Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, employed by the department of public works since 1972, publicly criticized the city's decision to purchase a certain brand of tractor and indicated that board members were influenced to purchase the more-expensive tractors by having been taken on an expenses-paid visit to the company's plant. A letter was published in the local paper and the board ultimately changed its decision. After the debate, the plaintiff's subordinates were promoted over him and his applications for promotion were denied. The district court rejected First Amendment retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the plaintiff made his public comments in the context of performing his job. When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.

Nurses sued their former employer, a privately-operated jail, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging racial discrimination and hostile work environment. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record concerning plaintiffs' allegations about references to monkeys and skin color, clothing marked by the confederate flag, and disparate treatment, was insufficient to establish a triable issue of hostile environment. With respect to other claims of discrimination, the plaintiffs did not establish a materially adverse employment action. State law whistleblower claims failed because the plaintiffs failed to allege violation of federal, state, or local law or misuse of public resources.

Defendant, convicted five times of felonies--murder, attempted murder (twice), aggravated battery, and domestic battery--and several times of other offenses, including unlawfully possessing firearms, participated in a shoot-out in 2009 and was prosecuted for unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court declined to sentence him as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which carries a 15-year minimum term, reasoning that four of the five convictions could not count. When defendant's parole on murder and aggravated battery convictions expired, officials sent him a letter saying that his civil rights to vote and hold office had been restored automatically. The letter did not state that Illinois does not restore the right to possess firearms. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the defendant had three countable felonies. The letter's inclusion of a date on which parole ended ties the letter to a single sentence and implies that rights have been restored only with respect to convictions underlying that sentence. Defendant did not receive such letters for other convictions.

The inmate, placed in the most restrictive disciplinary segment of the prison for 240 days due to misconduct in another segment, filed suit. On remand, after the Seventh Circuit held that the case did implicate a constitutional "liberty" interest, the inmate provided no evidence of how conditions in the disciplinary segment differ from conditions for the general population. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the inmate had the burden of proof in the civil proceedings.

In 1995 the city gave an examination for positions in its fire department and rated applicants on a scale between highly qualified and not qualified, based on scores. "Qualified" applicants were told that they were unlikely to be hired. From 1996 through 2001, the city hired random batches from the well-qualified pool. In 1997 a person in the qualified pool filed a charge of discrimination, claiming disparate impact on African-American applicants (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)). After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, applicants filed a class action in 1998. After a trial, the court rejected a business necessity defense and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On remand, after the Supreme Court held that most of the claims were timely, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city conceded that the cut-off score in the ranking system had a disparate impact, so each "batch" hiring had a similar impact. While hiring according to a list, perhaps hiring highest scorers first, might have served a business necessity, the random selection of batches amounted to repeated "use" of a tool that created disparate impact.

The union represents housekeepers at a hotel owned by the village. After the union staged a mock funeral procession on the premises, police blocked efforts to stage a second protest on August 31, 2009. After the union filed suit, it was denied permission to distribute pamphlets at the entry to the hotel (November incident). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the village. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the record clearly indicated that the union had dropped its claims with respect to the August 31 demonstration. At the time of the summary judgment motion, the union had not attempted to file a supplementary pleading to cover the November incident.

Former captains from the Illinois Department of Corrections sued state and union officials, alleging that the defendants unlawfully punished them for seeking to organize with a rival union. The district court entered summary for the defendants, including a decision that the governor was protected by immunity. The governor's line-item veto of funding for captains' positions was legislative in nature and, therefore, protected by immunity and the plaintiffs failed to tie the governor to any allegedly-retaliatory actions before or after the veto. The decision to eliminate the middle management position at issue was a policy decision, unlike hiring or firing a particular individual, regardless of the subsequent creation of a new, similar position. The captains did not show how deposing the governor or more extensive deposition of the deputy chief of staff would lead to relevant evidence on the immunity issue. That two unions were competing to represent the captains did not establish a conspiracy between one of the unions and the administration with respect to determining the seniority of captains who took positions as corrections officers after their positions were eliminated.

A former high school teacher and union president was fired for allegedly viewing pornography on school computers. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on an assertion that the firing was retaliation for union activity. Before terminating the teacher's employment, the school district held an open hearing at which the teacher was allowed to present evidence and witnesses. He did not refute the charges, but only issued an apology; he has had all of the process he is due. With respect to First Amendment retaliation claims, the court stated that the relationship between the union and the district was "contentious, combative, and miserable," but that the district had an independent, legitimate reason for the termination.

A jury rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arising from an incident at the county jail during which the plaintiff, an inmate, was injured. The district court denied a motion for new trial. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court was obligated to consider the same evidence considered by the jury and determine whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court's statement that it would not set aside the verdict âunless the testimony is such that reasonable persons could not believe it, because it contradicts indisputable physical facts or lawsâ indicated that the court applied the wrong standard.

After exhausting state appeals of his conviction and 240-year sentence for a 2004 Indiana home invasion that resulted in four deaths, the defendant unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The prosecution's witnesses included a participant in the crime, who testified as part of a plea bargain, and police officers, who testified about a "tip" that led them to the defendant. The double-hearsay testimony of the officers, which included statements supposedly made by the defendant to the tipster, was admitted on the theory that it was offered, not for the truth of the matters asserted, but to show the course of the investigation. The court did not instruct the jury of the limited purpose of the testimony. The double-hearsay testimony was, "beyond reasonable dispute," offered to establish the truth of the statements made, in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The prosecution went to great lengths to establish the credibility of the absent tipster. The state court incorrectly applied the "course of investigation" exception; there was no attempt to appropriately limit the testimony or instruct the jury. The testimony had a substantial, injurious impact.