Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During a radio call-in show, plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, called in response to critical comments regarding defendant's (county sheriff) involvement with an African-American community organization dedicated to reducing crime and indicating that defendant was not a good fit for his position. Defendant called in and retorted by describing plaintiff as a "slacker" and mentioning a disciplinary action taken in 2004 against plaintiff for "sexual harassment." In actuality, the disciplinary action was for violation of a department rule that prohibited offensive conduct or language. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for disclosure of plaintiff's disciplinary history, a claim under Wisconsin's Open Records Law, and a claim under Wisconsin's Right of Privacy statute. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was no Records Act violation; there was no request to inspect a disciplinary record, no permission granted, and no balancing test undertaken. The information at issue is a matter of public record, so there was no Privacy Act violation. Rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim, the court noted that there was no threat, coercion, or intimidation.

Plaintiff's decedent was shot and killed by her ex-boyfriend as she left her church. The shooter committed suicide; he was on parole for an earlier homicide and had a history of harassing and assaulting decedent in violation of his parole and a court order of protection. Law-enforcement and corrections officials were aware of these violations and could have ensured that he was detained without bail, but neither issued a parole-violation warrant nor arrested him for violating the order of protection. The district court held that female victims of domestic violence are not a suspect or protected class for purposes of equal-protection analysis and that a claim against the state department of corrections director was barred by the Eleventh Amendment as seeking damages from the director in his official capacity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not plausibly state a policy-or-practice equal protection claim, but included only generalized allegations that the city failed to have specific policies in effect to protect victims of domestic violence from harm inflicted by those who violate their parole or court orders of protection. The complaint alleged, in essence, that the city failed to single out domestic-violence victims as a class for special protection.

After receiving a call from the owner, stating that a robbery suspect was in the store, a police officer fatally shot a man as he exited a convenience store. The decedent disregarded the officer's repeated commands to stop and turned away with his hands not visible, then grabbed at the officer's gun. After his family sued the officer and the city, a jury found that the officer had not used excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court ruling admitting into evidence that the decedent had drugs secreted in his mouth at the time of the shooting, which were discovered during an autopsy. The court noted the limited use of the evidence.

Plaintiff was terminated as a probationary police officer. A supervisor stated that plaintiff violated departmental rules by revealing confidential information to another recruit during a training exercise, repeatedly failed to pass the firearms qualifying test, and admitted not reading the firearms manual (another rules violation). Plaintiff's father, then a deputy sheriff, argued for his son's reinstatement. Believing that the father had placed a threatening call to a school attended by the supervisor's children, the supervisor filed a complaint that resulted in a recommendation of termination and the father's early retirement. The father's suit under 42 U.S.C 1983 was dismissed; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's (son) suit, alleging bias based on his Polish ethnicity was also rejected by the district court. While both suits were proceeding, father and son pursued administrative remedies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, obtained right-to-sue letters, and jointly filed a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 200e. The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff, an inmate, worked as a library clerk. Defendant, the director of education, ordered plaintiff fired on the ground that, on the job, he had highlighted copies of opinions for personal use and had stolen an opinion from the library. A day after plaintiff told the librarian that he had filed a grievance, defendant filed a conduct report to justify ordering plaintiff fired. Plaintiff had a receipt showing that he had checked out the opinion and the theft charge was dropped. The hearing officer upheld the copying charge and ordered plaintiff confined to his cell for 14 days and the copies destroyed. After the state court ordered a new hearing, the prison expunged the disciplinary order from plaintiff's record; the order had already been carried out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that plaintiff had not shown "that the challenged action would not have occurred but for the constitutionally protected conduct." The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to other defendants, but reversed with respect to the director of education, noting the timing of his conduct report and evidence of animus toward plaintiff.

Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to possession of firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and waived his right to contest any aspect of his conviction or sentence unless the sentence exceeded either the sentencing-guidelines range calculated by the district court "or any applicable statutory minimum, whichever is greater." The district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal to a term of 180 months, the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). He did not pursue direct appeal. Nearly two years later, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in Oklahoma state court seeking to vacate two of the convictions that were used to enhance his federal sentence. The Oklahoma court entered an order purporting to dismiss the cases, along with six others pending against him. Petitioner moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court rejected the motion as untimely and held that it was barred by the waiver. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that while the appeal was in briefing, the Oklahoma court issued a nunc pro tunc order clarifying that its dismissal order did not in fact vacate the predicate convictions.

Officers went to plaintiff's home to question her sons about a burglary. A confrontation ensued and escalated. One of the officers Tasered plaintiff three times, and the officers arrested her for obstruction and resisting arrest. Those charges were dropped, and plaintiff sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging use of excessive force and false arrest. A jury returned a verdict for the officers on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff waived her most plausible claim of trial error, the decision to admit two of her criminal convictions, when she introduced evidence of the convictions herself, before the officers could do so. The court also rejected claims based on evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. The parties told dramatically different stories about the confrontation and the jury was entitled to believe the officers’ version.

Plaintiff filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging arrest without probably cause and assault. The judge allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis. After plaintiff delayed in responding to a draft pretrial order, the judge imposed a sanction of $9,055 against the plaintiff and an attorney who had agreed to represent him. Plaintiff was unable to pay and the judge rejected his offer of $25 per month. When plaintiff did not pay within the 30 day period set by the court, it dismissed his suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the fine was actually paid by the attorney after plaintiff complained to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The attorney admitted being unfamiliar with the federal rules and that he had never before filed a pretrial order.

Petitioner brought a "Bivens" action, claiming that prison officials provided him with limited, deficient access to the law library for four months while he was confined in a special unit. He claims that the prison switched to electronic research databases and did not provide instruction, causing him to miss filing dates for an appeal in a case he had filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Although the Seventh Circuit reinstated the appeal in that case, the district court dismissed the Bivens action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that petitioner did not show any prejudice as a result of his limited library access.

Petitioner, convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder and sentenced to 90 years in prison, unsuccessfully sought relief in Illinois state courts then filed a federal habeas corpus petition (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even if trial counsel was ineffective in impeaching a witness, petitioner was not prejudiced, in light of the substantial evidence of guilt. Petitioner could not prove his claim that the prosecution knowingly obtained his conviction on the basis of perjured testimony.