Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Westmoreland was convicted first for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, and in a second trial, for additional counts stemming from the murder of the wife of his partner in drug-dealing: causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime; using interstate commerce facilities to commit murder for hire; conspiring to commit murder for hire; tampering with a witness by committing murder; and causing the death of a witness through use of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed in 2001 and 2002. In 2002 he moved for a new trial, based on outrageous conduct, including the fact that a state police officer had an affair with his wife and a recantation. The court took no significant action before denying the motion in 2010. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Westmoreland did not present “newly discovered evidence” and was not prejudiced by allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Westmoreland" on Justia Law

In 2006 a teenager accused Gakuba of kidnapping and raping him. State charges are pending Gakuba sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that investigating police barged into his Rockford hotel room without a warrant and seized his wallet and other items after obtaining Gakuba’s video rental records from Hollywood Video to corroborate the accuser’s story that he had spent time watching videos in Gakuba’s room. He also sought damages under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court dismissed without prejudice, granting Gakuba leave to amend his complaint if the indictment concluded in his favor. The court advised Gakuba that certain claims would be barred on immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Gakuba’s claims of damages resulting from illegal searches, seizures, and detentions involve constitutional issues that may be litigated during the course of his criminal case. Monetary relief is not available to him in his defense of criminal charges and his claims may become time-barred by the time the state prosecution has concluded, so the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed Gakuba’s civil-rights claims. The court noted that Hollywood Video employees knowingly disclosed his rental information to the police without a warrant. View "Gakuba v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services removed Woods, then seven years old from his parents’ home in 1991 and placed him in a residential treatment facility. There had been many reports of sexual abuse among residents of the facility and Woods, claiming to have been abused by another resident, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because Woods failed to bring his claim within two years of its accrual, rejecting Woods’s contention that the 20-year limitations period applicable in Illinois to personal injury claims based on childhood sexual abuse applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The limitations period applicable to all Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and this includes claims involving allegations of failure to protect from childhood sexual abuse. View "Woods v. IL Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

The Pekin Board of Fire and Police Commissioners determined that Simmons, an officer of the city’s police department, had disobeyed an order. It suspended him without pay for 20 days. A state court of appeals reversed, concluding that the chief of police lacked authority to issue the order. Campion, a psychologist, had concluded that Simmons was unfit for duty. Simmons told the chief that he had been evaluated by other psychologists who thought him able to serve. The chief ordered Simmons to ensure that these other psychologists provided Campion with their conclusions, supported by evaluations and data. The appellate court held that the chief could require an officer to provide no more than a psychologist’s bottom line. Simmons then sued under 42 U.S.C.1983, contending that the due process clause requires the city to make up the pay he lost. The district court dismissed, holding that Illinois requires back pay only when the board rules in an officer’s favor, while here the favorable ruling came from a court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the district judge should not have used a section 1983 suit to resolve a claim that rests entirely on a proposition of state substantive law. View "Simmons v. Gillespie" on Justia Law

Bracey, an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, was injured in a 2005 altercation with officers after refusing to exit his cell as requested by officers executing a random search. Two days later, Bracey filed a complaint claiming that an officer “viciously attacked” him; by the time he notified the prison that tapes of the incident probably existed, the tapes had been recorded over. Bracey filed suit in 2010 alleging that corrections officers used excessive force and spoliation in failure to download and preserve video from the prison security cameras. Bracey requested court assistance in recruiting counsel, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). The district court concluded Bracey had made adequate efforts to find counsel but found the allegations sufficiently straightforward and Bracey sufficiently competent to handle the case himself. It denied a motion to compel disclosure of information relating to the destruction of the videotapes and denied requests for spoliation sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bracey did not meet his burden of establishing a duty to preserve the videotape and destruction of that video in bad faith. View "Bracey v. Grondin" on Justia Law

Thomas was sentenced to 65 years’ imprisonment for murder. Indiana courts affirmed the conviction and rejected collateral attack. A federal district judge denied Thomas’s petition for habeas corpus, declined to issue a certificate of appealability, and certified that the appeal had been taken in bad faith, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3). Thomas sought to proceed in forma pauperis. Under section 1915, appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that the prohibition does not apply to collateral attacks. Appellate fees are authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1913, which predated the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA). If Section 1915 were entirely inapplicable to collateral attacks, just because several of its subsections were rewritten by the PLRA, then there would be no basis for excusing prepayment of the fees and prisoners would be worse off. View "Thomas v. Hank" on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

Vaughn started working for the U.S. Forest Service in 1974. Vaughn filed internal complaints in 1997, 2004, 2005 and 2006, asserting discrimination based on race and age, and retaliation for exercising his right to bring such complaints. Vaughn filed suit, but in 2007 signed a settlement agreement. Two days later, he received a “letter of direction” describing a change in his work schedule. He would no longer work regular weekday hours. After receiving the letter, Vaughn was passed over for a temporary assignment and was denied overtime. During roughly the same period, Vaughn’s relationship with a co-worker ended, she accused him of harassment, and he was placed on administrative leave. She continued to complain after he returned and filed an EEOC complaint and a state court order of protection. Vaughn sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, claiming retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The district court granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vaughn failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he has failed to demonstrate that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations. The employer put forward, and he failed to rebut, a legitimate reason for the action that was taken. View "Vaughn v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Hudson filed suit in an Illinois district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, charging that medical personnel at a federal prison in Kansas, where he had been incarcerated, had negligently failed to diagnose a blood clot in his leg and that, as a result, he experienced serious health problems. The government moved to transfer the case to the federal district court in Kansas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), on the ground that the principal witnesses are in Kansas and that the Kansas court has a lighter caseload. The district court granted the motion. Hudson has petitioned the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the case should remain in Illinois because he lives here, as do his current treating physicians, who will testify about his current health problems and causation. His Illinois relatives will also testify to his continuing health problems. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that about two-thirds of the witnesses are closer to Kansas, that the medical records are in Kansas, and the ease of electronic communications. View "Hudson v. Baker" on Justia Law

Engel was convicted in 1991in Missouri state court for a drug-related kidnapping and was sentenced to 90 years in prison. In 2010 the state’s highest court vacated the conviction, based on the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence that a police investigator had paid a key witness to testify. The state declined to retry him and Engel was released after 19 years in prison. He sued the police department, the United States, individual officers, and the FBI agent claimed to have fabricated evidence. The district court denied the FBI agent’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding a “Bivens” action is available for “Brady” violations and that qualified immunity did not apply because the Brady obligations at issue were well-established at the time of the events at issue. View "Engel v. Buchan" on Justia Law