Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hobgood was the subject of repeated, intensive investigations that resulted in disciplinary proceedings and termination of his employment with the Illinois Gaming Board, though another state agency ultimately ordered that he be reinstated. Hobgood contends he was targeted because he helped a fellow Board employee with suits against the Gaming Board under Title VII and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. Hobgood sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and the First Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that Hobgood was fired, not because he had assisted his friend, but because the “nature” of that assistance involved providing confidential information. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting genuine issues of fact concerning the defendants’ motives for investigating, disciplining, and terminating Hobgood, who presented a “convincing mosaic” to show that his employer acted for unlawful reasons. When the evidence is viewed as a whole, a jury could reasonably infer that the Board investigated and fired him because he assisted in lawsuits against the Board. View "Gnutek v. IL Gaming Bd." on Justia Law

Officer Kermon charged Gutierrez with public intoxication and resisting arrest. According to Gutierrez, he was walking home from work, minding his own business, when Kermon, who never identified himself as a police officer, stopped him at gunpoint, pepper sprayed him, placed him in handcuffs, delivered gratuitous kicks to his torso, and uttered a racially derogatory slur. Officer Kermon says that Gutierrez was a belligerent drunkard, unsteady on his feet, who yelled at Kermon, and assumed an aggressive fighting stance. Gutierrez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Kermon violated his fourth amendment. The district court concluded that Kermon had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative detention but that a finding of qualified immunity was precluded genuine issues of material fact on the issue of probable cause. Because Kermon’s argument depends on a disputed fact, the Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction..Tinde View "Gutierrez v. Kermon" on Justia Law

Simpson, convicted of drug offenses, was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, which the district court found to be the statutory minimum, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Simpson’s collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his lawyer had furnished ineffective assistance, was rejects. Three years later he filed another collateral attack, which the district court rejected as lacking required appellate authorization. At the time of Simpson’s sentencing, either the jury or the judge could decide whether a defendant’s conduct met requirements for a mandatory minimum sentence. In 2013 the Supreme Court held that a judge cannot make that decision unless the defendant waives entitlement to a jury. Simpson argues that the decision entitles him to a second collateral attack because it establishes a new constitutional rule, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2), and proposes another ineffective assistance attack, which is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) and a claim based on the jury clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, stating that section 2255(h)(2) applies only when the new rule has been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review” by the Supreme Court. View "Simpson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011 Wisconsin reduced subsidies for the Wisconsin Care Program, which funds grants for organizations administering programs for disabled persons who live in group homes. The plaintiffs are developmentally disabled and suffered the largest cuts. Persons who had received smaller payments bore smaller cuts. For some (frail elderly) per capita payments increased. Plaintiffs claim that making larger absolute cuts for persons whose care is most expensive violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act and that reduction in payments increases the risk that they will be moved from group homes to institutions. The district judge noted that states have waived sovereign immunity with respect to the Rehabilitation Act, as a condition to receiving federal funds. The Supreme Court has held that the portions of the ADA that are not designed to implement disabled persons’ constitutional rights cannot be used to override states’ sovereign immunity. The district court concluded that the relevant provisions of the ADA do not concern the Constitution and that other claims were premature because no plaintiff has been moved to an institution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without information about care provided to other disabled persons, there is no useful theory of discrimination. View "Amundson v. WI Dep't of Health Servs." on Justia Law

Thompson, convicted of a gun crime based entirely on the testimony of Chicago police officers, claimed that the officers planted a gun in the vicinity of his stop and arrest to fabricate a case. While he was imprisoned, the State’s Attorney uncovered widespread corruption in the department, implicating the officers who testified against Thompson. His conviction was vacated. Thompson sued the arresting officers, alleging due-process violations under Brady v. Maryland and sued the city. During discovery, the defendants and other potential witnesses from the department invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thompson had to rely on his own testimony and the adverse inference from assertion of the Fifth Amendment. The court excluded much of Thompson’s proferred testimony from other victims of police misconduct and the guilty-plea testimony of officers who were convicted. The jury found one of the officers liable, only on the Brady claim. As damages for more than three years of wrongful imprisonment the jury awarded $15,000. Thompson challenged the evidentiary rulings and certain trial tactics by defense counsel that he claims were improper. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While none of the errors were prejudicial standing alone, their cumulative effect had a substantial and injurious effect. View "Thompson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Peele worked for the Portage Police Department as a detective. In 2007 he supported Charnetzky’s Democratic primary campaign to become mayor. Charnetzky lost. Peele spoke to a local reporter and criticized Sheriff Lain for endorsing the opponent, apparently stating that Sheriff Lain “won’t get any support here.” The day after the comments were published, Peele was reassigned to the more deskbound position of “Station Duty Officer.” Peele sued, claiming that he was demoted and constructively discharged without due process; retaliation for his support of Charnetzky; and defamation. The defendants counterclaimed malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to retaliation, noting that the district court did not address conspiracy, immunity, or the city’s liability. View "Peele v. Burch" on Justia Law

