Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In December, 2005, Chicago police officers Malaniuk and Shields arrested then-14-year-old Barber. Barber claims that the arrest was without probable cause and that Malaniuk used excessive force in shoving him into a holding cell, causing him to strike his head on a hard surface. The officers deny those allegations and say that the head injury occurred because Barber was intoxicated and fell over his own feet. In Barber’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1982, a jury sided with the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding merit in Barber’s claims that the district court erred when it allowed defense counsel to cross-examine him about a subsequent arrest for underage drinking and about his intervening felony conviction. View "Terrence Barber v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

Six-year-old D.B. and five-year-old twins C.C. and her brother W.C., were “playing doctor” in D.B.’s backyard when the twins’ mother arrived. She interpreted D.B.’s conduct as a sexual assault of her daughter and reported to the Department of Social Services. The Sheriff’s Department also responded. After an aggressive investigation, the District Attorney filed a petition alleging that D.B. had committed first-degree sexual assault and was in need of public protection or services. The petition was not adjudicated; the case was closed by consent decree. D.B.’s parents filed a civil-rights suit, alleging that county officials overzealously investigated and maliciously prosecuted D.B. They asserted a “class of one” equal-protection claim, noting that the twins engaged in the same behavior as D.B., but the twins’ father is a “high-ranking local political figure.” The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Allegations of improper subjective motive are not enough to state a class-of-one equal-protection claim; a complaint must allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that the plaintiff was treated differently from others similarly situated and that the discriminatory treatment was wholly arbitrary and irrational. Here, there was an objective rational basis for disparate treatment. The twins’ mother witnessed D.B.’s conduct and reported it; there was no adult witness to the twins’ behavior. View "Kurtis B. v. Kopp" on Justia Law

McGee was convicted of rape, home invasion, aggravated battery, and burglary, and was incarcerated in Illinois from 1980 until 2005, when, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, he was civilly detained and placed in the Rushville facility. In 2001, while serving his criminal sentence, McGee was diagnosed with liposarcoma cancer and underwent surgery to remove a tumor and adjacent muscle tissue in his right thigh. Since then he has undergone extensive treatment, biopsies, and other procedures to prevent or detect possible recurrence. McGee alleges that he suffers from edema and “neuropathic pain” in his legs as a result of the cancer treatments. Rushville has a policy, requiring detainees who are transported outside of the facility to wear metal leg irons. McGee complained several times to his treating physician about being required to wear restraints, but was never exempted. He was, on occasion, denied use of a wheelchair, and suffered cuts. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in McGee’s action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that 23 state officials, employees, and private medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "McGee v. Adams" on Justia Law

SVT hired Morgan, an African-American, to work as a security guard at one of its Ultra grocery stores. Morgan had previously worked security for a grocery store that previously occupied the location and at Home Depot. Morgan was working about 40 hours a week at Home Depot and 20 to 30 hours a week at Ultra when he was involved in an incident involving a white manager at Ultra, who had taken a newspaper without paying. Morgan was ultimately fired. He sued, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment to the company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the circumstances surrounding Morgan’s firing, did not, in themselves, raise a plausible inference of race discrimination. Although Morgan argued that the timing of his firing was “suspicious,” given his documented failure to perform theft stops, prior warnings about the lack of theft stops, and SVT’s stringent enforcement of its anti-shoplifting olicies, the court properly concluded that suspicious timing alone was insufficient to create a genuine dispute over whether Morgan was fired for failing to meet legitimate job expectations or for insidious racial reasons. View "Marcus Morgan v. SVT, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Weddington was convicted in two separate Indiana state trials of four counts of rape, two counts of criminal confinement, one count of criminal deviate conduct, and one count of robbery. He was sentenced to 133 years’ imprisonment. After unsuccessful appeals, Weddington filed a state petition for post-conviction relief in 2007, asserting ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The state court held evidentiary hearings and denied relief. Weddington did not appeal. In 2011, Weddington filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop and ineffective assistance of counsel. He maintains that his wife would have testified and given him an alibi, but counsel failed to contact her or any other witness, although aware that she wanted to testify. Weddington asserts that prison administration confiscated his legal work, legal books, pens and pencils, and even legal mail, for more than a year. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal and remanded for assignment to another judge. The district judge, in her former capacity as a state judge, presided over Weddington’s conviction for state criminal charges related to charges underlying the federal habeas action. The record presents factual issues regarding equitable tolling and procedural default of certain issues. View "Weddington v. Finnan" on Justia Law

