Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

White created a website to advance white supremacy and included a statement that “everyone associated with the Matt Hale trial has deserved assassination for a long time.” The site also included information related to the foreperson of the jury that convicted Hale, a white supremacist, of criminally soliciting harm to a federal judge. Although a jury convicted him of soliciting the commission of a violent federal crime against a juror, 18 U.S.C. 373, the district court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that White was guilty of criminal solicitation, and that White’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the conviction and remanded for sentencing. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on the contents of the website, its readership, and other contextual factors, White intentionally solicited a violent crime against Juror A by posting Juror A’s personal information on his website. Criminal solicitation is not protected by the First Amendment. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

On December 23, 1980, police found a body in a ditch and another nearby; both had been shot in the head. Months later, an informant implicated Pamela Thompkins; she was arrested and confessed to assisting her former brother-in-law (Willie Thompkins) and a friend in a robbery that became double murder. Willie agreed to talk after receiving Miranda warnings. During interrogation, he took a phone call from an attorney, but continued to talk without invoking his right to counsel; in court for a bond hearing, he confessed. A jury convicted him, based on his confession, eyewitness testimony, and evidence from the scene. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessful direct appeal and years of state post-conviction proceedings, the Governor commuted the sentences of all death-row inmates, and Thompkins was resentenced to life. He exhausted remaining post-conviction claims. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply federal law in holding that the right to counsel had not yet attached when Thompkins confessed, so the trial court properly declined to suppress the confession, or in rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance based on procedural default and lack of factual support. View "Thompkins v. Pierce" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, runs a number of youth detention facilities. Jamal, age 16, had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times when he arrived at one of those facilities in 2008. His intake assessment noted a history of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, major depression, bipolar disorder, psychosis, behavior disorders, and anger and drug abuse counseling. His behavioral history included delinquency, gang affiliations, anger, aggression, setting of fires, cruelty to animals, putting a gun to a cousin’s head, threatening to kill teachers, learning disabilities, alcohol abuse, and cannabis use. Jamal denied that he had manic or depressive symptoms, that he was depressed, or that he had experienced suicidal thoughts since his June 2008 attempt; the intake doctor prescribed Prozac and lithium. Jamal was noncompliant, had disciplinary problems, and was periodically evaluated for suicide risk before he committed suicide by hanging himself from a bunk bed. In his mother’s suit, alleging deliberate indifference to Jamal’s serious mental illness, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Miller v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law

