Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Poole, an Illinois prisoner, believed that a required $2 co-payment for dental care furnished at the prison violate his rights under the Eighth Amendment. After paying the fee, he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Poole’s complaint “frivolously” accuses defendants of “committing strong arm robbery” against a “captive market of inmates.” After screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A, the district court dismissed Poole’s claims against several defendants with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed against Isaacs, the prison healthcare administrator, because Poole alleged that he “didn’t have any money” for the co-payment. That allegation was false, and following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Isaacs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that both the original lawsuit and the appeal were so lacking in merit that they warrant the imposition of two strikes under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Isaacs did not deny dental care for Poole, nor is she to blame for the delay in treatment. Poole had sufficient funds in his trust fund account but opted to refuse treatment rather than part with his money. View "Poole v. Issac" on Justia Law

School administrators approved a seventh grade field trip to Mauthe Lake. Students were not required to attend. The school district forbids swimming on field trips unless a lifeguard is present. The administrator, present at the lake, knew that there was no lifeguard and that there were places in the swimming area where water would be over the children’s heads. Several students entered the lake at the beach. The chaperone told the children not to go deeper than their chests, Kamonie, with others, walked until the water reached his chest, and was pulled down to water over his head. He drowned inside the designated swimming area. His parents sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming that the defendants deprived Kamonie of his life in violation of the due process clause. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A state does not deprive a person of his life in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to prevent death, but only if the death was caused by the reckless act by a state employee acting within the scope of employment. Negligence enhanced the risk to Kamonie, but negligence is not enticement, or deliberate indifference, or blindness to obvious dangers. The parents may have state law claims, but damages would be capped at $150,000. View "Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs.of the City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Humphries applied to Milwaukee County to renew her child care provider certificate. Muniz reviewed her application, sent a standard inquiry to a state agency as part of the background check, learned that Humphries had a substantiated finding of child abuse from 1988, and, after conferring with his supervisor, Muniz denied Humphries’s application. Humphries claims that she was not aware of the finding; she had been certified as a child care provider in the past. The abuse finding was later overturned and Humphries was certified. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment to Muniz and his supervisor on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a due process claim. Muniz and his supervisor had no involvement in the investigation or determination of the 1988 finding of substantiated abuse and did not violate Humphries’s constitutional rights when they relied on that finding to deny her child care provider renewal application.View "Humphries v. Milwaukee Cnty." on Justia Law

On Halloween 1996, Parish, age 20, was arrested by Elkhart police as he prepared to take his three children trick-or-treating, and charged with attempted murder and armed robbery. No physical evidence tied Parish to the crime. Based mainly on eyewitness testimony, the jury convicted Parish. For eight years, Parish pursued appeals. In 2005, the appellate court ordered a new trial based on his attorney’s failure to properly investigate and introduction of an improper jury instruction. Parish was then 30 years old. The government offered a plea that involved no additional jail time, but Parish refused. The government then dismissed the case. Parish sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found in favor of Parish, but awarded only $73,125 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. In his unsuccessful motion for a new trial, Parish presented evidence that the average jury award was nearly $950,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the court admitted testimony of eyewitnesses identifying Parish, but refused to allow Parish to present significant evidence that he was not guilty, including identification of other individuals as possible perpetrators, and recantations by the eyewitnesses. View "Parish v. City of Elkhart, IN" on Justia Law

In 1995 Chicago administered a civil-service examination for the fire department and initially hired those with scores of 89 to 100. From 2002-2006 it hired from the group who had scored 65 to 88. Plaintiffs contend that drawing a line at 89 had an unjustified disparate effect on black applicants, violating Title VII. Following a 2000 remand, in 2006 the district court held that the city had not proved justification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the charge had been filed after the limitations period expired. In 2010, the Supreme Court, reversed, holding that a new claim accrued with each use of the list to hire. The district court held that 111 class members must be hired; others receive damages. Prospective intervenors have worked as firefighters since 2005. Each contends that he thought that he would receive extra seniority, pension credits, or back pay in this litigation and that he is entitled to intervene, after judgment, because he did not know that class counsel had decided not to seek relief for persons hired from the 65-88 pool. The district judge found their motion untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Lewis v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

