Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Belbachir, an Algerian citizen, 27 years old, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 2004. She overstayed and, in 2005, flew from Chicago to England, where immigration authorities returned her to Chicago. She was placed in the McHenry County Jail, which has a contract with the federal government to house detainees. She planned to seek asylum on the ground that she had a well‐founded fear of being persecuted if returned to Algeria. She committed suicide by strangling herself with her socks about eight days after arriving at the jail. Her estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that defendants had deprived Belbachir of her life without due process of law, and under Illinois tort law. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to the section 1983 claims. The plaintiff appealed only with respect to McHenry County; the county sheriff and the director of the jail; and three employees of Centegra, a private firm, hired to provide medical services at the jail. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to one Centegra employee, who was aware of Belbachir’s suicidal thoughts and depressed condition, but failed to take action. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Belbachir v. McHenry Cnty., IL" on Justia Law

A child services case worker and detectives went to the home Hurlow shared with his fiancée, Funk, to check on Funk’s children. Hurlow claims that he requested that they leave unless they had a search warrant; the detectives asked Funk for permission to search, stating that her children would be taken if she did not consent. Funk gave written consent. The detectives found methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a handgun. In custody, Hurlow stated that all of the illegal items were his and that Funk had no knowledge that drugs were in the home. Harlow claims that his attorney did not listen to his version of events, did not investigate, and persuaded him to plead guilty to avoid a sentence of “30 years to life.” Hurlow entered a plea with an agreement not to contest his conviction or sentence in a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The stipulated basis for the plea stated that Funk granted consent to search in writing. Hurlow affirmed the factual basis for the plea before the district court and stated that he was satisfied with his representation. The district court denied Hurlow’s subsequent request for an evidentiary hearing and concluded that his 2255 motion was barred by the plea agreement. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a hearing, finding that the waiver did not bar his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in negotiating the agreement. View "Hurlow v. United States" on Justia Law

Bates, a black firefighter, joined the Chicago Fire Department in 1977 and rose through the ranks. In 2000, Fire Commissioner Joyce appointed Bates to one of seven District Chief positions. A District Chief is a member of the personnel management team and holds an at-will position. Bates’s work was well-regarded. Joyce resigned as Fire Commissioner in 2004, and Trotter, also black, became the new Fire Commissioner and chose his own management team; he issued a personnel order that contained eith black and 10 non-black promotions, three black and five non-black demotions, and four lateral reassignments for at-will positions. Bates was demoted to a Deputy District Chief position in Operation Relief, which is a floating assignment. The district court dismissed Bates’s 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 claims of racial discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. Trotter had sufficient experience with Bates and the Chicago Fire Department to support his assertion that Bates’s demeanor and level of enthusiasm were not compatible with his management style. View "Bates v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hester, a white male, began working for the Department’s laboratory in 1994. In 2007 he was reprimanded for failing to timely report test results. Hester later applied for promotion. Liu interviewed him, but chose another white male. When the supervisory position opened again, Hester again applied and was interviewed. Liu chose a white female in her mid-twenties, Gentry, who had been working in the lab for four years, citing Gentry’s performance record and concern that Hester did not have a good working relationship with others. In 2009, Hester received a form listing his “performance deficiencies.” A second performance appraisal report found that Hester still did not meet expectations for “job knowledge” and “communication.” The Department terminated his employment. Hester, then in his 50s, could be fired only for just cause. The State Employees Appeals Commission rejected his challenge. Hester sued, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that Indiana was immune from liability for private damages under the ADEA, and that Hester did not adequately show that the Department discharged Hester because of a protected characteristic. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hester v. IN Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

After Newman, then 16 years old, turned himself in to police and was arrested, his mother told Newman’s attorney that her son was a “special child” who attended a “school for the handicapped, the mental school.” She gave him a two-inch-thick stack of educational and psychological records reflecting Newman’s lengthy history of severe mental and cognitive deficits, including a diagnosis of mental retardation from the Social Security Administration and a psychologist’s report indicating that Newman’s IQ was 62. Newman was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 47 years’ imprisonment. Following unsuccessful appeals, Newman filed a state post-conviction petition. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. Newman filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate his fitness for trial and failing to seek a fitness hearing. The district court held an evidentiary hearing days and determined, on the basis of the state court record, that the Illinois courts unreasonably concluded that Newman was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate his fitness to stand trial and that counsel’s failures to investigate known deficiencies in Newman’s mental capacity and to raise the fitness issue constituted ineffective assistance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Melvin Newman v. Michael Atchinson" on Justia Law

