Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Another detainee threw hot coffee on King while the assigned tier officer, Szul, was gone, assisting another officer. When Szul returned, King stated that he needed medical attention. King was not examined until the next day. He was transferred to Stroger Hospital. A jail employee gave King an Inmate Grievance Response/Appeal Form for his failure-to-protect grievance, stating: “Your allegation(s) have been forwarded to the Offices of Professional Review [OPR] and Divisional Superintendent for review and/or investigation. You may follow-up with [OPR]”; “[t]o exhaust administrative remedies, grievance appeals must be made within 15 calendar days." The response to his delayed-treatment grievance stated only that he had been treated at Stroger Hospital and referred to exhausting administrative remedies. King appealed that response. King was later interviewed for the OPR investigation and signed a “Detainee/Complaint Notification,” stating, “I understand that if I do not file a complaint register within 10 days that OPR will close the investigation.” King did not file a complaint register.In King's section 1983 suit, the court granted the defendants summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although King appealed his delayed-medical-treatment grievance, he failed to give the defendants notice of the claim because it did not allege wrongdoing by any correctional officer. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the failure-to-protect claim. Because the jail’s procedure for grievances that are referred to OPR is so obscure that no ordinary prisoner could understand it, the remedy was unavailable. View "King v. Dart" on Justia Law

Crain, a Black woman, became the Chief of the Environmental Management Service at the VA Center in July 2014, subject to a year-long supervisory probationary period, with a GS-12 pay grade. Before Crain applied, she was told that if she successfully completed her probationary period, the Center would try to get the position’s pay grade increased to the GS-13 level. After Crain assumed the position, her supervisor added responsibilities to the role in an effort to justify a higher pay grade and asked Scaife, an HR classification specialist, to upgrade the role. Scaife concluded that she was unable to “justify anything higher than a GS-12.” Crain alleges that six White service chiefs’ pay grades were elevated to GS-13 or GS-14. During Crain’s tenure as Chief of EMS, several performance and behavior-related concerns arose.In June 2015, Crain was notified that she had failed to satisfactorily complete her supervisory probationary period and was being reassigned to a different role with the same salary. The memo identified multiple “performance-based deficiencies” as the basis for the decision. Months before her reassignment, Crain had initiated an EEOC complaint. After her reassignment, Crain sued under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the VA, rejecting Crain’s claims of disparate pay based on her race and that she was removed as Chief of EMS in retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. View "Crain v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Officer Sandoval encountered inmate Hacker, who is almost totally deaf, and ordered him to return to his bed. Hacker, unable to hear, did not comply. Sandoval shoved Hacker, who awoke handcuffed to a bed. He filed an administrative grievance and received notice that it had been referred to the Office of Professional Responsibility and the Divisional Superintendent, with a form allowing Hacker to appeal within 15 days. Neither document gave any timeline for OPR’s disposition of Hacker’s grievance. More than three months later, an OPR investigator concluded he could not substantiate Hacker’s claims; his superior officer signed the memorandum to approve the closure of the referral. The document does not state that the grievance process as a whole had ended, nor mention an appeals process. Hacker apparently received no communication from the Superintendent.Hacker had already filed suit. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing failure to exhaust claims under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and to comply with other PLRA requirements, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The jail’s grievance procedures became unavailable to Hacker after the jail involved OPR; various communications forced Hacker to “go beyond the established system and guess” what he needed to do. One of Hacker’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act failed because his grievance did not give fair notice that he was requesting a personal listening device; his other claim, concerning missing medications, was not tied to a physical injury as required to recover damages under the PLRA. View "Hacker v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law

