Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Since 2006 Ray has experienced pain in his shoulder. He contends that the pain stems from an injury and that an MRI scan would point the way toward successful treatment; Shah, Ray’s treating physician at the correctional center, believes that the pain stems from arthritis and that a scan would not help in diagnosis and treatment. The district court rejected Ray’s suit under 42 U.S.C.1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Ray has been examined often, x-rays have been taken, and physicians have prescribed painkillers; staff also has arranged for Ray to be assigned a lower bunk. Because Ray’s claim fails the objective component of cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis, his contention that Dr. Shah displayed subjective antipathy is irrelevant. View "Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate of a federal prison, filed a “Bivens” suit against seven named prison staff members plus several unnamed defendants, complaining that in retaliation for the plaintiff’s going on hunger strikes, they used excessive force to force feed him and extract blood samples, placed him in a cell infested with feces, denied him minimal recreational opportunities, refused to allow him to have a Bible, refused to allow him to file grievances, and tried to block his access to the federal courts. The district judge dismissed the complaint before a responsive pleading was filed on the ground that the “99-page complaint defies understanding, rendering it unintelligible” and citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that a complaint may be long not because the draftsman is incompetent or is seeking to obfuscate, but because it contains a large number of distinct charges. The 28-page complaint, with a 71-page appendix, is not excessively long given the number of separate claims and is “not only entirely intelligible; it is clear.” View "Kadamovas v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald had not eaten all day, had not slept in three day, and drank some wine. Feeling “down,” Fitzgerald attempted to call a hospital help line, but instead dialed a police non-emergency number. She proceeded to talk to the desk officer. Though Fitzgerald denied suicidal thought or intention, the desk officer described a “very depressed,” possibly suicidal, intoxicated female caller. As officers approached the building, Fitzgerald abruptly hung up on the desk officer. This information was relayed to the officers. Upon entering the apartment, officers and paramedics found Fitzgerald unsteady on her feet and slurring her words. For 30 minutes, they talked to her. She denied wanting to harm herself, but admitted being upset and told them that she had been taking anti-depressants. They, along with Fitzgerald, unsuccessfully attempted to contact Fitzgerald’s friends. The decision was made to take Fitzgerald to the hospital. Fitzgerald would not go voluntarily. She screamed and physically resisted. Eventually, the officers and paramedics lifted Fitzgerald onto the stretcher and handcuffed her right hand to the stretcher. She continued to resist, eventually breaking bones in her wrist. Surgical repair was necessary. The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fitzgerald v. Santoro" on Justia Law

Devbrow entered the Indiana prison system in 2000. During intake, he told the medical staff that he had prostate problems and would need to be tested for prostate cancer within two to four years. In 2004 a test revealed an elevated PSA, but the medical staff did not order a prostate biopsy for more than a year. In a biopsy six months later, Devbrow was diagnosed with prostate cancer that had spread to his spine; treatment options were severely limited. Devbrow sued prison doctors and a nurse practitioner under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered judgment for the defendants based on the two-year statute of limitations, construing the claim as a constitutional violation that in April 2005 when the biopsy was ordered. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations for a section 1983 deliberate-indifference claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause. Devbrow did not know of his injury when the defendants ordered a biopsy; he discovered it six months later when he learned he had cancer that might have been diagnosed and treated earlier. View "Devbrow v. Kalu" on Justia Law

McArdle was hired as principal of Lindbergh School in 2008 with a two-year contract that allowed termination after one year with payment of severance. Lindbergh’s prior principal, Davis, was McArdle’s superior. McArdle claims that she discovered irregularities, including Davis’ use of school funds for personal purposes; improper payment to a student teacher; and circumvention of rules regarding admission of nonresidents. McArdle alleges that she received evasive responses from Davis. Davis put McArdle on a performance improvement plan in 2009, asserting parental complaints, but refusing to identify complainants. McArdle was told that the board would consider termination of her contract. McArdle consulted an attorney and filed a police report, accusing Davis of theft of school funds. She sent letters to the board, listing improprieties. Davis was excused from the meeting; the board discussed McArdle’s allegations, then voted to terminate McArdle’s contract at the end of the school year. Davis was prosecuted for theft of school funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on claims under the First Amendment and of breach and interference with contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. McArdle’s reporting of misconduct was speech as a public employee, not shielded from her employer’s response; defendants’ motives are immaterial. View "McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. 150" on Justia Law

