Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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In 2007 Maniscalco hosted a party for a local politician at his Gurnee restaurant. Maniscalco capped the night with celebratory shots of tequila and a trip to McDonald’s, where he encountered Fidel Castro at the drive-through window. Minutes earlier, a police officer had handed Castro a note containing four numbers (2626) and told him to give it to his co-worker Guzman. Castro did so. The numbers partly corresponded to Maniscalco’ license-plate number: C112626. Maniscalco got into an argument with Guzman while paying for his order, grabbing Guzman and, according to Guzman, nearly pulling him through the window. Maniscalco released Guzman and drove to the pick-up window. As Castro was giving him his food, Guzman yelled to stop. Castro stopped; Maniscalco drove off. The manager called 911. A dispatch went out over the police radio. Maniscalco was arrested. A jury found him not guilty of drunk driving and battery. Maniscalco sued the officers and McDonald’s under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming conspiracy to induce him to breach the peace so the officers would have a pretext to arrest him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Notwithstanding Castro’s deposition testimony about the unexplained note, the evidence supported probable cause to arrest. McDonald’s cannot be liable because there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. View "Maniscalco v. Simon" on Justia Law

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Lisa Williamson and her husband Lance were arrested on a charge that they had stolen someone else’s horse. The facts are disputed, but the horse had apparently been boarded at Lance’s stable, by an agent of its owner, but against the owner’s specific wishes. After being acquitted, Williamson filed suit against two Lake County, Illinois sheriff’s deputies under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they arrested her without probable cause and in violation of her right to equal protection by arresting her based on nothing more (she contends) than her status as Lance’s wife. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. So far as the deputies knew, Lance was in the wrong in maintaining possession of the horse, and the lien filed by Williamson Stables was a ruse to give cover to his conversion of the horse and, quite possibly, to extort money from the horse’s owner; they also had reason to believe, based in large part on Williamson’s own interaction with them, that she shared responsibility along with her husband and Williamson’s Stables for the possession of and refusal to surrender the horse. View "Williamson v. Curran" on Justia Law

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In 1996, Stalker was fatally bludgeoned and stabbed following a drug sale. Witnesses led Chicago police to Monroe and three fellow members of the Black P-Stone Nation street gang: Thomas, Curry, and Jackson, who had been selling crack cocaine and Stalker, a member of another gang, who had recruited customers. Members of Stalker’s gang drove up to make a purchase but sped off without paying for the cocaine. Stalker was beaten by Monroe and Curry, then stabbed by Thomas. Monroe later acknowledged striking Stalker but denied any foreknowledge that Thomas would stab him. Monroe pleaded not guilty. Jackson, after himself being acquitted on a murder charge, was a key witness. Monroe was convicted of first-degree murder on an accountability theory and sentenced to 40 years. After exhausting state remedies, Monroe unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments: that Monroe was arrested without probable cause; that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call his brother and sister-in-law as witnesses at trial and in support of his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements; and that the state presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction on an accountability theory. View "Monroe v. Birkey" on Justia Law

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Warren shot and killed a man in 2002, during a marijuana sale. Although Warren was originally charged in state court with first-degree intentional homicide, he eventually pled no contest to first-degree reckless homicide, a reduced charge. Soon after entering the plea, Warren began attempting to withdraw it. He unsuccessfully fought his 40-year sentence through the Wisconsin court system and was denied habeas corpus in federal district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the state trial court’s refusal to allow him to withdraw his plea deprived him of due process and that he received unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel throughout his state court proceedings. View "Warren v. Baenen" on Justia Law

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Following his arrest in 2009, Budd spent 45 days in the Edgar County Jail. In newspaper articles, the sheriff described the jail as not “livable” and violating “acceptable standards.” During his detention, Budd was confined with eight inmates in a space intended for three; he had to sleep on the floor alongside broken windows and cracked toilets. After another arrest, Budd returned to the jail. Vents were blocked, the heating and air conditioning systems did not work, and inmates were denied any recreation. During a third stay at the facility, something scratched or bit Budd’s leg. After infection set in, the jail nurse gave Budd ice. Budd wrote to the sheriff asking to see a doctor. Over the course of several hospital visits, he received tests, medication, and an MRI. He developed a “hole in [his] leg,” which doctors attributed to unsanitary conditions at the jail. He became “hysterical” at the prospect of returning to the jail. A judge ordered that he be taken to another facility. After a video conference to screen Budd’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, the district court dismissed, but furnished no written statement of reasons and did not prepare a transcript. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. View "Budd v. Motley" on Justia Law