On December 7, 2009, Burd pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to attempted burglary. He had 30 days to withdraw the plea. For the first 29 days of this period, he was held at prison facilities that had no library resources. On the thirtieth day, he was transferred and immediately asked to use the library. Officials told him the library was closed. Burd missed the filing deadline, but continued to seek access to the law library. He filled out request slips, but each time he was denied access because the library was closed. When he explained to Sessler, the prison educational administrator, that he wanted to research withdrawing his plea or an appeal of his sentence, she told him that any such action would be untimely and denied him access to the library. Burd also requested that a fellow inmate be permitted to assist him with his motion. He never received a response. Burd did not seek to set aside his conviction through federal or state habeas corpus before filing under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of his request for damages as for failure to seek collateral relief.View "Burd v. Sessler" on Justia Law

Woolley was charged in Illinois state court with murder, armed violence, armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, arising out the fatal shootings of two victims in 1995. After initially confessing, he later recanted, claiming he had falsely implicated himself in order to protect his wife, Marcia, who committed the murders out of jealousy toward one of the victims. The jury convicted him on all counts. In state post-conviction procedures, Woolley produced an expert who pointed out flaws in expert evidence introduced at trial. After obtaining no relief and exhausting review in state court, Martin filed a federal habeas corpus petition (28 U.S.C. 2254), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Woolley’s counsel was ineffective, remaining nearly passive in the face of damning, impeachable testimony from the crime scene investigator, that effectively hollowed out the core of his client’s defense, but Woolley was not prejudiced by the error. View "Woolley v. Gaetz" on Justia Law

Escobedo became suicidal and ingested cocaine. He dialed 911 and told the operator he had taken cocaine, had a gun to his head, and wanted to kill himself. An emergency response team was dispatched to negotiate with Escobedo and to try to get him to put down his weapon and leave his apartment voluntarily. Negotiations were unsuccessful and the police opted to deploy a tactical response to remove Escobedo, as they thought he presented a danger to the community around him. After deploying two volleys of tear gas into Escobedo’s seventh-floor apartment, a team of six officers wearing gas masks and other protective equipment broke into the apartment. The officers found him in his closet with a gun to his head. The officers ordered him to put down the weapon, but Escobedo did not comply and was shot by two officers. Escobedo’s Estate brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claim against the police and the City of Fort Wayne. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of Escobedo v. Martin" on Justia Law

Harney and Muldoon occupy one unit of a three-unit Chicago building; DeVarela occupies another. In 2004, DeVarela contacted police to complain about damage to her vehicle. Midona’s police report noted an “unknown offender.” Months later, DeVarela’s dog bit Harney. Harney reported the incident. Days later, DeVarela telephoned Midona, claiming that Harney and Muldoon chased her up the stairs and pushed her. Months later DeVarela again called Midona and showed officers a videotape that may have shown Harney and Muldoon damaging the car. The next day Midona went to the building with detectives, and, outside the unit, told Harney that he was under arrest. While outside of his unit, Harney told the officers that he would get Muldoon. The officers followed Harney into the unit. Harney did not invite them in, but did not instruct them to remain outside. While Harney was speaking with Muldoon, the officers instructed them that they needed to come out of the bedroom. Harney did not know that they were in the unit until then. Harney and Muldoon were found not guilty of damaging the vehicle and sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) Midona and the city. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Harney v. Devarela" on Justia Law

In 2006, B.T., 14 years old, was failing in high school. Her friends accused her of making a bomb threat. She attempted suicide. In July 2006, B.T. told police that Dietrich, a family friend, had sexually assaulted her between June and August 2004 when she was 12 years old. Dietrich was charged repeated first-degree sexual assault of a child and intimidation of a child victim. Dietrich sought in camera review of B.T.’s counseling records. Dietrich believed the records would show that though the alleged sexual assaults occurred in 2004, B.T. did not tell her therapist about the assaults until after her April 2006 suicide attempt. The state trial court declined. Dietrich was convicted and sentenced to 13 years in prison. After exhausting post-conviction remedies in Wisconsin courts, Dietrich sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether Dietrich’s due process rights were violated when the state trial court did not conduct the requested in camera review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The state court reasonably applied precedent, as Dietrich failed to make a plausible showing that the victim’s counseling records contained evidence material to his defense. View "Dietrich v. Smith" on Justia Law