Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Naficy began working for IDHS in 1996. According to Naficy, her co-worker and eventual supervisor, Bailey, mocked her accent and suggested that Naficy should not have been promoted because she is Iranian. Naficy filed complaints of discrimination, relating to treatment during a layoff and unfavorable performance evaluations. In 2010, in connection with closure of another facility, IDHS followed provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Naficy and others received a letter alerting them to the possibility of a layoff and outlining potential bump options. Naficy was reassigned to a part-time position; she returned to her former position with the same schedule and salary two months later. Naficy filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that the reassignment was discriminatory and retaliatory. She received a right-to-sue letter and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the claims, reasoning that as a state agency, IDHS is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that Naficy had no direct evidence of discrimination by anyone involved in her reassignment, of retaliation, or of a similarly situated IDHS employee who received better treatment than Naficy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Naficy v. IL Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Charged with possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Dowell plead guilty in return for the government’s agreement to withdraw an information filed under 21 U.S.C. 851, alleging that Dowell had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense. Without that withdrawal, Dowell would have faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. The court nonetheless applied the “career offender” guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, and imposed a sentence of 180 months. Although Dowell claims to have instructed his attorney to file, a notice of appeal was not filed within 10 days, as required for timely filing. Dowell, therefore, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asserting that failure to file constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Dowell’s agreement in his plea not to challenge his sentence on collateral attack precluded relief. The district court agreed with the government. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination as to whether Dowell told his attorney to file the appeal.View "Dowell v. Unted States" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved. View "Kress v. CCA of TN, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005 brokers sued Merrill Lynch under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII raising claims of racial discrimination and seeking to litigate as a class. They alleged that the firm’s “teaming” and account-distribution policies had the effect of steering black brokers away from the most lucrative assignments and prevented them from earning compensation comparable to white brokers. That litigation is ongoing. Three years later, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, and the companies introduced a retention-incentive program that would pay bonuses to Merrill Lynch brokers corresponding to their previous levels of production. Brokers filed a second class-action suit. The district court dismissed. The court held that the retention program qualified as a production-based compensation system within the meaning of the section 703(h) exemption and was protected from challenge unless it was adopted with “intention to discriminate because of race.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). The court then held that the complaint’s allegations of discriminatory intent were conclusory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not enough to allege that the bonuses incorporated the past discriminatory effects of Merrill Lynch’s underlying employment practices. The disparate impact of those employment practices is the subject of the first lawsuit, and if proven, will be remedied there. View "McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Bell protested Operation Iraqi Freedom in Chicago. President Bush was at a luncheon at a nearby club. After one protestor was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a squadrol, Bell and two others, banner in hand, approached the squadrol, walking into the street. The police ordered the men to get back on the sidewalk several times. They refused and began chanting, “Hell no, we won’t go. Set him free.” Police arrested them for disorderly conduct. In particular, police arrested Bell pursuant an ordinance that criminalizes an individual’s behavior when he “knowingly . . . [f]ails to obey a lawful order of dispersal by a person known by him to be a peace officer under circumstances where three or more persons are committing acts of disorderly conduct in the immediate vicinity, which acts are likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” A state court acquitted Bell and he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and malicious prosecution and indemnification. Bell appealed adverse rulings by the district court. The Seventh Circuit reversed, invalidating the ordinance in part, as inhibiting protected speech and not amenable to clear and uniform enforcement. View "Bell v. Keating" on Justia Law

