Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of robbery and forgery in state court, filed a state court motion challenging his sentence. The motion was denied, as was his request for appointed counsel. The federal district court rejected a habeas corpus petition and denied a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit granted a COA to consider the unresolved, substantial constitutional issue of whether petitioner was entitled to counsel in the state proceeding. Whether the proceeding is characterized correctly as direct or collateral presents a necessary antecedent non-constitutional question.

Plaintiff received a written warning from his supervisor for failing to complete a task and went to management to complain. The complaint triggered a series of events that led to his discharge. He sued his former employer, complaining of racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as discriminatory discharge, discriminatory employment actions, and retaliatory discharge, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but reversed as to the retaliatory discharge claim. The sum of the circumstantial evidence, including past discrimination, the investigation, and a "race card" statement, would not allow a rational jury to conclude that racial discrimination caused the firing. The evidence did not show that any similarly situated person actually received better treatment than plaintiff. Plaintiff did not prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence, but his history of complaints and the "race card" statement were enough to allow the retaliation claim to survive summary judgment.

Seeing that plaintiff was not wearing a seatbelt, the officer followed him to a store where plaintiff worked, arriving at 5:57 p.m.. Plaintiff, due at work at 6:00 p.m., sped into the parking lot. The officer pulled in behind him and activated his emergency lights. Plaintiff did not respond, so the officer drove the squad car between him and the store, then followed him toward the store and grabbed him. Plaintiff did not stop, but ran to the store. The officer used his taser. Apparently plaintiff continued to struggle and the officer used handcuffs and pepper spray. Plaintiff was fired. He filed suit for excessive force and false arrest under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The officer counter-sued for battery. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding against the officer on his battery claim, against plaintiff on his false arrest claim, and for plaintiff on his excessive force claim, but granting only nominal damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury could reasonably have believed that the tasering was justifiable and the judge acted within his discretion in denying attorney fees in a suit seeking to redress a private injury and based on an isolated incident.

Plaintiff was one of the first female custodians hired by the Chicago Public Schools in 1981 and, in 2004, qualified to oversee custodial operations at large school buildings. She clashed with her new boss, who declined requests to work the morning shift and suspended plaintiff without pay three times. Plaintiff filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging gender, race, age, and disability discrimination and retaliation. When she received her right-to-sue letter, she sued her boss and the Board of Education. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that there were material issues of fact for trial. Defendants offered facially nondiscriminatory reasons for the three suspensions, the only relevant employment decisions for purposes of the discrimination claim. A reasonable jury would not have found the reasons pretextual. With respect to a retaliation claim, a notice of disciplinary action and hours restriction could be viewed as adverse employment actions and those actions were close in time to plaintiff's EEOC deposition.

Plaintiff, Green County's chief juvenile-intake worker from 1997-2008, alleged that Green County (county) deprived her of a property interest in her job without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, where the county Board of Supervisors removed the juvenile-intake position from the auspices of the circuit court and created a new juvenile-intake position within the Human Services Department. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The court concluded that the evidence indicated that the county reorganized to save costs and, had the county reorganized merely to terminate plaintiff's employment, its decision to rehire her for the new position would be inexplicable. The court also concluded that because nothing in the record suggested that saving money was a pretext for something else, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the county eliminated plaintiff's court-attached juvenile-intake position in conjunction with a legitimate governmental reorganization. Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to due process and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Inmates filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the Indiana Department of Corrections violated their First Amendment Rights by prohibiting them from advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials from websites and publications that allow persons to advertise for pen-pals. The prohibition was enacted in response to an investigation of the link between pen-pal correspondence and inmate fraud. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the IDOC. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs conceded that preventing prisoners from developing relationships with outsiders in order to defraud them by inducing financial contributions is a legitimate governmental objective. The prohibitions are reasonably related to that objective; viable alternative means of communication are available.

The warden at the prison where plaintiff worked suspended him pending discharge and recommended termination after concluding that plaintiff had sexually harassed a female subordinate and had lied about the matter. An independent state agency responsible for hiring and firing unionized employees then had 30 days to act on the recommendation. Instead of objecting, plaintiff resigned and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming that the firing was because he is black. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff had no direct evidence of race discrimination and did not show that the stated reasons for termination were pretextual.

An inmate filed suit against guards (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming that they used excessive force against him in an altercation. After the altercation a disciplinary board found the inmate guilty of "Assaulting Any Person, Dangerous Disturbances, Insolence, and Disobeying a Direct Order," based on officers' statements that the inmate was belligerent and punched an officer repeatedly in the face and head before being handcuffed. He did not challenge the ruling. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. A civil rights suit cannot be maintained by a prisoner if a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply that his disciplinary conviction had been invalid, but the inmate can remain "agnostic" about the findings in the disciplinary proceeding. The inmate's factual assertions about the incident are in tension with the disciplinary findings. Because the inmate was proceeding pro se, the judge could have disregarded allegations in which the inmate denied those findings; could have warned the inmate to delete those allegations; or could have dismissed, without prejudice, with an explanation and consideration of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Decedent was arrested on June 10, 2006, and pronounced dead at about 1:30 a.m. on June 12. She died of heart arrhythmia while in lockup. The evidence showed that she experienced severe abdominal pain throughout her confinement and that officers did not respond to pleas for help. A jury found that four police officers violated the Illinois Wrongful Death Act 740 ILCS 180, which requires proof of negligence, and the federal Constitution, 42 U.S.C. 1983, which requires proof of intentional wrong-doing or deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, by allowing decedent to suffer untreated pain. The award was $5,000,000 in compensatory and $4,000 in punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to liability, but vacated and remanded the award. The district court erred in excluding evidence of the decedent's addiction and criminal history to show her life prospects, relevant to calculation of damages.

Subdivision residents claimed that a retention pond's problems with algae, mosquitoes, and flooding would be exacerbated by proposed expansion of the subdivision. The residents, most of whom are African-American, claimed that the town was unresponsive to their concerns, but responded to similar concerns from white residents of another subdivision. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, as modified. The residents did not have any evidence that a subdivision, similar except for the race of the residents, was treated differently, but relied solely on allegations. State law claims should have been dismissed, not remanded.