Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Decedent was arrested on June 10, 2006, and pronounced dead at about 1:30 a.m. on June 12. She died of heart arrhythmia while in lockup. The evidence showed that she experienced severe abdominal pain throughout her confinement and that officers did not respond to pleas for help. A jury found that four police officers violated the Illinois Wrongful Death Act 740 ILCS 180, which requires proof of negligence, and the federal Constitution, 42 U.S.C. 1983, which requires proof of intentional wrong-doing or deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, by allowing decedent to suffer untreated pain. The award was $5,000,000 in compensatory and $4,000 in punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to liability, but vacated and remanded the award. The district court erred in excluding evidence of the decedent's addiction and criminal history to show her life prospects, relevant to calculation of damages.

Subdivision residents claimed that a retention pond's problems with algae, mosquitoes, and flooding would be exacerbated by proposed expansion of the subdivision. The residents, most of whom are African-American, claimed that the town was unresponsive to their concerns, but responded to similar concerns from white residents of another subdivision. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, as modified. The residents did not have any evidence that a subdivision, similar except for the race of the residents, was treated differently, but relied solely on allegations. State law claims should have been dismissed, not remanded.

Plaintiff claims that in 2005 county officials told his mobile home park tenants to stop paying rent and vacate. In 2006 the health department obtained a court order to remove the remaining 13 units. Plaintiff claims that he did not appeal because he is bipolar and the county caused him stress. The owner alleges numerous illegal actions in connection with the demolition of the units and that the sheriff refused to investigate. In 2009 and 2010 the district court dismissed claims and amended claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the two-year Indiana statute of limitations. The court rejected claims of fraudulent concealment of conspiracy; the owner did not state facts sufficient to establish post-2007 conspiracy.

A sergeant was asked by town supervisors to investigate charges of "double dipping" against the police chief, who reportedly told the sergeant that he would "get him." The sergeant was acting chief while the chief was on administrative leave. Although independent investigation substantiated the sergeant's report, the chief was reinstated and began to work on retribution, ranging from "slights" to defamatory statements made to cause criminal prosecution. The sergeant took medical leave and did not return to work before the police department was disbanded. The district court granted a motion to dismiss that claimed qualified immunity and that the sergeant's complaint did not adequately allege constitutional violations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that the sergeant failed to establish good cause for modifying the scheduling order to permit amendment of the complaint. The sergeant failed to respond to "myriad" arguments presented in the motion to dismiss.

For nearly three decades, Chicago had ordinances effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. In 2008 the Supreme Court struck down a similar District of Columbia law . After Chicago's ban was found to be unconstitutional, the city enacted a Responsible Gun Owner's Ordinance that mandates one hour of range training as a prerequisite to lawful gun ownership, but prohibits all firing ranges in the city. The district court denied an injunction to prevent enforcement. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the challenge has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, that the loss of Second Amendment rights cannot be remedied by an award of damages, and that the city's claim of harm to the public interest was based entirely on speculation. Harm to a constitutional right is not measured by the extent to which it can be exercised in another jurisdiction.

Officers, staking out a suspected drug operation, saw plaintiff (known to them) driving a car, ran a search, and learned that his license was suspended. They later filled out a ticket and obtained a warrant. Three weeks later, officers approached plaintiff at a barbecue at his apartment. Plaintiff asserted that his car was not running at the time of the observation, then started to back away, waving his arms. The officers used pepper spray, twice, several seconds apart, then transported plaintiff to the station. He was acquitted on the driving charges and of resisting a peace officer. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Actions recorded by a video camera showed that a reasonable officer could have believed that petitioner was resisting. His freedom was not actually curtailed until that resistance ended, so the arrest was not wrongful, regardless of the facts underlying the original warrant. It would not have been obvious to a reasonable police officer under the circumstances that application of pepper spray was unlawful.

Responding to a domestic violence call in an apartment building, officers attempted to follow the suspect through the building and encountered plaintiff, mother of the suspect, and searched her apartment. The district court rejected her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.Because the officers presented evidence of exigent circumstances, the only question was whether plaintiff had met her burden of showing that the police did not reasonably believe that her son would be found in plaintiff's apartment. The district courtâs instruction on burden of proof correctly and clearly stated the law. A question asked of an officer: "At the time that youâre moving through [the] apartment, did you believe [plaintiff's son] was moving to the rear of the building?" did not call for subjective assessment of reasonableness of officers' actions, given the circumstances.The testimony provided a sufficient basis from which the jury could conclude that the officers reasonably believed that a suspect was behind the door of what turned out to be plaintiff's apartment.

An African-American salesperson was fired after his white boss concluded that the salesperson violated the company's zero-tolerance employee guidelines by processing a noncommissionable transaction as a commissionable one. The salesperson was reinstated after the customer whose transaction was allegedly botched clarified the type of service he had requested. Shortly after he returned to work, the company made changes to its compensation scheme that the salesperson believed adversely affected his future earnings potential. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981(a) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employee did not demonstrate a real link between the bigotry and an adverse employment action. A rational jury could not infer from this evidence that the compensation plan was enacted for discriminatory reasons or that the company unlawfully retaliated against the employee.

In 1997 petitioner shot and killed four men; he was sentenced to death. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the sentence. On remand the court reimposed the death sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner waived state post-conviction relief after the court found him competent to forego further challenges to his sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He changed his mind. The trial court dismissed a petition for post-conviction relief as untimely; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The federal district court granted habeas relief, holding that the prosecutor violated the Sixth Amendment by offering to forego the death penalty if petitioner would waive a jury trial, and ordered resentencing. The Seventh Circuit reversed without considering petitioner's additional claims. The U.S. Supreme Court twice vacated the Seventh Circuit's decisions. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district courtâs judgment granting habeas relief on the basis of the claimed Sixth Amendment violation; affirmed that Indiana courts did not mishandle the issue of competence to waive post-conviction remedies; and remanded for consideration of remaining grounds for habeas relief.

Plaintiff was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to three consecutive 30-year terms to begin after a 28-year sentence for an unrelated conviction. Five years later, DNA testing revealed a match to plaintiff's uncle. Plaintiff's conviction was vacated. He sued the city and two officers, alleging malicious prosecution and due process violations (Brady v. Maryland) under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was ample probable cause to commence proceedings against plaintiff, apart from the victim's identification: shoe prints in snow leading from the crime scene to plaintiffâs residence; wet shoes in the house; no other male present when police arrived; plaintiff behind the residence holding jeans that matched the victim's description; plaintiff's wallet in those jeans; and an alibi that did not check out. Plaintiff had no evidence of malice and the officers enjoy state-law immunity, because there was no willful and wanton conduct. Even if police failed to disclose "pressure" they put on the victim to identify plaintiff during a "show-up," there is no evidence that they coerced her to lie; it is unlikely that the result would have been different if the pressure had been disclosed.