Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An officer responding to a report of gunshots, saw a Hispanic male running toward a building. A witness told the officer that her cousin had been shot by a black male and was hiding in an apartment in that building. Officers approached the apartment. Delgado, the Hispanic male, and the shooting victim, with a visible graze wound, emerged from the apartment. Officers detained Delgado and, without a warrant, searched his apartment, finding firearms. Delgado was indicted as a felon in possession and for possessing an unregistered firearm. The district court agreed that the search was not justified by exigent circumstances, but found that it was a valid protective sweep and denied a motion to suppress. Delgado entered a conditional plea. The government conceded that the search was not a valid protective sweep, but argued that a reasonable officer could have believed that the shooter was in the apartment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that, absent any indication that anyone was in the apartment or had been subjected to violence inside the apartment, the mere fact that the shooter was at large was not enough for a reasonable officer to believe that the shooter was in the apartment. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

In 2007 Calumet City’s Mayor Qualkinbush appointed Embry commissioner, to oversee construction and repair of streets, paving, sidewalks, and other public improvements. Embry supervised day-to-day work, prepared the department’s annual budget, managed payroll and scheduling for 40 employees, and met with the mayor and other department heads to brainstorm improvements. During the 2009 municipal election, Embry campaigned for a team of candidates that included Mayor Qualkinbush and three of the four defendant-aldermen. The three broke party ranks to support Munda. Munda won, creating a rift between the defendant-aldermen and the mayor. Defendants urged Embry to stop supporting the mayor. Embry declined. After the election, the city council merged Embry’s department with the Sewer and Water Department; the Sewer Superintendent planned to retire, and Embry thought that he would be appointed commissioner of the new department. Defendant-aldermen vowed not to ratify Embry’s appointment, so the mayor nominated someone else. The city council approved the new appointment. Embry filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. . Applying the Elrod-Branti line of political-patronage cases, the district court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that the commissioner is a policy-making position and that Embry could be removed because of his political affiliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Embry v. City of Calumet City" on Justia Law

The insurers provided law enforcement liability coverage to the city of Waukegan and its employees acting within the scope of employment. In 2009, Starks filed a civil rights suit against the city and some current and former police officers, among others, alleging that each played a role in his wrongful conviction for a 1986 crime. The insurers obtained a declaratory judgment that they have no duty to defend or indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the policies were not in effect at the time of the crime, that Starks was not exonerated during the period when the policies were in place, and that any outrageous conduct that might be grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress also fell outside the policy dates. View "Northfield Ins.Co. v. City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

Holloway was arrested without a warrant and detained. Although Holloway had a probable cause determination the day after his arrest and an initial appearance in front of a judicial officer within three days, he was detained for nine days without having any charges filed against him. During his time in jail, Holloway received care from the medical staff. Before his detention, Holloway had been taking prescribed Oxycontin and other medications to treat chronic pain caused by his Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome. The jail physician did not believe that Oxycontin was necessary to treat Holloway’s chronic pain and, instead, prescribed non-narcotic pain medications and other medications to prevent narcotic withdrawal symptoms. After the prosecutor did not file charges against Holloway within the time allowed by the court, Holloway was released from jail and was admitted to a hospital, where he resumed his regimen of Oxycontin. Holloway sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the sheriff violated his rights by detaining him without charges for nine days and that the jail physician and two attending nurses violated his constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

Ray was convicted of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment, arising from a retaliatory shooting that left an 11-year-old girl dead and two others injured. At trial, the state called Detective Phillips to describe a signed statement that Ray gave during his police interview. Phillips read from Ray’s statement and recounted his own out-of-court statements informing Ray that co-actors had implicated Ray. Neither co-actor testified, but defense counsel did not object to Phillips’s testimony. Wisconsin courts rejected direct appeal and denied post-conviction relief. In his first federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit found that Ray’s constitutional rights were violated when the state introduced out-of-court statements made by individuals who did not testify, but remanded to allow the state to assert that Ray’s state post-conviction motion was untimely. On remand, the district court placed the burden of proof on Ray, finding that he did not timely give his motion to a prison official for mailing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the prisoner mailbox rule governs whether a state post-conviction document is “properly filed” because Wisconsin has not clearly rejected it. The state failed to rebut Ray’s testimony and documents showing that he timely gave his state post-conviction motion to a prison official. View "Ray v. Pollard" on Justia Law

