Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Balthazar lived in one of two apartments on the third floor. Police had a warrant to search the other apartment. Both had rear doors about opening on a common landing. The officers climbed the stairs to the landing and used a battering ram on the door of Balthazar’s apartment. According to Balthazar they entered the apartment, screaming profanities and pointing guns; handcuffed Balthazar and her cousin; ransacked the apartment, dumping food on the floor, opening drawers, flipping mattresses, and throwing clothing; and left after about 15 minutes when another officer appeared and said they were in the wrong apartment. The officers claim that, while they did hit the wrong door, they immediately realized the mistake and none of them entered Balthazar’s apartment. Balthazar’s attorney later claimed that even looking inside the apartment constituted an illegal search. Neither a claims adjuster who visited the apartment the day of the incident, nor the Independent Police Review Authority employee who took a report, noted complaints about anything other than damage to the door. A jury rejected Balthazar’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A search resulting from an innocent mistake is not unreasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even accepting Balthazar’s alternative theory, simply looking inside does not always constitute a search. View "Balthazar v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1999 Brumfield was hired as a nonprobationary police officer. In 2006 she began to experience unspecified “psychological problems.” The city required her to submit to four psychological examinations. Each time Brumfield was found capable of continuing her work. Brumfield sued, alleging that subjecting her to psychological examinations amounted to discrimination on account of race, sex, and sexual orientation. The city suspended Brumfield without pay pending discharge proceedings. The Police Board rejected the discharge recommendation but suspended Brumfield without pay for 180 days. Before the suspension expired the city again suspended Brumfield pending discharge proceedings. Before the Police Board issued its second suspension order and before Brumfield returned to work, the city initiated a third discharge proceeding. Brumfield filed another lawsuit, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) and dismissed the first case. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Brumfield filed a third suit, alleging violation of Title I of the ADA, which was dismissed as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title II of the ADA does not cover disability discrimination in public employment; such a claim must be brought under Title I, but Brumfield waived her challenge to dismissal of her Title I suit. The Rehabilitation Act claim fails because Brumfield has not alleged that she was suspended or fired by reason of disability.View "Brumfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Grandberry sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a disciplinary sanction, loss of “good time” credits, imposed against him by a state prison. He claimed that the Indiana prison’s disciplinary proceedings failed to provide him with minimal due process protections. The district court denied the petition on the merits. The Seventh Circuit held that a certificate of appealability was not required in a habeas case challenging state prison disciplinary proceedings because in such cases, “the detention complained of” is the additional time the prisoner must stay in prison as a result of the disciplinary proceedings. The detention does not “arise out of process issued by a State court.” View "Grandberry v. Knight" on Justia Law

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hardaway v. Meyerhoff" on Justia Law

Serino was employed as a soccer coach at Oakland City University in Indiana. In September 2008, the university’s Vice President informed Serino that he was suspended from his position then contacted Hensley, Chief of the Oakland City Police Department, and told him to come to the university athletic center to speak to Serino. Hensley complied. He confronted Serino and told him that he was trespassing. Serino refused to leave and Hensley then arrested him. Serino was arraigned on charges of trespass and resisting law enforcement. The state ultimately dismissed both charges. In 2012 Serino sued Hensley and Oakland City, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution, with Indiana tort claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, finding the section 1983 and state‐law false arrest claims time‐barred; that the section 1983 malicious prosecution claim was not cognizable as a constitutional claim; and that his state‐law claims for malicious prosecution and IIED were barred by the defendants’ immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Serino v. Hensley" on Justia Law

Devbrow, an Indiana prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting that prison officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and destroying his legal papers in retaliation for a prior lawsuit (concerning medical care) he filed. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Devbrow failed to show that prison officials actually destroyed his legal documents or took his papers for retaliatory reasons. The court noted testimony that Devbrow had created a fire hazard by stacking excess property by his bed, that prison officials had allowed him to keep some legal materials by his bed, that Devbrow stored the rest of them, and that the officials were unaware of Devbrow’s pending litigation. The court further reasoned that Devbrow did not suffer any actual injury from the alleged actions: Devbrow’s medical indifference suit had been terminated not on the merits, but on grounds of untimeliness and that Devbrow had not submitted any admissible evidence to discredit the officers’ explanation that they had removed his property from the dorm room because it was a fire hazard. View "Devbrow v. Gallego" on Justia Law

