Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During his intake interview, King informed the jail’s nurse that he had asthma, diabetes, a heart problem, high blood pressure, seizures, and mental health problems. The jail contracted medical services from a private company. The doctor, 300 miles away, visited once a week. The doctor did not obtain details about King's existing prescriptions, but scheduled him to be quickly weaned off of a drug that was not on the company’s formulary. The drug that was substituted was not normally appropriate for King’s conditions. Although King suffered side effects and requested to see a doctor, he was not seen by the doctor for 10 days. Later, when he was convulsing on the floor, the nurse indicated that he was "faking" a seizure. He was left lying on the floor, then moved to a padded cell, where he later died. His widow brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. There was significant evidence that the jail’s policies violated King’s constitutional rights.

Smith claimed (42 U.S.C. 1981) that he endured serious racist harassment from his immediate supervisor at former defendant Equistar and was fired for complaining about it. Equistar was an affiliate of another former defendant, Lyondell, but both are now bankrupt. Smith has settled his claims against the primary wrongdoer, his former supervisor Bianchetta. He also brought claims against Equistar’s human resources manager, Bray, who, Smith says conspired with Bianchetta to retaliate against him. The district court granted Bray for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The retaliation claim did not satisfy the causation element of the direct method of proof because Smith did not present sufficient circumstantial evidence showing that his complaints about discrimination motivated Bray to seek his termination. Constructive discharge occurs when working conditions become so unbearable that an employee is forced to resign; the evidence showed that Smith was fired.

Siblings of decedent, a 22-year-old inmate who committed suicide while incarcerated, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that staff members acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition involving a long history of suicide attempts, self-harm, and mental illness. The district court granted qualified immunity to the management level defendants, the Wisconsin Resource Center defendants, and the nurse who was called after the suicide, but denied qualified immunity to staff members. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the different levels of knowledge available to the defendants and that there is a clearly established right to be free from deliberate indifference to suicide

In 1984 petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, and attempted robbery. During six jury selection striking sessions, both sides used all 20 of their peremptory challenges; the state exercised 17 on African-Americans. Two African-Americans served on the jury and one was an alternate. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Following the decision Batson v. Kentucky, 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded. The trial court accepted the state’s race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and conditionally vacated the convictions, holding that petitioner established a prima facie case of discrimination. On remand the trial court found no Batson violation, again imposing the death penalty. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court dismissed a postconviction petition, claiming ineffective-assistance-of-counsel in the Batson hearing and a Brady violation based on nondisclosure of medical records that would have impeached a witness. On remand from the supreme court, the trial court dismissed because Illinois Governor Ryan had commuted the death sentence. The appellate court affirmed; the supreme court denied review. The federal district court denied habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit reversed. It was unreasonable for the state courts to credit the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for several peremptory challenges.

Plaintiff, hired as a police officer in 1992 and promoted to sergeant and shift supervisor in 1996, publicly criticized several departmental officials at two police officers’ union meetings. Roughly during that same time period, he also committed several violations of departmental policy and was punished accordingly with, among other things, a written reprimand and a two-day suspension. After plaintiff failed to clear a fitness-for-duty evaluation, the department filed termination charges. The matter was assigned to arbitration where he was suspended but not terminated. The district court rejected his claims of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. None of the employment actions that plaintiff complained about followed close on the heels of his purportedly protected speech. The context in which these actions were taken indicates that they were not related to his speech. Significant intervening, particularly plaintiff's own negative behavior, were the cause of the negative or disciplinary employment actions.

In 1997 Javier unlawfully entered the U.S.; he married in 2001. In 2007 the bank hired wife. Husband, attempting to start a business, could not open a bank account without a social security number. He obtained an individual tax identification number. Wife named him a joint owner on her account and helped use his ITIN to open accounts of his own. The business failed. Husband returned to Mexico to deal with his citizenship. Wife revealed the situation to her supervisor, requesting time off to help husband obtain citizenship. The supervisor agreed and called the bank security officer, who was concerned that the accounts might implicate bank fraud laws. During a meeting, the security officer became angry and berated wife. Wife refused to attend another meeting without her attorney The bank terminated her employment and reported her activity to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and a consortium of area banks. Wife sued, claiming blacklisting, defamation, emotional distress, and employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the bank summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any discrimination was not based on race or national origin, but on an unprotected classification, husband’s status as an alien lacking permission to be in the country.

Two officers stopped plaintiff’s adult son for a traffic violation and found crack cocaine in the car. Daniel attempted to flee, resulting in a physical altercation. Plaintiff, who lived close, was told by a neighbor, “you have to get down to the corner,” “they’re killing your son.” Plaintiff claims she was calmly asking about her son when she was accosted and arrested for no apparent reason. The officer testified that plaintiff was yelling, being aggressive, and leading the crowd in a charge, so they arrested her and placed her in the prisoner wagon for five to ten minutes before releasing her. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court declined to exclude evidence of events that preceded her arrival and testimony that the events took place in a “high-crime area” and entered judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the case boils down to a credibility contest that was properly reserved for resolution by the jury and upholding in the district court’s balancing of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence.

The suit, against law enforcement officers and the county, claimed denial of equal protection in failure to respond to complaints about gang harassment. The district court, interpreting the pro se complaint as concerning inadequate police protection, dismissed. The Seventh Circuit panel interpreted as charging defendants with arbitrarily providing less police protection to than to other residents, a "class of one" discrimination claim, but concluded that the claim failed, absent an allegation of personal animosity. On hearing case en banc, the court split three ways, affirming the dismissal by tie vote. Four judges (with a concurring opinion) stated that a "class of one" plaintiff must establish intentional discrimination by state actors who knew or should have known that they had no justification, based on their public duties, for singling him out for unfavorable treatment. The opinion stated that class-of-one suits should not be permitted against police officers or police departments. The complaint did not allege personal motives. "Rightly or wrongly they thought him a paranoid pest obsessed with motorcycle gangs." Four dissenters indicated that plaintiff should be allowed to replead and that the standard, which does not require mindreading," is the rational-basis test.

Plaintiff, an inmate waiting to be keyed into his cell, was wounded by a pellet fired in an attempt to break up a fight. He showed his wound to an officer, who refused a medical technician's request to move plaintiff to the health care unit. The prison was on lockdown. The technician never returned with medical supplies. Plaintiff made additional requests, but claims that the technician stated that she was told by staff not to document any treatment for gunshot wounds and would not give her name. Plaintiff wrote an emergency grievance to the warden. Four days later, he was treated in the health care unit. The doctor expressed concern that plaintiff was not brought in on the day of his injury to prevent infection. Plaintiff claims that an internal affairs investigator was sent intimidate him into dropping his grievance. Plaintiff was placed on transfer to a facility where he had known enemies. The warden, grievance officer, and administrative officer determined that there was no emergency and no justification for compensation. His court-appointed attorney was allowed to withdraw and the district court dismissed plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that his claim for retaliation was prematurely dismissed.

Plaintiff, a self-described tax consultant, worked for the county board of review (property tax assessments) for 10 years, until 2002. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962c, he alleged that defendants, elected and appointed board employees, flagged his clients' files and ran the board as a "pay for play" racketeering enterprise to extort campaign donations and consulting work from him. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not identify any statute, regulation, or contract that suggests his work as a consultant for private clients might be a constitutionally protected property interest. His allegations of improper treatment were implausible, negating both constitutional and RICO claims.