Hill, an African American, began working for the General Services Administration in 2008 through the Federal Career Intern Program. Realizing that his Master’s degree entitled him to a higher pay rate, he filed a complaint with the EEOC. The parties settled. Hill maintains that he acted professionally during his one-year probationary period. His coworkers complained to supervisors about Hill’s temper on three occasions. A supervisor told Hill that his “stomping around” and slamming doors could be seen as threatening because he was a “pretty big guy,” which Hill took as a coded racial reference. After his probation, Hill was fired, based on those three incidents. Hill sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, for race discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to GSA, stating that Hill was not meeting legitimate expectations because he had engaged in a pattern of behavior that led three different coworkers to report him to their supervisors, and that a white female intern was not a suitable comparator because only one coworker had ever complained about her behavior, nor had Hill established pretext. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Anthony Hill v. Martha Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2007, Williams was pulled over for allegedly running a stop sign. Because he had no proof of insurance, he and his car were taken to a Chicago police station. The next day, officers approached Williams on the street and claimed that he had wrongfully taken his car from the station the previous night. Williams claimed that one of the officers said he could take the car and gave him the keys. The officers sought to tow his car; Williams resisted. According to Williams, the officers beat him repeatedly; after he was handcuffed and taken to the station, the physical abuse continued. Williams sued the officers for false arrest and excessive force, 42 U.S.C. 1983. . The trial was largely a credibility contest; defendants presented evidence that Williams had committed seven drug or gun felonies in the last 10 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of defendants, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing in evidence of his prior convictions under Federal Rule 609, because it did not articulate a probative-prejudice balancing analysis. Williams did not ask the court to perform the balancing test. View "Williams v. Dieball" on Justia Law

Hawkins has a long history of violent crimes, gun offenses, escapes, drug use, and violations of supervised release. In 2003 he assaulted U.S. marshals and pleaded guilty to violent assault with a weapon that inflicted bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b), 1114. The guidelines range would have been under 30 months, but with two prior felony convictions for “walkaway” escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a), the range was 151 to 188 months. At the time, the guidelines were mandatory; two years later the Supreme Court declared them advisory. On remand the judge reimposed the 151-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Three years later the Supreme Court held that walkaway “escape” is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The district court denied a motion to set aside the sentence reasoning that the legal error committed in deeming such an escape a violent felony was not the kind of error that can be corrected after a criminal judgment has become final. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Hawkins’ history would justify reimposing the sentence again. The court found that rehearing was not warranted by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Peugh v. United States, (2013), reasoning that, unlike this case, Peugh involved constitutional error: violation of the ex post facto clause. View "Hawkins v. United States" on Justia Law

Adeyeye, a native of Nigeria, moved to the U.S. in 2008. He requested several weeks of unpaid leave so he could travel to Nigeria to lead his father’s burial rites. He explained that his participation in the funeral ceremonies was “compulsory” and that if he failed to lead the burial rites, he and his family members would suffer at least spiritual death. The employer denied the request, but he traveled to Nigeria for the ceremonies anyway and was fired when he returned to work. Adeyeye filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failure to accommodate his religion. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that Adeyeye’s two written requests did not present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that he had provided notice of the religious character of his request. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whether or not Adeyeye’s letters might have justified holding as a matter of law that they provided sufficient notice of the religious nature of his request, they certainly were sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the employer had notice of the religious nature of the request. View "Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC" on Justia Law

Estremera was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine plus possessing a firearm despite an earlier felony conviction and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2007. Estremera sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his lawyer had misstated the terms of a plea bargain proposal. The district court denied the petition in 2012 without holding a hearing. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There was insufficient evidence to determine whether the petition was timely, given Estremera’s assertions of his own diligence and of abandonment by counsel. With respect to Estremera’s request that the prosecution be required to offer the original deal again, the court noted that it no longer possible for the defendant to fulfill promises that would have been valuable to the prosecutor, had a deal been struck before trial and that, assuming that it proceeds to the merits, the district court may think it prudent to await the Supreme Court’s opinion in Titlow before crafting a remedy. View "Estremera v. United States" on Justia Law