Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A suit seeking to represent a class of inmates at the “supermax” Tamms Correctional Center, alleging due process violations, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While remand was pending, the Illinois Department of Corrections developed a “Ten-Point Plan,” revising procedures for transferring inmates to Tamms, with a detailed transfer-review process. Although it had not been implemented, IDOC submitted the Plan at trial. The court held that conditions at Tamms impose atypical and significant hardship, establishing a due-process liberty interest in avoiding transfer to Tamms, and that procedures for transfer decisions were unconstitutional. The court entered an injunction incorporating the Ten-Point Plan. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The scope and specificity of the injunction exceed what is required to remedy the due process violation, contrary to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A), and to Supreme Court statements about remedial flexibility and deference to prison administrators in this type of litigation. Injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be “narrowly drawn,” extend “no further than necessary” to remedy the violation, and use the “least intrusive means” to correct the violation of the federal right. Making the Plan a constitutional baseline eliminated operational discretion and flexibility, exceeding what due process requires and violating the PLRA.

During a narcotics investigation, an informant (Tucker's brother-in-law) told the Task Force that Tucker was in possession of a stolen backhoe. Investigator Williams went to Tucker’s house, observed a backhoe, and asked Tucker about it. Tucker said that in the summer of 2000 or 2001, he bought it through a friend without any documentation. Williams took the serial number, told Tucker that it was not reported stolen, but asked Tucker not to move the backhoe. When Williams returned weeks later, neither Tucker nor the backhoe was present. Tucker later explained that he loaned it to Krulac. After tracing ownership, but without a warrant, Williams seized the backhoe from Krulac. Tucker never contacted the Task Force to object to the seizure or demand the backhoe be returned. The backhoe was returned to the titleholder. Tucker sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Fourth Amendment and due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that the initial seizure of the backhoe satisfied the Fourth Amendment and due process requirements; that the Task Force was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; and that Williams was entitled to summary judgment on the post-seizure disposition due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In 2006 police seized unregistered guns from Justice’s business. He sued and lost. In 2010 Justice sued again, based on the same events, and lost again. Justice asked the court to reconsider under FRCP 59(e). The 28-day period for filing such a motion cannot be extended, FRCP 6(b)(2). Justice had until November 22, 2011, to file. The Northern District of Illinois accepts electronic filing. Justice filed at 3 AM on November 23. The district court rejected the motion on the merits. The Seventh Circuit gave Justice 14 days to show cause why the judgment should not be affirmed summarily. A judge who lacks authority to grant an extension of time cannot achieve the same end by calling the extension a "nunc pro tunc order" (now for then) and backdating a document. Justice did not transmit his Rule 59 motion on November 22; he transmitted it on November 23 and must live with the consequences. Justice did not argue that anything extraordinary occurred between October 25 and November 23 that could support relief under Rule 60(b), but it is premature to decide whether Justice has satisfied the standard for relief under that rule, although his prospects are "dim."

Attorney Mehta was charged with converting escrow funds and lying to a state court. After a hearing, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended disbarment. While the recommendation was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a ruled to show cause why he should not be suspended, rejected Mehta's arguments, and suspended his license. Mehta sued the court and the IARDC under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the suspension violated his right to due process. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the meantime, Mehta was disbarred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, rejecting Mehta's argument that the suspension was not a final order that was subject to the doctrine. Illinois law provides that an interim suspension order is a final judgment in the Rule 774 proceeding in which it is issued.

Christmas and Banks were acquitted of drug charges. Banks, on behalf of herself and her infant daughter sued the city and police officers, asserting violations of the Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983) and state law claims for false arrest, unlawful search, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After seven days of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. During trial, plaintiffs moved for a mistrial and, at the conclusion of the trial moved for a new trial. In both motions, plaintiffs argued that they were denied a fair trial due to defense counsel's repeated violations of evidentiary rulings and improper comments to the jury. The district court denied both motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it could not concluded that defense counsel's conduct had a substantial influence on the jury.

The Bald Knob Cross is a well-known Illinois tourist attraction, claiming to be the largest cross in the Western Hemisphere. It had fallen into disrepair. The non-profit group Friends of the Cross was formed to solicit donations. In 2008 Friends secured a $20,000 grant from the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity. Sherman, an atheist, filed suit, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause (42 U.S.C. 1983) and claiming standing as a taxpayer. A magistrate ruled that Sherman lacked standing and that his claim was moot. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. "Whatever may be lurking in the background of this appropriations legislation, the $20,000 grant to Friends was not the result of legislative action; rather, it can be traced at most to the initiative of a single legislator. The ultimate pool of $5 million was in the hands of an executive agency, which was formally responsible for the decision to hand out the $20,000 to Friends." Taxpayer standing is foreclosed under these circumstances.

Gay is a deeply disturbed Illinois inmate with a history of self-mutilation, scheduled for parole in 2095. Between 1996 and 2011, he filed more than 30 federal civil cases. Gay lost two at trial, settled two, and lost or withdrew the remainder. At least four were dismissed as frivolous, leading Gay to strike out under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury, Gay may not proceed in forma pauperis in federal court. He sued prison mental health professionals, alleging constitutionally inadequate treatment and retaliation for a prior lawsuit. The district court required him to post a $1,000 bond, which it knew he could not afford, to cover costs if this suit proved unsuccessful. The court required the bond without evaluating the merit of Gay’s claims. When Gay did not post the bond, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit reversed. District courts have several tools for dealing with indigent litigants who abuse the court system. Requiring a party to post a cost bond that the court knows the party cannot afford, however, is not one of those available tools for dismissing or discouraging frivolous suits.

In 1986 two victims were found murdered in their home. They had been stabbed numerous times and their home had been set afire. Whitlock and Steidl were convicted in 1987. They spent the next 21 and 17 years in prison, respectively, before each obtained reversal on the basis of numerous Brady violations. Whitlock and Steidl brought suit against state officials for violations of their constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss some of the defendants. Following discovery the district court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment and set a trial date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an interlocutory appeal. The prosecutor is not protected by immunity from liability for alleged fabrication of evidence; presentation of perjured testimony violates a clearly established right. The state police defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on a claim that they took affirmative steps to quash an investigation to further conceal the evidence. The court rejected claims of sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff-Appellee Chaunte Ott was wrongly convicted and incarcerated for the 1995 murder of Jessica Payne. He brought a civil rights action against the City of Milwaukee and several police officers. This appeal was filed when Plaintiff served subpoenas on two non-party state agencies, the Wisconsin Crime Laboratory and the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. Rather than comply, the state agencies filed motions to quash. The district court denied those motions, at which point the state agencies filed this appeal, invoking jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Seventh Circuit concluded that this was not a proper case for that basis of jurisdiction, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Mohawk Industries, Inc. v.Carpenter," (130 S. Ct. 599 (2009)): "[the Court added] that even if [it] read "Mohawk Industries" too strictly and jurisdiction [was] proper, [the Court] would find that the state agencies' arguments lack[ed] merit."

Officers, responding to an assault in progress, saw defendant, who voluntarily submitted to a pat down. A pistol was found in his coat pocket. Charged possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant insisted that the police had planted the gun. His lawyer believed that he could not argue that the firearm was the fruit of an unreasonable search. Following his conviction, defendant brought a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance in that his attorney did not move to suppress the firearm as the product of an unreasonable and did not explain to defendant that his testimony at a suppression hearing could not be used at trial as evidence of his guilt. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant’s insistence that the police planted the gun neither justified nor compelled counsel to refrain from challenging the search that produced the weapon. The court remanded for determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by that failure.