During unrelated civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate, pro se, filed motions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions. The Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known? After Eichwedel was released, the court withdrew the certification as moot. While the underlying situation may occur again and may not be resolved before a prisoner’s release date, the chance of this situation happening to Eichwedel is simply too speculative to constitute a continuing controversy between him and IDOC. View "Eichwedel v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Johnson, an African-American woman, age 67, worked for 16 years as a legal assistant at the U.S. Attorney’s Office until her voluntary retirement in 2007.Weeks before her retirement, Johnson had a verbal altercation with another legal assistant, Mosley. Management eventually decided that the office would best be served by Johnson’s reassignment to another floor, rather than by a formal reprimand. Johnson’s salary and benefits did not change. Her duties and some working conditions were altered. She sued the Department of Justice for discrimination based on her age, sex and race. She asserted that the trier of fact could infer discriminatory intent from a “mosaic of evidence” comprised of the DOJ’s arguably contradictory witness statements and from her assertions that similarly situated employees had received preferential treatment. She also contended that she could make out a prima facie case of discrimination because she belonged to a protected class, had met her employer’s legitimate expectations, suffered an adverse employment action when reassigned to the file room and was treated differently than similarly situated employees. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOJ. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Johnson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Porter, a civilian police department employee, worked the “auto desk,” where employees process information about towed, stolen, repossessed, or recovered vehicles, 24 hours per day, seven days a week. In 2005 she was assigned to a group that has Fridays and Saturdays off. She requested reassignment because she was involved in her church. The request was granted. She then requested to work a later shift to attend classes as a student minister. The request was granted. Weeks later, Porter took leave due to a car accident and pregnancy complications. Following three months of FMLA leave, Porter took a medical leave for another six months. She returned and was assigned to the Friday/Saturday days-off group. She was told that her request would be accommodated when an opening became available in the Sunday/Monday group. Between returning to work on July 16, 2006, and November 12, 2006, Porter was absent 34 days, including 16 Sundays. Porter claimed that she was harassed by her supervisors and filed internal grievances. Porter sued, alleging that the city failed to accommodate her religious practice, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Porter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officers were investigating gunshots heard near an intersection and learned that one person had been shot in the leg and was recovering at a hospital. An officer approached a backyard shared by two duplexes on one of the streets and noticed bullet holes and a trail of spent casings in the area, including five casings next to one of the duplexes and a casing in the yard itself. Without a warrant, he entered the backyard and found and seized a rifle, which belonged to Schmidt, who was subsequently indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)). The district court denied his motion to suppress. Schmidt pled guilty and was sentenced to 21 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that any danger had dissipated by the time of the search given the heavy presence of police and passage of a few hours’ time. A reasonable officer could have believed that there were other exigent circumstances, i.e., wounded victims in the backyard; the officer’s warrantless presence in the backyard was justified even if the backyard were curtilage and the scope and breech of the rifle were in plain view once he was there. View "United States v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Sanchez testified that he, José, and friends were outside of José’s house when three unmarked police cars pulled up. Officers demanded to know what the men were doing and ordered them to empty their pockets for a pat-down. Officer Caballero seized keys and walked toward the dwelling. Sanchez protested. A swearing match ensued and Sanchez was handcuffed. Caballero nodded at officers who forced Sanchez to the pavement. Sanchez testified that the officers hit and kicked him. José called 911. The police left the scene without arresting anyone. The officers testified that they had tried to break up a fight between Sanchez and Jose; they filed contact cards without mention of a fight. Caballero wrote that José was “loitering”; Peterson wrote that Sanchez “made a suspicious movement as if to conceal something.” Sanchez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to intervene in misconduct of another. A jury found in defendants’ favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the parties and the court apparently misapprehended the prospective liability of defendants for the acts of unnamed officers, and the jury was not properly instructed as to the potential liability of officers for failing to intervene, none of the errors warranted reversal. View "Sanchez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law