Betker was shot twice during a late-night police raid on his home. The officer who shot him was part of a tactical unit executing a no-knock search warrant secured by Officer Gomez, who obtained the warrant after receiving information from Capol, the estranged sister of Betker’s wife, Sharon, regarding Sharon being a convicted felon allegedly in possession of a firearm. Capol now swears that most of the information that Gomez related in his affidavit to support the warrant’s issuance was not true. In Betker’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Gomez’s motion for judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Betker has produced sworn deposition testimony of Capol contradicting the probable cause affidavit. If believed, that testimony would establish that Gomez knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth made false or misleading statements in the affidavit. Absent those false statements, probable cause for the no-knock warrant would not have existed. View "Betker v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Elusta sued tChicago and police officers for excessive force, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He first retained Cerda and De Leon, who conducted discovery and obtained a settlement offer of $100,000. Elusta rejected this offer, apparently because his retainer contained a 40% contingent fee provision. The district court permitted the attorneys to withdraw. Elusta retained Smith and Genson. A jury found in Elusta’s favor on two counts and awarded $40,000. Smith and Genson petitioned for attorney’s fees on behalf of Elusta pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. Before the court could rule, Elusta retained new attorneys, Johnson and Gentleman, to litigate the fee issue. They sought direct payment of some of the fees to Elusta, rather than to Smith and Genson. Smith and Genson’s petition languished for nearly 16 months before Cerda and De Leon filed sought fees, asserting an attorney’s lien or a right to recover under quantum meruit. The court granted Smith and Genson’s request for $82,696.50 under section1988. Cerda and De Leon had not perfected an attorneys’ lien, but the court allowed recovery of $15,000 in quantum meruit. The court rejected Elusta’s motion to have 60% of both amounts paid to him directly. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Elusta v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Griffin, a high school freshman, was told to go home for dress code violations. Bell, a police officer, accompanied Griffin and twice removed Griffin’s hat. Bell claims that Griffin struck Bell in the face. A second security officer grabbed Griffin’s arm. Bell told Griffin that he was under arrest and got one handcuff on Griffin before Griffin began to struggle. The struggle continued for approximately 20-30 minutes before Bell attached the second handcuff. Griffin told a different story, claiming to have been beaten. Before trial, Bell moved to exclude a two-minute video of part of the incident, recorded by Brown, a friend of Griffin’s. Brown apparently could not be located at the time of trial. Bell contended that, without Brown as a witness, Griffin could not establish a proper foundation, and that the video was confusing and unfairly prejudicial because it showed only a small part of the incident and included gaps. The court excluded the video, excerpts from the video, and still photos created from the video, and prohibited reference to the video to explain a discrepancy in Griffin’s testimony. A jury rejected Griffin’s 42 U.S.C. claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Griffin v. Bell" on Justia Law

Hoppe is a tenured professor of Philosophy at Lewis University. She lost the privilege of teaching aviation ethics after the new chair of the Aviation Department, Brogan, deemed her unqualified because she had no formal training in aviation, had never worked in the industry, and had not obtained any degrees or certifications relevant to the field. During the two years before her removal from the course, Hoppe filed a series of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, requesting an accommodation for her clinically diagnosed “adjustment disorder” and accusing the university of discrimination and retaliation. She sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court awarded the university summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While there was no evidence of Hoppe’s job functions or her inability to perform them, the undisputed evidence shows that the university offered Hoppe three different accommodations, which she rejected, and no rational trier of fact could find that the university’s efforts were unreasonable. Hoppe has no evidence of a causal link between her protected activity and Brogan’s decision and failed to make a prima facie showing of retaliation. View "Hoppe v. Lewis Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff taught sixth-grade at a public school and met with a student’s parents about a threat the student had made against another student. He met the parents again after seeing the student beating another student. The father threatened a lawsuit and told plaintiff that an older son, who had assaulted the assistant principal, should have assaulted plaintiff. During a subsequent class, the student used an assignment to write a song with lyrics about stabbing plaintiff. The police liaison encouraged plaintiff to file criminal charges; under Illinois law declaring a knowing threat of violence against a person at a school is disorderly conduct, 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(13). School administrators feared a suit and were not supportive. After plaintiff filed charges, his evaluations went from satisfactory to unsatisfactory and administrators advised him that they would recommend that he not be rehired. Plaintiff resigned and filed suit, claiming retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the complaint was not protected by the First Amendment because it did not involve a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Principles underlying the suit are well settled, which defeats claims of qualified immunity. View "Gschwind v. Heiden" on Justia Law