Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vitrano pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing a firearm while under a domestic abuse injunction, 922(g)(8)(B). The prosecution argued that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), he should have faced a minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment based on three prior “violent felony” convictions for escape and recklessly endangering safety. On remand, the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 360 months; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vitrano moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing Fifth Amendment violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the court erred in sentencing him under ACCA. Vitrano claimed that he had located a discharge certificate restoring civil rights he lost due to his 1977 conviction for endangering safety. The prosecution determined that the certificate was forged. Vitrano was indicted for perjury and corrupt influence, 18 U.S.C. 1623(a); 1512(b)(1) & (c)(2). Instead of filing a reply, Vitrano sought leave to amend his 2255 motion, claiming that the earlier convictions were not violent felonies for ACCA purposes. The government argued that, not filing a reply to his initial 2255 filing, Vitrano had abandoned his claims. The district court denied Vitrano’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Vitrano v. United States" on Justia Law

Swanson purchased a lakeside home, next to the home of Whitworth, the elected mayor of Chetek. Swanson obtained a permit for “remodel-repair” and began work, including installation of a three-foot high fence between his property and Whitworth’s and along the street. Whitworth repeatedly told a building inspector that he should not have issued a permit; repeatedly entered the Swanson house without permission; used his influence to cause another inspector to delay a fence permit; told the fence installation team that Swanson was a drug dealer and unlikely to pay; and caused municipal prosecution of Swanson for construction of the fence in violation of a five-foot setback that did not apply to Swanson’s fence. Meanwhile, another neighbor of Swanson, installed a fence that encroached on part of Swanson’s property, without a permit, and was not prosecuted. Swanson filed a class-of-one equal protection suit and defamation and slander claims. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for Whitworth, finding that Swanson did not show a similarly situated individual who received more favorable treatment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A clear showing of animus, absent a “robust comparison” to a similarly situated individual, may sustain a class-of-one equal protection claim. View "Swanson v. Whitworth" on Justia Law

Serrano pled guilty to attempted first degree murder and possession of cannabis in exchange for a total sentence of 15 years in prison. In an unrelated case, Villanueva pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a 25-year sentence. Each claims that the plea agreements did not mention supervised release even though Illinois imposes a mandatory three-year term of supervised release (MSR) on murder and attempted murder charges. At the time, Illinois law did not require listing MSR on the conviction and sentencing order. At both plea hearings, however, the state judges mentioned MSR and obtained the defendants’ understanding that the law imposed such a term. Illinois law now requires that the term of MSR be specified in the sentencing order. Serrano’s conviction became final in 2002; Villanueva’s conviction became final in 2004. The two claim to have learned of the MSR while in prison. After extensive proceedings, state courts denied their petitions for post-conviction relief, which argued that the state denied them the benefit of their plea bargains in violation of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal district court denied petitions for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Villanueva v. Anglin" on Justia Law

Findlay and his uncle, Howey, live on adjacent lots. Findlay found a surveillance camcorder set up near the property line and called the Sheriff’s Office to file an abandoned property report. Howey had set up the camera because he suspected Findlay of trespass and vandalism. Deputy Lendermon responded. With video running, Findlay made comments suggesting he had trespassed. Lendermon decided to confiscate the memory chip containing the statements as evidence. The memory chip separated from the camera and fell to the floor. Findlay says Lendermon tackled him as he reached for the chip. Lendermon says he simply grabbed Findlay’s arm to prevent him from picking up the chip. Findlay sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive use of force. The district court denied Lendermon’s motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Findlay did not carry his burden of showing the violation of a clearly established right, so Lendermon is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Findlay v. Lendermon" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officer Cates sexually assaulted Lemons while responding to her 911 call and was convicted of violating the woman’s civil rights while acting under color of law, 18 U.S.C. 242. Cates reported problems with his attorney. The district court delayed sentencing. Two months after appointment of new counsel and five months after the deadline for filing post-conviction motions, Cates’ new attorney requested an extension of time to file post-conviction motions. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Cates to 288 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the circumstances did not warrant a finding of excusable neglect. View "United States v. Cate" on Justia Law

