Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 20 U.S.C. 1681 for failure by defendant,a middle school principal, to prevent sexual abuse of several female students by their band teacher. The band teacher pled guilty to multiple counts of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the awards. The awards of compensatory damages reflected consideration of the harm to each individual plaintiff; the award of punitive damages was justified in light of defendant's failure to act.

Petitioner sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Indiana prison officials violently roused him from his cell and in the process broke his arm. After a second remand, the district court resolved the factual disputes in favor of defendants and dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a complaint within 48 hours. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that it was not convinced that it was clear error for the district court to disbelieve petitioner's account of events and that petitioner's own words belie any suggestion that he exhausted his administrative remedies.

Plaintiff provided day care in his home. When a sick child collapsed, he performed CPR and called 911. Police arrested plaintiff for aggravated battery and falsely told him that a doctor had stated that the baby's injuries were caused by shaking. Plaintiff signed a waiver, admitted shaking the baby, but stated that he did not cause the injury. The baby died. Plaintiff was charged with murder. The case fell apart when it came to light that the child had been sick and feverish and that the child's mother had a history of violence and abuse. Charges were dismissed. Plaintiff sued five officers and the village (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging, among other things, that one of the officers shielded the mother and provided doctors with false information because of attraction to the mother. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers and the village. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The court reversed dismissal of a claim of wrongful interrogation against officers, who continued to "badger" plaintiff and employ trickery after he invoked his right to a lawyer. The court reversed dismissal of claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution for murder against the officer who was allegedly protecting the child's mother.

Plaintiff was banned from the senior center because she repeatedly violated the code of conduct by yelling, making threats, and making frivolous complaints to police. She sued the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming violation of free-speech and due-process rights and that the code is facially unconstitutional. A magistrate judge granted summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the director and board of the center are not final policymakers for purposes of enforcing the code of conduct. Under state and local law, plaintiff could ask the city council to overturn the expulsion. She had been informed of her right to appeal and failure to do so precludes municipal liability to the extent that claimed constitutional violations stem from the ban. The court stated that it was not imposing a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under Section 1983, but recognizing the council's role as policymaker. The board has authority to make rules for the center, so the code of conduct itself is city policy. The court rejected a facial challenge to the code, which consists of reasonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions and is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.

Plaintiff's suit against the municipality and officials alleged that his water was shut off without due process and that he was singled out as a "class of one" for irrational or political reasons in violation of the equal protection clause. After surviving a motion to dismiss, the case was assigned to a magistrate judge, based on the written consent of all parties. With seven extensions, discovery continued over 15 months, with plaintiff alternately pro se and represented by counsel. He was represented by counsel when he consented to proceed before the magistrate and during consideration of defendants' summary judgment motion. When the magistrate cut off discovery, with permission for one more deposition, plaintiff appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that all parties consented to assignment to a magistrate and that all rulings were within the court's discretion.

Defendant was convicted of aggravated driving while license revoked, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d-3) (2008), a Class 4 felony carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 days' imprisonment. He was taken into custody on February 17; on March 7, he was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. The Department of Corrections originally calculated a tentative release date as November 17, reflecting the February 17 custody date and statutory good-time credit of one day per day of sentence. Because the full award of 180 days of additional good-time credit would bring defendant below the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 days, defendant was only awarded 87 days of meritorious good-time credit. In defendant's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state employees after defendant failed to respond to their motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that defendant did not sue the proper parties. None of the named state employees were responsible for the purported constitutional deprivation.

Plaintiff, a correctional officer, is a veteran of the Persian Gulf War, and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder for years. After an argument with his wife, plaintiff left his home and drove around the area, frequently calling his wife and at least once suggesting to her that he might commit suicide. His wife called the police; the dispatcher put out a report that plaintiff was suicidal, was on medication, and had access to weapons. Plaintiff was asleep in his car when officers found him. After two hours of surveillance, officers called in a specialized team, CIERT. A CIERT armored vehicle was moved into position, spike strips were put behind the parked car, and an officer shot "pepper balls" into the car, before officers removed plaintiff. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming excessive force and brought state law claims for battery, false arrest, and willful and wanton misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, none of whom had authority over CIERT. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In pleading guilty to four felony charges, defendant admitted that he had forcibly detained a 17-year-old boy, threatening to kill him if he resisted or tried to escape, and raped him. Charges that defendant had raped a 13-year-old boy were dismissed. The Indiana state judge imposed a sentence of 50 years in prison in light of defendant’s prior felony convictions. Direct appeal and collateral attack in state court were unsuccessful. Defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, in that his attorney did not explain the possible sentence before he accepted a plea. A federal district judge denied habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although defendant may have established prejudice by claiming that he would have demanded a trial, if correctly informed, the state judge gave him the information allegedly omitted by defense counsel.

Decedent was arrested for contempt of court and was treated for alcohol withdrawal before being jailed. After he was jailed, his repeated requests for medication were denied. He was assigned high risk status and scheduled to be observed every fifteen minutes. A doctor prescribed Haldol and Libruim after observing that he was disoriented. He died soon after, on September 27, 2007. In August 2006, decedent's ex-wife was named administrator of the estate and filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed as time-barred by the two-year Illinois statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have tolled the limitations period because the sole beneficiary of the estate was a minor when the cause of action arose.

A sergeant, passed over for promotion to lieutenant, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was passed over because he is a Republican and did not contribute to the then-sheriff's campaign fund. The district judge granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, as a group heavier contributors to the campaign were treated worse and that plaintiff was not asked to contribute and did not allege that he was told he had to contribute money if he wanted to be promoted. Plaintiff's visible involvement with the Republican party was minimal and there was significant evidence that the sheriff did not know plaintiff or his political affiliation.