Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hale, former head of a racist church, was convicted of putting a contract on the life of a federal judge who ruled against the church in a trademark case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court then rejected Hale’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hale defaulted claims relating to the trial judge excluding him from a portion of jury selection that dealt with pretrial publicity concerning Hale’s praise of an individual who shot at least 11 people belonging to minority groups. Hale’s lawyer agreed that inquiries would best be made out of Hale’s presence and Hale did not raise the issue on direct appeal. With respect to a claim of ineffective assistance, the court noted that lawyers are forbidden to use peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors based on race and it that it would not second-guess trial counsel’s choice to defend by claiming entrapment or that Hale’s instructions to kill the judge were a misunderstanding. View "Hale v. United States" on Justia Law

The owner (an Asian Indian) of 60-room hotel in a manufacturing district near a major highway in Oak Forest, a Chicago suburb, sued the city, charging racial discrimination in zoning (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982) and that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, based on the city’s refusal to allow it to sell the hotel for conversion to a retirement home to be owned by a church in which most of the membership is African-American. The city claimed that a retirement home would not be “highway oriented” and, after the plan was proposed, amended its ordinance so that the hotel became nonconforming, and denied a special use permit. The owner later lost the hotel in foreclosure; it is now operating as a hotel under new ownership. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting numerous irregularities in the zoning process, but stating that the owner presented no evidence that any comparable facility, serving a white clientele, has ever been permitted by Oak Forest in a comparable district. View "Parvati Corp. v. City of Oak Forest" on Justia Law

Officers stopped a truck after they witnessed occupants apparently engaging in a drug deal. Hunter fled from the passenger seat with something resembling a gun in his hand. Officers ordered Hunter to stop, but Hunter continued to run. The officers heard a gunshot and fired at Hunter, striking him in the left buttock and in the foot. Hunter fell to the ground and was handcuffed. Police recovered a revolver from the ground close to Hunter, with one spent shell casing in the cylinder. Hunter was transported to a hospital by ambulance. Detective Karzin accompanied Hunter, who was handcuffed to the hospital gurney at all times. Doctors administered narcotics, but a treating nurse later testified that he had remained “alert and oriented.” While Hunter was receiving treatment, Karzin sat silently in the room until Hunter initiated interaction. Karzin read Hunter his Miranda rights. At some point, Hunter gave the name of his lawyer and asked if Karzin would call him. Karzin did not do so. Hunter made incriminating statements to officers who arrived after the conversation. The district court suppressed the statements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the interrogation occurred after Hunter unambiguously invoked his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

An inmate of the Illinois Danville Correctional Center sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The inmate suffers from scoliosis and the prison rejected his “incessant” requests for a lower bunk and for a medical mattress, a back brace, and orthopedic shoes. The district judge granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, in an opinion that included references to a Wiki-How article on bunk-climbing and to the recent discovery of the skeletal remains of Richard III of England and a picture of inmates in bunks. The court noted “overwhelming” evidence that he had no medical need for any of the requested items, except, possibly a lower bunk. Noting the inmate’s claim that he was injured trying to get into the upper bunk after being refused permission to sleep in the health care unit, the court remanded for a determination of the facts on that claim. View "Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

After drinking very heavily and accelerating to 80-90 miles per hour on a road with a posted limit of 35 mph, to escape alleged pursuers, McNary woke up in a hospital and learned that he had killed a pedestrian and then two occupants of a vehicle, during a police chase. He claims that he has no memory of speaking to officers at the hospital, of receiving Miranda warnings, or consenting to blood alcohol test. He is serving two life sentences, without the possibility of parole, in an Illinois state prison. State courts rejected arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on failure to prove that McNary was in custody while speaking to officers by eliciting testimony from his sister about her observations at the hospital and eliciting prejudicial testimony from McNary. The district court denied a habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the conclusion of the Illinois appellate court. View "McNary v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Mann operated a home day care center. While she was gone, her husband, a licensed day care provider, and Thompson, a newly-hired assistant, remained at the center. The children were left alone in the basement for about 10 minutes. One child hit another with a tray. A complaint was made to DCFS, which determined that Thompson was working without a background search or a medical evaluation. DCFS determined that Mann had failed to provide proper supervision, shut down the center, and prohibited Mann and her husband from providing child care pending full investigation. DCFS entered Mann’s name into the Illinois database concerning child abuse and neglect. DCFS concluded that the violation was “substantiated,” and after supervisory review, recommended license revocation. After another level of review, a corrective plan was recommend rather than revocation. Mann entered into a plan and had the report expunged and her name removed from the database. Mann sued DCFS employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Mann was not unconstitutionally deprived of a protected liberty interest relating to imposition of the protective plan or deprived of due process when she was prohibited from running her facility during the investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Mann v. Vogel" on Justia Law

Smith was arrested with narcotics on his person. Smith alleges and the officers deny that the officers stomped on his hand and beat him. When Smith arrived at the police station around he had an obvious finger injury. Officers delivered Smith to a hospital; a doctor determined that Smith’s finger needed to be moved back into place and that painkiller should be administered. Smith declined local anesthetic and instead requested “Dilaudid” (a morphine derivative similar to heroin). A doctor administered Dilaudid, and splinted Smith’s finger. Smith returned to the hospital days later; his finger was swollen and infected. It was no longer medically alive. The doctor told Smith that amputation might be necessary. Before Smith could return for another appointment, he was arrested and again alleged mistreatment (officers kneeling on and slapping his injured hand), which the officers again deny. After processing Smith at the station, officers returned him to the hospital, where the finger was amputated. At trial on Smith’s claims of excessive force and failure to provide medical attention, the district court allowed the defense to present evidence of Smith’s heroin use prior to one of the arrests. The jury found for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Smith v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Wells shot his gun into the air several times to celebrate the New Year, 2008. Arriving to investigate, Officer Coker shot Wells three times, seriously injuring Wells. Coker claims that Wells turned toward him and pointed a gun in his direction; Wells denies doing so. Through an agreement with the state to dismiss a felony count, Wells pleaded guilty to reckless conduct that he “discharged a firearm multiple times . . . and then pointed the firearm at [Coker].” Before entering the plea, Wells sued Coker and the City of Springfield, alleging that Coker used excessive force in shooting Wells. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Wells was judicially estopped from denying that he had pointed the gun at Coker because Wells pleaded guilty to a charge that included the statement that he had pointed the gun at Coker. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that neither judicial estoppel nor other doctrines of preclusion apply to the particular facts of Wells’s plea agreement. The discussion of the facts supporting the charge was brief and that Wells’s guilty plea was not specific with respect to what he admitted. View "Wells v. Coker" on Justia Law

Gutierrez was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Raymond. After pursuing his Illinois state court avenues for post-conviction relief, Gutierrez brought a federal action for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied his petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that: Gutierrez received two trials in state court; that his testimony was contradicted by testimony witnesses and by the physical evidence at trial; and that, before the second trial, the court heard extensive testimony as to Gutierrez’ history of treatment for mental illness. The Illinois appellate court held that even if evidence of Gutierrez’ mental illness had been presented, there was no reasonable probability that the court would have found that Gutierrez had a genuine, though unreasonable, belief that it was necessary for him to use deadly force to defend himself from Raymond. That court properly analyzed the evidence and reasonably applied the law. View "Gutierrez v. Anglin" on Justia Law