A former Illinois state prison inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in 2001, alleging that he was subjected to improper strip searches intended to humiliate him in retaliation for his grievances complaining about the earlier searches. Following a remand, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The trial judge put the burden of proof on the wrong party by instructing the jury that “to prevail on his claim of retaliation, the plaintiff must prove that the grievances … were the sole cause of the particular strip search.” View "Mays v. Springborn" on Justia Law

While proceeding to the Stateville prison cafeteria, Navejar spoke to other inmates in their cells. Officer Iyiola ordered him to get out of the line because prison rules forbid inmates from stopping to speak to other inmates. Navejar disobeyed, became belligerent, and punched Iyiola. Other guards wrestled Navejar to the ground where he was handcuffed. Navejar claims that guards kicked him in the forehead, stomped his head against the ground, pepper-sprayed him, dragged him along the floor, and left him alone for a half-hour, while he screamed in pain, before he was allowed to wash off the pepper spray. The next morning a guard brought Navejar to Stateville’s health care unit, where nurses examined him. Before a doctor could provide attention, a guard escorted Navejar out, explaining that he was being transferred to Pontiac. At Pontiac, Navejar was examined by a physician, who concluded that he had suffered only bruises and scratches. In Navejar’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied motions to recruit counsel and entered summary judgment for the guards on Eighth Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the court applied the wrong legal standard to Navejar’s motion and that lack of counsel prejudiced him. View "Navejar v. Iyiola" on Justia Law

Earl was convicted of intentional homicide, jailed, and placed for five days onto “suicide watch” segregation where he was dressed in a “suicide-proof gown,” kept in continuous light for 24 hours, and constantly monitored. The jail says that suicide watch is required of every inmate convicted of a serious felony until he is examined by a mental-health expert. Earl claims that he was placed on suicide watch as punishment after an officer relayed false information that he had threatened other guards. Earl claimed an allergic reaction to the special gown and received medical attention. After a mental-health worker recommended that Earl be discharged from suicide watch, Earl was placed for 12 days in administrative segregation, apparently as punishment for initially refusing to wear the suicide gown, and afterwards was transferred to a Wisconsin state prison. Two years later Earl returned to the jail for a court appearance and again was housed in segregation. In his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Earl’s placement in segregation was too short to deprive him of a liberty interest and that conditions were not “unusually harsh.” Earl did not show delay in responding to his claim of allergic reaction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Earl v. Racine Cnty. Jail" on Justia Law

Ramos was arrested in 2007 and charged with residential burglary. After an Illinois state court acquitted him of that charge, he brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Chicago and five police officers violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in conducting a false arrest and malicious prosecution, and also asserting state law claims for malicious prosecution and indemnification. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the section 1983 claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ramos’ state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on a report of a burglary and a description of the suspect, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was ongoing, sufficient to justify a “Terry” stop. Ramos’ failure to produce a valid driver’s license provided probable cause for his arrest. View "Ramos v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, a candidate for the state legislature seeking placement on the general election ballot without having participated in a primary (or having replaced a candidate who did) must submit a nominating petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters. In July 2012, the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners determined that five Republican candidates for the state legislature had not collected the requisite numbers of signatures and denied their petitions to be listed on the ballot in the 2012 general election. In September the candidates and supporters sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the statutory scheme violated their constitutional rights to free speech and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of laches barred their claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after holding that laches does not apply because the delay in filing suit did not impact the Board’’ ability to fashion prospective relief in future elections. The requirement that candidates seeking ballot access submit nominating petitions is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and serves the important regulatory interests of protecting the integrity of elections from frivolous candidates and preventing voter confusion; it does not unconstitutionally burden the candidates’ and voters’ expressive and associational rights. View "Navarro v. Neal" on Justia Law