him to jail for booking. In the jail’s secure entryway, Tubby became non-compliant, refusing to exit the squad car and concealing one hand under his shirt while threatening to “do it” if officers came any closer. The officers called for backup. Tubby was eventually forced out of the car with pepper spray. He kept one hand under his shirt in a manner that, to officers, indicated he had a weapon. Exiting the squad car, Tubby refused to surrender but instead rushed toward the exit in an apparent escape attempt. An officer heard a “pop” that he believed to be a gunshot coming from the weapon he presumed Tubby was hiding and discharged his firearm eight times, hitting Tubby with five shots. Tubby died. His estate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The officer’s conduct did not violate Tubby’s constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures; qualified immunity shields the officer from liability. The officer’s conduct was reasonable, given that Tubby intentionally led the officers to believe he was armed and ready to “do it.” View "Doxtator v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

While incarcerated in Cook County Jail, Thomas was assaulted by another inmate. Seventeen months later, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal statutes against Sheriff Dart, Cook County, and other Jail personnel, including corrections officers to whom he allegedly reported the inmate’s threat of violence. All of his claims were either dismissed or resolved against Thomas on summary judgment.Years after litigation began, Thomas sought to amend his complaint for a third time to name as defendants intake clerks who screened him at the Jail; he alleged they purposely omitted from intake forms that he suffered from mental health problems and that this omission led to his assault. The court denied the motion to amend. Thomas challenged the denial of that motion, asserting that the ruling demonstrated the court’s bias against him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment Thomas sought would have been futile and no bias against Thomas can reasonably be inferred from the district court’s adverse rulings. Thomas did not state a viable claim. Without more, simply being housed in the Jail’s general population, even while suffering from PTSD, is not a particular enough risk in the failure-to-protect context. View "Thomas v. Dart" on Justia Law

In 2006, an ATF agent posed as a drug courier and recruited Blitch and others to steal cocaine from a fictional drug cartel stash house. On the night the robbery was planned to take place, an ATF team arrested the men. On retrial, a jury found them guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in excess of five kilograms, 21 U.S.C. 846; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); and being felons in possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1). Blitch was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 25 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.In 2016, Blitch moved, pro see, to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, challenging the application of a sentencing enhancement based on his prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. More than a year after the denial of that petition, Blitch moved to reopen judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The district court denied the motion, finding it to be in substance a successive 2255 petition, which could only be brought if the Court of Appeals certified that it rested on newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even without the additional restrictions applicable to successive habeas corpus petitions, Blitch’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion, alleging mistake, was subject to a one-year time constraint. View "Blitch v. United States" on Justia Law

King, who was sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to three heroin charges, sought compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), To establish the required “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” King cited intervening Seventh Circuit precedent (Ruth), which held that a conviction under an Illinois law does not count as a prior cocaine conviction for purposed of certain federal recidivist enhancements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. There is nothing “extraordinary” about new statutes or caselaw, or a claim that the sentencing judge erred in applying the Guidelines; these ordinary legal issues should be addressed by direct appeal or collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statements contemplate the release of prisoners afflicted by severe medical conditions or risks, experiencing a family emergency, or otherwise in unusual personal circumstances. They do not hint that the sort of legal developments routinely addressed by direct or collateral review qualify a person for compassionate release. That the First Step Act lowered sentences for some cocaine crimes, enabled prisoners to seek compassionate release on their own motions, and more, did not modify the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” threshold for eligibility. King’s effort to use “Ruth” as a door opener under the compassionate-release statute is foreclosed by other decisions. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Westfield amended its ordinance governing signs within city limits. Out of a stated concern for public safety and aesthetics, the ordinance requires those wishing to install a sign or billboard to apply for a permit. The ordinance exempts directional signs, scoreboards, particular flags, and notices on gas pumps and vending machines. It prohibits signs on poles and those advertising ideas, products, or services not offered on the same premises (off-premises signs). Those seeking to install a non-compliant sign may appeal the denial of a permit or, if necessary, request a variance. GEFT applied for a permit to build a large digital billboard on private property along U.S. Highway 31 in Westfield. Because of the proposed sign’s off-premises location and use of a pole, Westfield denied GEFT’s application and subsequent variance request.GEFT sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit previously upheld a restraining order compelling GEFT to cease all actions to install its proposed billboard pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court later granted GEFT summary judgment and permanently enjoined Westfield from enforcing many aspects of its ordinance. The Seventh Circuit remanded for consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in “City of Austin v. Reagan National;” the fact that the city must read a sign to evaluate its conformity with regulations is not alone determinative of whether the regulation is content-based. View "GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield" on Justia Law

Kingman, Rhinelander Wisconsin’s Director of Public Works, spoke at a City Council meeting with a declaration of no confidence in a colleague. Rhinelander investigated Kingman’s contentions and found them without merit. In the process, however, third-party investigators discovered that Kingman himself had not only mistreated his employees but also had gone so far as to retaliate against those who had complained about the toxic work environment he created in his department.Kingman was fired and filed a lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the termination reflected retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights at the City Council meeting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Rhinelander and individual defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the Council’s vote to fire Kingman reflected unlawful retaliation. Regardless of whether Kingman spoke to the council as a private citizen or in connection with his employment, Kingman’s behavior toward his subordinates is just the type of “significant intervening event” and seriously “inappropriate workplace behavior” that separates an employee’s protected activity “from the adverse employment action he receives.” View "Kingman v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

In 2017 Nigro, a certified nurse anesthetist, began working at Riley Hospital. Division Director, Dr. Sadhasivam, recruited her and started implementing a new team-based care model. Within a year, an internal investigation revealed department-wide concern over the model’s efficacy and impact on team dynamics. Some employees believed that Sadhasivam’s leadership style resulted in a tense workplace. In 2017-2019, Nigro was the subject of multiple complaints, mostly concerning her attitude and ability to work on a team. Coworkers described her as “rude, snappy and belittling,” with management expressing concern that her behavior undermined the department’s already delicate atmosphere of collegiality. After investigating the complaints, hospital decision-makers issued a “coaching memorandum” to Nigro. A month later, it was determined that Nigro had engaged in timekeeping fraud by not working at times when she had been clocked in, Sadhasivam and three female administrators, agreed to terminate her for misconduct.Nigro filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), alleging sex-based discrimination and retaliation because of a supportive affidavit she had signed in another employee’s discrimination case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There is neither direct nor indirect evidence to support Nigro’s Title VII claim. View "Nigro v. Indiana University Health Care" on Justia Law