Johnson, an African-American woman, was employed at Koppers’ plant from 1995 until her termination in 2008. She had been disciplined for sleeping at her desk in the laboratory, for smoking in the lunch room, for not punching out on the time clock, for fighting with a security guard, and for an altercation with a white male co-worker, O’Connell. Without interviewing Johnson, the plant manager determined that both O’Connell and Johnson were at fault and decided that Johnson should be punished more severely because of her disciplinary history and O’Connell’s allegations of racial harassment. The plant manager warned Johnson that future incidents would lead to termination. O’Connell received a less severe warning letter. The Union filed a grievance on Johnson’s behalf and Johnson’s warning was reduced to a memo that summarized her work obligations and employment status. Johnson was fired after another altercation with O’Connell. A witness indicated that Johnson shoved O’Connell, who filed a police report. Johnson filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of her race and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Koppers. View "Johnson v. Koppers, Inc." on Justia Law

Carter, an Illinois prison inmate, sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. His petition was transferred to Illinois in June, 2010. On December 5, having heard nothing about the status of his case, Carter inquired. The clerk’s office incorrectly responded: “As of this date, the Court has taken no further action on the requested case. When an order is entered, you will be promptly notified by mail.” The district court had actually denied Carter’s petition in February 2011. The opinion was not sent or otherwise made available to Carter. After more than a year, Carter again wrote the clerk and was correctly informed that his petition had been denied two years earlier. Fewer than 30 days later, Carter filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a certificate of appealability. The district court did not docket his papers until about six weeks later. The Seventh Circuit allowed an appeal. While Federal Rule 58(c)(2)(B) provides that a judgment is deemed entered 150 days after the court’s decision, it does not set an appeal deadline. A jurisdictional rule is not waivable, but the Rule is subject to equitable tolling. View "Carter v. Hodge" on Justia Law

From 2006 until he was fired in 2011, Chrzanowski was an assistant state’s attorney. In 2011, a special prosecutor began investigating Chrzanowski’s boss, Bianchi. Bianchi allegedly had improperly influenced cases involving his relatives and political allies. Under subpoena, Chrzanowski testified before a grand jury, and later, again under subpoena, he testified at Bianchi’s trial. A few months later, Chrzanowski was interrogated by Bianchi and fired. Chrzanowski believed that the firing was retaliation for his testimony and filed suit, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and state statutes. The district court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, finding that First Amendment protections did not apply because the testimony was “pursuant to [his] official duties” and, in the alternative, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because any First Amendment protections were not “clearly established” at the time. The Seventh Circuit reversed. When Chrzanowski spoke out about his supervisors’ potential or actual wrongdoing, he was speaking outside the duties of employment. Providing eyewitness testimony regarding potential wrongdoing was never part of what Chrzanowski was employed to do; his rights were clearly established at all relevant times. Unlike restrictions on speech made pursuant to official duties, punishment for subpoenaed testimony chills civic discourse “in significant and pernicious ways.” View "Chrzanowski v. Bianchi" on Justia Law

In December, 2005, Chicago police officers Malaniuk and Shields arrested then-14-year-old Barber. Barber claims that the arrest was without probable cause and that Malaniuk used excessive force in shoving him into a holding cell, causing him to strike his head on a hard surface. The officers deny those allegations and say that the head injury occurred because Barber was intoxicated and fell over his own feet. In Barber’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1982, a jury sided with the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding merit in Barber’s claims that the district court erred when it allowed defense counsel to cross-examine him about a subsequent arrest for underage drinking and about his intervening felony conviction. View "Terrence Barber v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

Six-year-old D.B. and five-year-old twins C.C. and her brother W.C., were “playing doctor” in D.B.’s backyard when the twins’ mother arrived. She interpreted D.B.’s conduct as a sexual assault of her daughter and reported to the Department of Social Services. The Sheriff’s Department also responded. After an aggressive investigation, the District Attorney filed a petition alleging that D.B. had committed first-degree sexual assault and was in need of public protection or services. The petition was not adjudicated; the case was closed by consent decree. D.B.’s parents filed a civil-rights suit, alleging that county officials overzealously investigated and maliciously prosecuted D.B. They asserted a “class of one” equal-protection claim, noting that the twins engaged in the same behavior as D.B., but the twins’ father is a “high-ranking local political figure.” The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Allegations of improper subjective motive are not enough to state a class-of-one equal-protection claim; a complaint must allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that the plaintiff was treated differently from others similarly situated and that the discriminatory treatment was wholly arbitrary and irrational. Here, there was an objective rational basis for disparate treatment. The twins’ mother witnessed D.B.’s conduct and reported it; there was no adult witness to the twins’ behavior. View "Kurtis B. v. Kopp" on Justia Law