Animal control officers responded to a complaint about the Abbotts’ dog running loose. Travis interfered with efforts to capture the dog and made threats, prompting a call to police. After his mother, Cindy, coaxed him out, Officer Sweeney informed Travis that he was under arrest for obstruction and assault. Travis attempted to evade the officers. Sweeney handcuffed Travis and placed him in a cruiser. A taser was used. Seeing Travis struggling in the moving car, with no partition, Sweeney reached to gain control. His foot slipped and his cruiser rolled into Cindy’s vehicle. Cindy became upset and began screaming. Sweeney, concerned that she was trying to help Travis escape, ordered her to stop, but she continued toward the vehicles. He shot her in the abdomen with his taser. Cindy fell; after another jolt, she was handcuffed. Cindy was never informed of charges against her. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part; Sweeney had probable cause to arrest Travis and is entitled to qualified immunity on Travis’s excessive-force claim. Qualified immunity also applies to Cindy’s false-arrest and false imprisonment claims, but the court vacated with respect to her excessive-force claim.View "Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1983, Matamoros was sentenced to 10 years in prison, with a three-year special parole term to follow. When his ordinary parole term expired in 2005, Matamoros’ parole officer issued a Notice of Discharge, explaining that he was no longer subject to supervision by the U.S. Parole Commission. Neither the Commission nor Matamoros’ parole officer noticed that Matamoros still had the special parole term left to serve until a month later, when the Commission issued a Certificate of Special Parole, nunc pro tunc. About six hours after the Commission issued the Certificate, Matamoros participated in an armed robbery, for which he was later sentenced to jail in Wisconsin. The Commission issued a warrant for Matamoros’ arrest for violating the conditions of his special parole. The warrant later lodged as a detainer that remains in effect. Matamoros sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of the special parole term imposition, the detainer, and the delayed dispositional review of the detainer. Matamoros argued that the government should be estopped from enforcing the detainer because he was mistakenly told he was no longer subject to the Commission’s supervision. The district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Matamoros v. Gram" on Justia Law

Starting in 2002, Smith sought a place on Beloit’s “tow list,” to be called when police required towing services. Chief Wilson denied these requests. Smith, who is African-American, attributed his exclusion to racial bias. In 2008, Wilson’s subordinates made allegations that, in everyday conversation, Wilson referred to “niggers,” “towel heads,” and “spics.” Several officers specifically recalled that Wilson used such slurs about Smith. Smith filed claims under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, 42 U.S.C.1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict finding that race was a “motivating factor” in Wilson’s decision not to include Smith on the list, but that Wilson would not have added Smith to the list even if race had played no part in Wilson’s thinking. The district court concluded that the mixed verdict precluded relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury’s second finding (that his company would have been left off the tow list regardless of race) was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; that Smith was entitled to some relief because he succeeded in demonstrating that improper racial considerations at least partially motivated Wilson; and that instruction on the allocation of the burden of persuasion was incorrect. View "Smith v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Suggs was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 300 months. He challenged his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, succeeding on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing. On remand, the district court sentenced him to 240 months. After his 2009 resentencing, Suggs obtained new information that he argues was withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland. A key witness has recanted and claims that his first statement to law enforcement did not implicate Suggs. The government agreed that if this were Suggs’ first 2255 motion, the evidence would require an evidentiary hearing, but sections 2244(a) and 2255(h) restrict “second or successive” motions to circumstances that do not apply. The Seventh Circuit denied permission to bring a second challenge, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), finding that his new evidence did “not come close to showing that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty.” Suggs filed a new 2255 motion, arguing that the new evidence challenge should not be barred because his resentencing imposed a new judgment. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Magwood v. Patterson, did not address this situation. View "Suggs v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011, BEST fired Aslin, a securities broker, to remain compliant with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority “Taping Rule,” which requires securities firms to adopt monitoring measures when too many of their brokers have recently worked for “Disciplined Firms.” Instead of adopting such measures, the employer may terminate brokers. FINRA, a private corporation, is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a “national securities association.” The Maloney Act provides for establishment of private self-regulatory organizations to oversee securities markets, 15 U.S.C. 78o. The SEC must approve FINRA’s rules and may abrogate, add to, and delete FINRA rules. Aslin filed suit alleging that FINRA violated his due process rights by including him on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms without providing him the opportunity to challenge the designation. The district court dismissed, concluding that Aslin failed to state a claim because he was not deprived of a protected property or liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Since Aslin sought only injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent application of the rule to him, the controversy ended in 2012, after which Aslin was no longer included on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms and the case was moot. View "Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc." on Justia Law