Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

From 1996 to 2003, Harbaugh worked periodically for Chicago Public Schools as a substitute music teacher. In 2003, she was hired as a “full-time basis substitute,” and tin 2004 she was appointed to a fulltime probationary tenure-track teaching position. In 2008, the principal at Harbaugh’s school recommended against renewing her contract. The Chicago Board of Education accepted that recommendation and terminated her appointment effective at the end of the semester. Harbaugh sued, alleging violation of her due-process rights by terminating her employment without a hearing. The district court entered summary judgment for the Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Illinois law Harbaugh had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment only if she had tenure; a teacher becomes tenured at the beginning of her fifth year of full-time employment on the tenure track. Her year as a full-time-basis substitute teacher does not count toward the four-year requirement. View "Harbaugh v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Between 2002 and 2005, May, a Chrysler pipefitter, was the target of graffiti in and around the plant’s paint department. Messages stated: “Otto Cuban Jew fag die,” “Otto Cuban good Jew is a dead Jew,” “death to the Cuban Jew,” “fuck Otto Cuban Jew fag,” “get the Cuban Jew,” and “fuck Otto Cuban Jew nigger lover.” May found death-threat notes in his toolbox, had his tires punctured, had sugar poured in the gas tanks of his cars, and found a dead bird wrapped in toilet paper to look like a Ku Klux Klansman in his work station. May contacted the police, the FBI, the Anti-Defamation League, and complained to Chrysler. Chrysler responded: The head of human resources informed employees that harassment was unacceptable, a procedure was implemented to document harassment, efforts were made to discover who was present when the incidents occurred, and a handwriting analyst was retained. The offenders were never caught. May sued Chrysler, alleging violations under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. His hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment. A jury awarded $709,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages. May accepted remittitur to $300,000; the court vacated the award of punitive damages. On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "May v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law

In 1996, Brown was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court classified Brown as a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Brown filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion arguing that “counsel was ineffective for failure to object to his sentencing as a career offender which resulted in his sentence being a minimum of 360 months instead of between 262 and 327 months.” The district court rejected this argument. The Third Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Now incarcerated in Indiana, Brown filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, contending that under the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Begay v. U.S., his Delaware conviction for Arson in the Third Degree did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the savings clause in 2255(e) requires a claim of actual innocence directed to the conviction, not merely the sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that challenges to a sentence are not categorically barred under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Under Begay, Brown’s prior conviction does not qualify as “generic” arson under the Guidelines’ enumerated crimes clause, nor is it covered by the residual clause. View "Brown v. Lockett" on Justia Law

Loera was a passenger in a car stopped for traffic violations. The driver consented to a search and the police found cocaine. Arrested, Loera was read his Miranda rights and refused to sign a waiver. Loera stated that he knew nothing about the cocaine; he had been asked to deliver the car. He offered to assist in apprehending intended recipients of the drugs. On his attorney’s motion, the judge suppressed statements made after a request for counsel, but did not suppress all post-arrest statements, nor rule that Loera had actually requested a lawyer. The court dismissed without prejudice, for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). After reindictment, Loera's attorney moved to suppress all the statements made after his arrest. The court ruled that Loera had never asked for a lawyer. Loera was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Loera then moved to aside his conviction, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective, 28 U.S.C. 2255, for failing to argue that the first ruling on suppression should be binding at trial and for failing to argue that the delay violated both the Speedy Trial Act and the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment, so that dismissal should have been with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Loera v. Unted States" on Justia Law

Kamlager was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and use of a dangerous weapon in the death of his girlfriend, Wis. Stat. 940.01(1)(a), and was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for extended supervision. He was also convicted of hiding a corpse and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. After exhausting postconviction remedies, Kamlager sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied his writ of habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing as “harmless error” the admission of statements Kamlager made to officers after he requested to see counsel. Given the “overwhelming” evidence of guilt, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict even if the tainted evidence had been suppressed. View "Kamlager v. Pollard" on Justia Law

In 2005 Smith was charged with impersonating a police officer and was detained in the Sangamon County Detention Facility pending trial. Because he had a parole hold and a history of problems during a prior detention, Smith was housed in a maximum-security cellblock. While there, he was severely beaten by another inmate who was awaiting trial on armed-robbery and aggravated-battery charges. Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that the Department’s approach to classifying inmates for cellblock placement ignores serious risks to inmate safety by failing to separate “nonviolent” from “violent” inmates with assaultive tendencies. A magistrate entered summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To avoid summary judgment, Smith needed evidence that the jail’s security classification policy systematically fails to address obvious risks to inmate safety. He had no such evidence. View "Smith v. Sangamon Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Collins fled police officers by car and then by foot after he was stopped for speeding. An officer kicked Collins repeatedly and dosed him with pepper spray, but Collins did not stop resisting until another officer deployed his Taser. Afterward, the officers discovered a bag containing crack and powder cocaine that Collins had discarded during the foot chase, and a wad of cash in his pocket. The district court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that use of excessive force during an arrest is not a basis for suppressing evidence and that the drugs and money were not seized as a result of the alleged use of excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Stitts was convicted of murder in Indiana state court and sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Stitts claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, because, before deciding not to present an alibi defense, he only interviewed one alibi witness, Stitts’s father, unreasonably failing to investigate whether there might be more. The state court found that such a limited investigation was sufficient under Strickland. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded to state court for a factual determination of the amount of investigation actually conducted. Stitts’s alibi was that he was at a nightclub, where there could be any number of potential alibi witnesses, so failure to explore that possibility would be unreasonable. The state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it found no prejudice, because the prosecution’s case rested entirely on the shaky testimony of two witnesses which could have been neutralized by alibi witness testimony. View "Stitts v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Cromwell was fired from his position as a Momence police lieutenant, after an incident of alleged misconduct involving alcohol that was followed by lying and insubordination during the investigation. Cromwell sued, arguing that his termination was procedurally inadequate and that that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued public employment derived from the city’s Police Department Rules and Regulations, which provide that probationary employees may be terminated at any time for any reason but omit similar language with regard to nonprobationary employees. The district court rejected this argument and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulations on which Cromwell based his claim do not contain the clear language needed to overcome Illinois’s presumption of at-will employment. Something more than inference from silence is required. View "Cromwell v. City of Momence" on Justia Law

Cloe started working for the City of Indianapolis in 2007 as an Unsafe Buildings/Nuisance Abatement Project Manager. In 2008, she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, a chronic, incurable neurological disorder that rendered her disabled and significantly impaired her day-to-day life. In 2009, the city terminated her, ostensibly for poor performance. Cloe sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that the city discriminated against her because of her disability; failed to reasonably accommodate her disability; and retaliated against her for requesting accommodations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the reasonable accommodation claims, but reversed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, noting “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn.” View "Cloe v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law