Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The School District includes four high schools. Groves, who is white, started at the District in 1991 as a teacher. In 2007 he became the Adams High School athletic director. In 2017 Groves applied to serve as Corporation Director of Athletics, a new, District-wide position. Superintendent Spells interviewed four applicants and recommended Gavin, who is Black, explaining that Gavin inspired confidence in his ability to repair the District’s relationship with the Indiana High School Athletic Association; Groves interviewed poorly and seemed to boast of firing 24 coaches during his tenure. Noncompliance with Association regulations occurred under Groves’s watch at Adams.Groves sued under Title VII, noting that Spells is also Black. The District later eliminated the Corporation Director of Athletics position and created a hybrid Dean of Students/Athletics position at each of the four high schools. Groves, Gavin, and seven other candidates applied for the four new positions. The Riley High School position went to Gavin. Groves added a claim of retaliation based on the elimination of his position. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary rejection of his claims. Groves was not substantially more qualified than Gavin. Both met the criteria that the District required for the position. The court rejected a claim of pretext. Although Gavin’s criminal background came to light after the challenged hiring decisions, the District interpreted its background check policy as applying only to external hires, not existing employees moving to new positions. View "Groves v. South Bend Community School Corp." on Justia Law

Runkel worked as the assistant purchasing agent for Springfield, Illinois. The purchasing agent announced that he planned to leave the position. Runkel, who is white, unsuccessfully sought a promotion to that job. The city promoted a Black candidate, Wilkin, who had worked under Runkel’s supervision. Runkel was offered a $5,000 per year raise but nonetheless stated that she believed the hiring was discriminatory; she caused a disturbance in the office. Runkel filed a race discrimination charge with the EEOC. Runkel was disciplined and the promised raise was revoked. She retired and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a), and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The city told incompatible stories about how and why Wilkin was chosen for promotion and Runkel was not. One version relied explicitly upon race as a factor. Regarding Runkel’s retaliation claim, the explanation for disciplining Runkel and taking away the promised raise also involves genuine questions of material fact. Her disruptive response to the denial of the promotion could warrant discipline, but giving Runkel the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences from it, a reasonable jury could find that Springfield’s stated nondiscriminatory justifications for the promotion decision are pretextual and that it retaliated against Runkel for claiming discrimination. View "Runkel v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Rodriguez was arrested for domestic violence. He gave the police his brother’s name and date of birth. He was convicted and sentenced to probation. Although the court had learned Rodriguez’s real name, the judgment of conviction listed “Ely M. Martinez” as an alias for Rodriguez and listed Martinez’s date of birth. Rodriguez failed to report for probation. An arrest warrant was issued with the same information as the judgment. Years later, police arrested Martinez for an unrelated offense and booked him in the Milwaukee County Jail on a Wednesday. The next day, the district attorney decided not to press charges but a warrant check revealed the outstanding warrant for Rodriguez. Although jail officials made efforts to positively identify the detainee, he was not released until Tuesday morning.Martinez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming due process violations. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Martinez’s detention was relatively brief and Martinez could not show that the defendants failed to investigate or ignored evidence of his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the defendants could have improved aspects of their investigation, Martinez has not provided evidence showing that they were deliberately indifferent to his claims of mistaken identity. View "Martinez v. Santiago" on Justia Law

S.B., age 13, lived with his mother in Michigan and visited relatives in Indiana. S.B.’s uncle, Hinkle, isolated and molested S.B. during two visits. By the time he was 17, S.B. used opiates and marijuana regularly and had experimented with heroin. During a family meeting to address his drug use, S.B. admitted his drug use and that Hinkle had molested him.Hinkle was charged with child molesting, sexual misconduct with a minor, and being a repeat sexual offender. Hinkle’s counsel opposed a motion to exclude evidence of S.B.’s drug use, arguing the evidence was relevant to show S.B.’s motive to fabricate allegations. The court ruled that it would not allow evidence of S.B.’s drug use except to show that it interfered with his ability to recall relevant events. At trial, Hinkle’s counsel unsuccessfully argued (outside the jury’s presence) that S.B. had falsely accused Hinkle to avoid facing consequences when his family confronted him for using narcotics. The jury heard evidence that S.B. “ha[d] a habit of playing family members against each other,” and was “really good at lying.” S.B. testified that he had convictions for credit card fraud, auto theft, and retail fraud.Hinkle was convicted and sentenced to 42 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition. The Court of Appeals of Indiana did not unreasonably apply federal constitutional law in upholding the exclusion of evidence of S.B.’s drug use. View "Hinkle v. Neal" on Justia Law

Meyers was one of seven men convicted of the 1989 gang-related murders of Williams and Kaufman in Chicago. In 1995, after Meyers’ conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction, arguing that his trial counsel, Nichols, was ineffective for failing to investigate the scene of the shooting and to establish that a witness, Wilson, would not have been able to see the shooters from his second-floor vantage point. Pointing to Wilson’s post-trial recantation, Meyers added that he was wrongfully convicted based on Wilson’s perjured trial testimony and the prosecution’s subornation to commit perjury. Meyers also argued that his trial counsel, Nichols, was ineffective in failing to interview and present the alibi testimony of Parker. The Illinois appellate court rejected his claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition. The Illinois Appellate Court did not unreasonably apply “Strickland” in rejecting his claim that Nichols was ineffective for failing to interview and present Parker’s alibi testimony. The risk that the defense would have taken by pursuing that alibi, which contradicted statements made by Nichols after his arrest, is obvious. The state court reasonably determined that his conviction was not based on the knowing use of perjured testimony. View "Meyers v. Gomez" on Justia Law