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McDaniel arrived at the emergency room in May, 2001, with a gunshot wound to the head. She died two days later. Her death was ruled a homicide, and Brady, her boyfriend and the father of her child, became a suspect. After several weeks on the run, Brady was arrested in Los Angeles, extradited to Illinois, and convicted. Brady claims the shooting was an accident and has identified four witnesses to corroborate his story. None of them testified at trial, because Brady’s lawyer did not call them. State courts were not persuaded that the omission was serious enough to undermine his conviction, and the federal district court held that their decision was not so unreasonable that federal relief was possible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that the performance of Brady’s lawyer fell below constitutional standards, he cannot show prejudice. The court characterized the proffered testimony as only “marginally exculpatory.” View "Brady v. Hardy" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs are correctional officers and were part of a specialized unit, the Special Operations Response Team (SORT) that guarded inmates in the Cook County Jail’s Abnormal Behavioral Observation Unit (ABO). In 2006, six violent felons escaped from the ABO, raising suspicion of inside assistance. A correctional officer, Gater, confessed to allowing the escape and named three others as assisting him or having advance knowledge of the escape. Those officers were investigated and reassigned after disbandment of SORT. They filed suit, claiming psychological and emotional injuries from the investigation and that they were investigated due to their political support for a then-candidate for Sheriff. Following a remand, the district court again denied summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact relating to the political retaliation claims, the veracity of Gater’s confession and the fact that no other officers were investigated for the jailbreak. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Authorities had probable cause to investigate the officers, making other possible motivations for their treatment less relevant. While the defendants may have expressed negative opinions regarding the officers’ support of the candidate, it was objectively reasonable to investigate officers implicated in a multi-felon jailbreak. View "Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

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Burge joined the Chicago Police Department in 1970 and rose to commanding officer of the violent crimes section in the 1980s, but his career was marked by accusations from more than individuals who claimed that he and officers under his command tortured suspects in order to obtain confessions. Burge was fired in 1993 after the Office of Professional Standards investigated the allegations, but he was never criminally charged. When asked about the practices in civil interrogatories served on him years later, Burge lied and denied any knowledge of, or participation in, torture of suspects. A jury heard overwhelming evidence to contradict that assertion and convicted Burge for obstruction of justice and perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) and 1621(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence showed that Burge lied when he answered the interrogatories, his false statements impeded an official proceeding, and the statements were material to the outcome of the civil case. Burge received a fair trial and hearsay reference to a victim impact letter was admissible at sentencing.View "United States v. Burge" on Justia Law

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Although Hall has been a plumber for the City of Chicago since 1995, she was on disability leave from 1999 to 2003 due to a work-related injury. Hall returned to the City’s employ with the limitation that she could not lift over 25 pounds. Hall and the City agree this restriction precluded her from resuming work as a plumber, so Hall began working in the House Drain Inspectors Division of the Department, which was composed of 13 male house drain inspectors and the supervisor’s female secretary. Hall claims that the supervisor created a hostile work environment by assigning her menial work and prohibiting coworkers from interacting with her. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in her Title VII suit, finding that the conduct was not hostile in comparison to other employees’ responsibilities and that Hall failed to produce evidence that the supervisor’s conduct was because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a jury could infer that deliberate isolation of Hall was sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment and that the supervisor’s comments to Hall could indicate that Hall’s gender played a part in his actions. View "Hall v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

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An inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, complaining that officials denied him an accommodation of his religious observances. He is a member of a religious sect, the African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem, and took the “Nazirite vow,” which committed him not to cut his hair. He wore his hair in dreadlocks, which form naturally in some people who do not cut their hair. His previous suit, based on the prison’s refusal to allow him to have visitors unless he consented to a haircut, settled in 2003; the parties agreed that he could receive visitors, if he allowed prison staff to search his hair before and after any visit for concealed contraband. In 2004, for appearance in court in a case he had filed, the prison gave the inmate a choice: a haircut, or segregation as punishment for eluding his scheduled trip to court. He chose the haircut. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Precedent recognizes the need for and validity of rules regulating the hairstyles of prisoners in the interest of security; the Nazirite vow is an optional rather than mandatory observance for African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem. View "Peter Lewis v. Jerry Sternes, et al" on Justia Law