A 1980 fire in a Chicago apartment building killed 10 children. Kidd became a suspect following his arrest on unrelated charges. At his 1987 trial on charges of arson and 10 counts of murder, Strunck, a public defender, represented him. Kidd was convicted and sentenced to death. In 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. At his new trial, Kidd waived assistance of counsel and represented himself, despite the judge’s repeated warnings and advice. Kidd expressed dissatisfaction with the public defender and requested that Dan Webb or Jenner & Block represent him. Kidd was unable to find private counsel. Strunck represented him at the penalty phase and presented evidence that Kidd was borderline mentally retarded. Kidd was convicted again and is serving a life sentence. In unsuccessful state postconviction proceedings, before the same judge who presided over his trial, Kidd argued that the court should have ordered a formal competency hearing because Kidd was taking psychotropic drugs under medical direction and that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary. The state denied his habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Sixth Amendment arguments. View "Kidd v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Steidl and Whitlock were convicted of 1987 murders, largely based on testimony by two supposed eyewitnesses. Long after the convictions, an investigation revealed that much of the testimony was perjured and that exculpatory evidence had been withheld. The revelations led to the release of the men and dismissal of all charges. Steidl had spent almost 17 years in prison; Whitlock had spent close to 21 years. They sued. By 2013, both had settled with all defendants. Because the defendants were public officials and public entities, disputes arose over responsibility for defense costs. National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the defense of former State’s Attorney, McFatridge, or Edgar County, agreeing to pay their costs under a reservation of rights until the issue was resolved. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of National Casualty. In another case McFatridge sought a state court order that the Illinois Attorney General approve his reasonable expenses and fees; the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim. In a third case, National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that another insurer was liable for costs it had advanced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the other company is liable. It would be inequitable for that company to benefit from National’s attempt to do the right thing, especially since it did not do the right thing and contribute to the defense costs under a reservation of rights. View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. White Mountains Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Foster was charged with distributing crack cocaine and a separate conspiracy-to-distribute charge. Against the advice of appointed counsel, Kupsis, Foster rejected two proposed plea agreements, each of which would have resulted in a sentence of about 20 years imprisonment. Foster faced a possibility of a life sentence, if convicted of the conspiracy charge. The government filed an information, pursuant to 21 U.S.C 851, 10 days before trial, stating that Foster had a prior felony drug conviction, which increased the mandatory minimum penalty on each count from 10 to 20 years. Kupsis had not anticipated the information and had not advised Foster that it was a possibility. After receiving notice of the information, Kupsis suggested to Foster that they attempt to revive one of the earlier proposed plea agreements. Foster refused. Kupsis successfully defended Foster against the conspiracy charge, but he was convicted on the distribution count and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Foster filed a Section 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held that Foster could not establish that he was prejudiced by Kupsis’ representation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Foster v. United States" on Justia Law

An Illinois inmate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that a nurse practitioner and a correctional counselor were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition, hypertension (high blood pressure). He had been diagnosed in 2007 at age 22 and did not receive his prescribed medication for a three-week period in 2009. The district judge dismissed, reasoning that the nurse practitioner did not know that plaintiff was not receiving his medication and the correctional counselor, not a member of the prison’s medical staff, assumed the medical staff would deal with it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after criticizing the failure, by the court and lawyers, to use scientific resources to determine the effect on the plaintiff’s health of a temporary interruption in the medication. “The legal profession must get over its fear and loathing of science.” The court also noted “that this plainly meritless suit was filed … more than four years ago. … A stronger judicial hand on the tiller could have saved a good deal of time, effort, and paper.” View "Jackson v. Pollion" on Justia Law