Police saw Rabin carrying a holstered gun on his hip in public. He was handcuffed and detained for about 90 minutes while officers sought to confirm the validity of his carrying license. None of the detaining officers were familiar with Rabin’s unique license, carried primarily by private detectives and security officers. When it was confirmed that the license was legitimate, Rabin was released. Rabin sued the officers for unlawful arrest and excessive force. The district court denied the officers summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding the officers entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim, because even if they had known about the type of license, it would have been reasonable under clearly established law to detain Rabin while they verified its legitimacy. The length of Rabin’s detention was “unfortunate,” but was caused by the government’s failure to have an efficient system of license verification. One officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that unnecessary tightness of the handcuffs exacerbated Rabin’s preexisting medical conditions. Rabin only told that officer about his medical issues. View "Rabin v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Turley is serving a life sentence in an Illinois state prison. Between January 7, 2008, and October 4, 2010, administration 25 times placed the prison on lockdown, confining prisoners to their cells without yard time; the longest continuous lockdown was 81 days, for a total of 534 lockdown days, more than 50% of the period at issue. Turley brought Eighth Amendment claims and a Due Process claim, claiming that lockdowns were often imposed for non-penological purposes, such as isolated fights, rumors of a potential fight, or no reason at all. Turley claimed that he suffered injuries including irritable bowel syndrome, headaches, tinnitus, sleep deprivation, colon spasms, nosebleeds, weight loss and extreme stress; that there was of a conspiracy among prison officials and union employees to create a staff shortage, negotiate a pay raise, and allow staff to take vacation; and that his $10 monthly idle pay stipend was withheld during lockdowns without due process. Turley’s grievances were denied; he filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that Turley exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the Eighth Amendment claims, that those claims are not time-barred, and that they sufficiently state a claim. The Due Process claim was properly dismissed. View "Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour, et al" on Justia Law

In 2010, Hill filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that the district court had erred in deeming him a career offender when calculating his sentence in 1999. The Seventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) forecloses resort to 2241, because Hill could have used section 2255 to present the same argument, if he had acted promptly after the decision in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). Hill did not seek rehearing or Supreme Court review, but sought relief in the district court under F.R.C.P. 60(b), arguing that the Seventh Circuit overlooked that he had earlier lost a 2255 motion The district court denied the motion, concluding that failure to apprise the court of important facts is not “excusable neglect,” permitting reopening of a judgment. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that 2241 may apply under specific circumstances when 2255 does not allow successive collateral attack. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, reasoning that legal developments after a final judgment do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances for a litigant who bypassed arguments on appeal. The court noted that Hill did not argue that he is in prison for an act that is not criminal; his sentence is within the range that would have prevailed had the judge not applied a career-offender enhancement. View "Hill v. Rios" on Justia Law

Taylor, convicted of murder in Illinois state court, was sentenced to 35 years in prison. In his habeas corpus petition, Taylor claimed that his counsel operated with a conflict of interest by jointly representing him and his brother, Lowell, in simultaneous murder trials. He claimed that the conflict adversely affected his representation because his lawyer refused to call certain exculpatory witnesses, because they might implicate his brother in the murder. The Illinois Supreme Court denied relief, finding that Taylor’s interests did not conflict with those of his brother and relied upon a purported credibility finding by the trial court that any conflict did not adversely affect the performance of Taylor’s lawyer. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conflict of interest between Taylor and Lowell adversely affected Taylor’s representation. The state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in holding that Taylor’s interest in presenting exculpatory witnesses did not conflict with his brother’s interest in preventing admission of inculpatory testimony and unreasonably determined that the trial court’s bare rejection of the claim must have constituted an implicit credibility finding concerning the motivation of the lawyer. View "Taylor v. Ground" on Justia Law