Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The owner of an outdoor amphitheater in a rural area claimed that the sheriff forced him to hire off-duty deputies as a private security force for events and threatened to close the road leading to his property if he did not comply. After giving plaintiff's attorney three tries at producing a complaint that complied with Rules 8 and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that each iteration of the complaint was generally incomprehensible and riddled with errors, making it impossible for the defendants to know what wrongs they were accused of committing. The Seventh Circuit ordered plaintiff's attorney to show cause why he should not be suspended from the bar of the court or otherwise disciplined under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and directed that a copy be sent to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

The inmate asked for a vegan diet, telling the chaplain that he adheres to the Moorish Science Temple. The chaplain rejected the request, observing that the tenets of Moorish Science require a non-pork diet, which can include dairy products and some meat and fish. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in the inmate's action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but granted the motion with respect to claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.2000cc to 2000cc–5. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The inmate is no longer at the prison, so damages would be the only potential relief. Money damages are not available in suits against states under RLUIPA and suits against state employees in their official capacity are treated as suits against the states. RLUIPA does not authorize any kind of relief against public employees in their private capacities. The warden was entitled to summary judgment under section 1983, which does not provide for "supervisory liability." To decide whether the chaplain has qualified immunity, the district judge must determine whether he reasonably attempted to determine whether the inmate had a sincere belief that his religion requires a vegan diet.

A part-time school custodian, suffering mental disability, applied for full-time positions and was rejected. His performance had been evaluated as unsatisfactory. He filed a charge with the EEOC. A few months later the employer again evaluated his performance and fired him. In a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The employee did not establish the elements of a valid discrimination and retaliation claim under the ADA: that he was meeting his employer' legitimate employment expectations, and was performing his job satisfactorily.

Plaintiff, publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state prison system, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after prison officials concluded that the March 2007 edition posed an unacceptable risk to inmate rehabilitation and prison security and refused to distribute the issue to inmates. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and entered summary judgment in their favors. A second case was filed by a prisoner, against DOC employees, after they confiscated medical records and legal documents regarding other inmates, as well as copies of an article he published in the newsletter. The district court dismissed the claims on their merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both decisions. The publisher did not establish that confiscation of the newsletter was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. DOC's policy, restricting prisoners' access to third-party mail did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights.

Petitioner, imprisoned in Wisconsin for a term of 60 years following a 1994 conviction for sexual assault and attempted homicide, sought a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The case involved police misconduct in "doctoring" the crime scene to conceal evidence of prostitution, by withholding semen-stained sheets and towels from the massage parlor. The items were later tested and did not disclose petitioner's DNA. The court stated that the evidence was irrelevant, in that it could only be used to impeach the victim, given the other evidence and petitioner's own admissions. Rejecting a "Brady" claim concerning petitioner's gun, the court noted that nothing suggests that defense team was unaware of the gun, the state's possession of it, or the prosecution's theory of its role in the crime, or that the defense unsuccessfully requested access.

When he arrived at the prison, plaintiff told the prison clinical director that he had rheumatoid arthritis and asked for Enbrel, a medication successful in controlling the condition before his incarceration. Because Enbrel was not on the approved formulary, personnel had to seek prior approval from the Central Office of the Bureau of Prisons. The doctor submitted a request for Gabapentin, used to treat nerve pain, but not Enbrel, and approved a consultation with an outside rheumatologist. Despite the rheumatologist’s instruction and plaintiff's repeated requests and complaints of pain and swelling, he didn’t receive Enbrel for 10 months. Because plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court screened his "Bivens" complaint alleging cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed all defendants, except the clinical director, then entered summary judgment for the clinical director. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the non-medical defendants on the pleadings, but held that the prisoner properly stated a claim against medical defendants. Affirming summary judgment in favor of of the clinical director, the court found that plaintiff failed to meet his burden to submit evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff began working as a correctional officer for DOC in 2006, assigned to duty that required walking. In 2007, she was reassigned to a control room and no longer required to walk. In 2007, plaintiff received a warning for excessive absenteeism and was switched to a different schedule. She never worked under the new schedule. She took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act and returned to the bettr schedule. After her return, she was in an automobile accident, but did not disclose physician's restrictions on activity until a 2008 hearing on her refusal of overtime. In early 2008, plaintiff used vacation time to visit her brother, who had been injured. When she returned, she had been reassigned to watch tour duty. She refused some duties, stating that she physically could not do the job and that it violated her medical restrictions. Her supervisor asked for her resignation. She was barred from entering and never returned to work. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOC on claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a material issue of disputed fact under the indirect method of proof analysis.

Plaintiff was operating a video camera in public park, perhaps because of the presence of a former domestic partner. An angry crowd accused him of videotaping their children in a public park and called police, who arrested him for disorderly conduct. The charges were eventually dropped and plaintiff sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming they arrested him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, on grounds of qualified immunity. While videotaping is not a crime in Illinois, one officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff was guilty of disorderly conduct and the other could have reasonably believed there was probable cause.

An Indiana inmate, alleging mistreatement during a shakedown, was denied permission to proceed in forma pauperis because his three previous suits had been dismissed (28 U.S.C. 1915(g)). The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of his suit for failure to pay fees. His previous filings had been dismissed for failure to prosecute, after the judge deemed his allegations unintelligible, and not as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. That they might have or even should have been dismissed on those grounds is irrelevant.

A longtime employee of the Illinois Secretary of State's office, the only African-American on a crew of 27 maintenance workers, was fired after incidents concerning his knowledge of private use of state property and an off-the-books leave policy. He was reinstated after arbitration. He brought suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, claiming that two white managers targeted him because he is black. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated, based on evidence that the employee engaged in the same conduct as his supervisor but was disciplined more harshly. Formal job titles and rank are not dispositive; an employer cannot insulate itself from claims of racial discrimination by making formalistic distinctions between employees.