During a 3:30 am encounter, while South Bend Officer O’Neill was investigating reports that someone was stealing from parked cars, Logan picked up a hunting knife and approached O’Neill. The officer told Logan to stand still and put down the weapon. Logan held the knife up, came within three steps of O’Neill, and threw the knife, hitting O’Neill in the arm. O’Neill fired his gun, hitting Logan in the torso. O’Neill called for an ambulance, but Logan died at a hospital.The district court rejected Logan's estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that one of O’Neill’s multiple descriptions of the events implies that Logan threw the knife a second or so before O’Neill pulled the trigger and that O’Neill was safe (Logan was no longer armed) or that a jury might doubt O’Neill’s version of events because he did not activate his body camera and has been convicted of ghost employment. The physical evidence, such as the bullet track, is consistent with O’Neill’s account. Disbelief of the only witness is not proof that the opposite of the witness’s statements is true. “The fact that many shootings by police eliminate an important source of evidence is troubling, but litigation remains tied to the record," which compels a decision for O’Neill. View "Estate of Eric Jack Logan v. City of South Bend" on Justia Law

In 2016, law enforcement agents, with a search warrant, broke open the doors and windows of Rodriguez’s home, threw a flash-bang grenade into the living room where his one-year-old daughter was sleeping, and searched for illegal drugs. Rodriguez was arrested and convicted in state court. Rodriguez sued 14 defendants under “Bivens” and 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming they provided false information to the judge who issued the warrant and executed the search in an unreasonable manner. Two defendants were identified by codes that Rodriguez received in his criminal proceeding. The judge dismissed 13 defendants as not properly identified and granted the remaining defendant summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. A plaintiff who uses “placeholders” ordinarily must substitute identified defendants before the statute of limitations expires. A plaintiff may be able to replace or add defendants after the limitations period by using the relation-back doctrine of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C), which applies because “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out … in the original pleading.” Rule 4(m) requires service of the complaint and summons within 90 days after the complaint’s filing unless the plaintiff shows good cause for the delay. Not until the district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A was service possible; by then the 90 days, and the statute of limitations, had expired. Delays required by section 1915A constitute “good cause” under Rule 4(m) for belated service, which increases the time for Rule 15(c) relation back. View "Rodriguez v. McCloughen" on Justia Law

A person arrested in Chicago can take some property into jail but must surrender other property, including cell phones. The detainee has 30 days to reclaim the property in person (if released) or by a designated friend or relative. Property remaining in the city’s hands after 30 days is sold or thrown away. In 2021, the Seventh Circuit (Conyers), rejected several constitutional challenges to that policy. Kelley-Lomax remained in custody for more than 30 days and did not have anyone retrieve his property. The city disposed of a cell phone and a wallet, including a debit card and library card, that the police had seized.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. The disposition of the seized property is governed by the Due Process Clause. Chicago provides detainees with notice and an opportunity to reclaim their property. Rejecting a substantive due process argument, the court reasoned that property is a fundamental right but property can be abandoned. Chicago draws the abandonment line at 30 days. Physical items seized from arrested persons make claims on limited space, and for many detainees, the costs of arranging a sale to free up space would exceed the value of the items in inventory. View "Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2010, Scaife, an African-American woman, began working as a specialist classifying VA jobs. Scaife received “Outstanding” or “Excellent” ratings on her annual performance reviews. After a few years, Earp, a white male, became Scaife’s immediate supervisor. Scaife claims he mistreated women employees. In 2016, Earp told Scaife and another black female that he wanted them to classify positions higher if told to do so. When Scaife inquired whether doing so would violate regulations, Earp became “aggressive.” Scaife inquired about the process for addressing a hostile work environment and sent text messages to Earp’s supervisor. After an incident during which another white male referred to Scaife as a "N-----," Scaife filed EEO charges. Scaife received a formal counseling email. Scaife later accepted an offer for the same classifier position at a California VA center, which allowed her to work remotely.Scaife sued under Title VII, claiming a race and gender-based hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the VA. Given the totality of circumstances, Scaife failed to show that the one-time use of the N-word outside of her presence established a hostile work environment based on race. Scaife failed to show harassment based on gender, that the alleged conduct was severe or pervasive, or that she endured a hostile work environment based on both race and gender. Absent evidence that she suffered an adverse action, Scaife cannot establish retaliation. View "Scaife v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

White injured his knee while incarcerated and playing basketball at an Illinois prison in June 2015. From the date of his injury through November 2017, White complained about knee pain to various prison nurses and doctors, including Nurse Practitioner Woods and Doctor David, who met White’s complaints with “conservative” treatment. White did not receive an MRI for his knee until December 2017. The MRI revealed that White had a serious knee injury that required surgery.White filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Woods, David, and the prison’s healthcare provider, Wexford, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed White’s claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. The district court improperly granted Woods and David summary judgment on White’s deliberate indifference claims; the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to White shows a factual dispute. A jury could find that Woods’s decisions not to perform a complete examination on White and not to refer White to David, for an MRI or anything else, for nearly seven weeks were deliberately indifferent. A jury could conclude that he unreasonably delayed necessary treatment for White’s knee injury by continuing a conservative care regimen. View "White v. Woods" on Justia Law