Adams was sentenced, in Illinois, to 180 days in jail plus three years’ probation for a 1981 armed robbery; he committed a second robbery while on probation. He was convicted of robbery and aggravated battery. Paroled in August, 1984, he promptly violated, but was re-paroled in December. He committed another armed robbery in January 1985 and was sentenced to 25 years. While confined, Adams committed aggravated battery of a guard. He had not been out for long when he was caught with a firearm, convicted as a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Adams conceded that two convictions qualify as violent felonies but argued that two do not, given 18 U.S.C.921(a)(20), which provides that restoration of civil rights causes a conviction to be disregarded for federal felon-in-possession statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 1984 Illinois repealed statutes that had allowed criminals to possess firearms beginning five years after release from prison; his civil right to possess firearms was not restored and that right would not have been restored even under the pre-1984 version of Illinois law, since he has not spent any five-year period out of prison. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Racine County Human Services Department caseworker Wagner removed Thor, a 12-year-old, from his parents’ home and placed him into protective custody. Thor suffers from cerebral palsy, global developmental delay, and is confined to a wheelchair. Wagner investigated after receiving a referral from personnel at Thor’s school concerning bruising on his arm and leg. A judge issued a probable cause order for removal, based on evidence of Thor’s injuries and that he had been left unattended. Thor suffered additional injuries as a result of accidents that occurred in foster care and at a rehabilitation facility. Thor’s mother and stepfather and Thor sued Wagner, his supervisor, another caseworker, and her supervisor, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds and because plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence of racial animus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged violation of plaintiffs’ right to familial relations; for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity based on the decision to continue his placements; and for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to individualized treatment. View "Xiong v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Four-year-old Jaquari died from asphyxiation by an elastic band from a fitted bed sheet. That day, his mother, Harris, disciplined her sons for leaving the apartment while she out doing laundry. The state argued that Jaquari would not stop crying and that Harris strangled him while five-year-old Diante slept in the bunk above. The defense claimed that Jaquari had wrapped the elastic around his own neck and accidentally asphyxiated himself. A videotaped confession, recorded the day after Jaquari’s death following 27 hours of intermittent interrogation, was admitted. Diante, has maintained since the day after Jaquari’s death that his brother wrapped the elastic band around his own neck and that neither parent was present. The trial court determined that Diante (then six) was not a competent witness, improperly reversing a presumption of competency, requiring the defendant to prove competency. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected direct appeal. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Exclusion of defense evidence violates the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause where evidence is material to the outcome and the exclusion is arbitrary or disproportionate to the state’s legitimate interests. Harris was denied effective assistance. Counsel did not interview Diante, did not secure a witness to show that Diante’s recollections were consistent, and did not challenge the burden of proof. View "Harris v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns properties in a mixed rural/suburban area in central Illinois and lives in a house on one parcel. The other parcels, about 190 acres and near the house, were zoned agricultural and very close to a hog farm. The owners of two other properties in proximity to the hog farm obtained rezoning to the “rural residential” classification, but the county declined plaintiff’s applications for rezoning. Plaintiff sued in state court; the court entered an “Agreed Order” that stated that the parcels should be rezoned, but did not order that they be rezoned. One year later, the zoning board held the required hearing and recommended approval. The County Board voted 11 to 10 in favor of the applications, less than a three-fourths majority, which functioned as a denial. In 2008, the Board granted the applications, but the real estate market had collapsed, and the parcels were no longer worth more zoned residential than they had been when zoned agricultural. Plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that protection of agriculture was a rational, nonretaliatory motive for voting against the applications. View "Guth v. Tazewell County" on Justia Law

The Illinois inmate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that his cell was infested with mice and cockroaches, that a window pane was missing and rain came in through the window, and that a warden had seen the conditions, yet nothing had been done. The district judge dismissed on alternative grounds: that the defendants were immune from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and that the complaint failed to allege harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after noting that the complaint alleged that allowing rain to enter the cell created a health hazard, adequately alleging harm. Depending on how extensive infestation is, what odors or bites or risk of disease the pests create, the prisoner’s known particular psychological sensitivities, and how long infestation continues, a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the prisoner had been subjected to harm sufficient to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment even if he had not contracted a disease or suffered any pain. The suit is against a state and a state agency and Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under section 1983, as it could have done. A state and its agencies are not suable “persons” under section 1983. View "Thomas v. State of IL" on Justia Law

Gruenberg, who has accrued 230 misconduct reports since his incarceration for burglary in 1999, seized a set of keys from a prison guard and swallowed them. He was taken to a hospital, where an x-ray showed that the keys were lodged in his abdomen. A physician told the prison officials that Gruenberg would probably pass the keys naturally within five days. They returned him to the prison and kept Gruenberg naked and in restraints for five days until he passed the keys. After five days, Gruenberg had not yet passed them and surgery was needed to remove them. Gruenberg sued, claiming violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing qualified immunity. While the conditions were undoubtedly uncomfortable, there was no evidence that any member of the prison staff showed “deliberate indifference” to Gruenberg’s health or safety. Those conditions were a reasonable response to a “unique situation.” View "Gruenberg v. Gempeler" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested plaintiffs for disorderly conduct at a 2005 antiwar demonstration. The plaintiffs brought claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false arrest, Fourteenth Amendment class-of-one equal protection violations, and state law malicious prosecution. They also brought facial challenges against Chicago’s disorderly conduct ordinance, as overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of qualified immunity. The facial attack on the ordinance was rendered moot by an earlier decision, which partially invalidated the subsection on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ arrests under a now-invalid ordinance may have affected their free speech rights, but that they did not bring an as-applied challenge to redress such an injury. View "Thayer v. Chiczewski" on Justia Law