In a custody dispute between Hadzi-Tanovic and her former husband, Pavlovich, an Illinois state court ordered that Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time with her children be supervised. She filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the state court judge, alleging they conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact. The district court dismissed her complaint on abstention grounds.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is well established that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine imposes a “jurisdictional bar” that prohibits federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing final state court judgments The state court order at issue is final, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s finality requirement is met. Allegations of state court corruption are not sufficient to avoid the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hadzi-Tanovic has not argued that state law or procedures prevented her from raising her federal constitutional issues in state court. Parties may raise procedural and substantive due process challenges to custody orders in Illinois state court. View "Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Williams sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), citing as “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances the fact that a district court treated him as having a prior conviction for unlawful drug delivery, which increased his minimum sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), while his Illinois conviction for delivery of cocaine did not satisfy the criteria of a “serious drug felony.”The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, noting its own precedent. Section 3582(c)(1) addresses some new fact about an inmate’s health or family status, or an equivalent post-conviction development, not a purely legal contention for which statutes specify other avenues of relief with distinct requirements, such as the time limits in 28 U.S.C. 2255(f) or the need for a declaration by the Sentencing Commission that a revision to a Guideline applies retroactively. There is nothing “extraordinary” about a legal error and the law provides methods other than compassionate release for dealing with those claims.Williams also argued that he has a spotless conduct record in prison, has completed educational programs that will allow him to participate in society, and has a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 and other diseases in prison. The court rejected those claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies by presenting them to the Bureau of Prisons. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2018, Escamilla was stationed at Fort Drum. During an on-base medical appointment, he complained of hearing voices that were telling him to commit suicide. He agreed to seek treatment at Samaritan Hospital, where he was admitted to the inpatient mental health unit under New York State Mental Hygiene Law, 9.39(a), which permits the director of a hospital to “receive and retain therein as a patient for a period of fifteen days any person alleged to have a mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others.” Escamilla was discharged 11 days later, with diagnoses of mild depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and autism spectrum disorder.A year later, Escamilla attempted to purchase a handgun from an online retailer, who shipped the gun to a federal firearm licensee in Wisconsin. The National Instant Criminal Background Check System generated a response denying the firearm transfer. Escamilla was prohibited from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), as a person who “has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment for the government. Escamilla’s admittance to Samaritan constituted a “commitment” under section 922(g)(4). The court rejected Escamilla’s argument that his hospitalization did not qualify as a commitment because he was there on a voluntary, informal basis. View "Escamilla v. United States" on Justia Law

Xiong is Hmong and speaks English as a second language. He joined the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh as its Director of Affirmative Action in 2018, reporting to Kuether, Associate Vice Chancellor of Human Resources. Kuether found Xiong’s work to be of poor quality. Xiong gave Kuether a self-assessment as part of his annual performance review in which he claimed he was being paid less because he is Hmong. Kuether canceled his review meeting, declined to reschedule it, and did not share the final written performance review with him.When Xiong wanted to hire a compliance officer who had a law degree and would add diversity to the HR department, which was primarily white, Kuether questioned Xiong’s judgment. Xiong recalls Kuether saying “people of color are not a good fit.” Kuether denies saying anything like that. After multiple cross-accusations, Xiong demanded that he no longer report to Kuether. Xiong says he also raised concerns about the HR department’s hiring and promotion policies. The next day, Xiong was terminated for insubordination and poor work performance.Xiong sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the University. Because the University fired Xiong one day after his whistleblowing, a reasonable jury could infer that his termination was retaliatory. Employers often have mixed motives for adverse actions against employees. The existence of both prohibited and permissible justifications reserves the question for a jury. View "Xiong v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System" on Justia Law

Scott was suspected of shooting and killing Bishop. Scott claims he asked for an attorney during his arrest, but no questioning occurred at that time. Approximately four hours later, Scott was taken for an interview. After the detectives read Scott his Miranda rights, he admitted in a recorded interview to murdering Bishop. Four attorneys worked on Scott’s case before trial; one moved to exclude Scott’s confession on the basis of intoxication. The judge denied the motion, doubting Scott’s testimony. The jury heard the confession and convicted Scott.In a postconviction motion, Scott unsuccessfully alleged that his attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress his confession on the theory that, because he requested an attorney during his arrest, his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Scott's second unsuccessful postconviction motion claimed his first postconviction counsel deficiently pleaded his claim by failing to marshal facts showing he informed his trial counsel of his request for an attorney.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition, in which he claimed both his trial and first postconviction attorneys were ineffective. The Wisconsin appellate court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, which has never extended Miranda beyond the context of custodial interrogation to permit an accused to request an attorney at the time of his arrest so as to cut off questioning before any attempt at questioning. View "Scott v. Hepp" on Justia Law

GEFT, a billboard company, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because Monroe County did not allow the installation of a digital billboard along I-69. Receiving a sign permit required compliance with size limits, height restrictions, setback requirements, a ban on changeable-copy (or digital) signs, and a prohibition on off-premises commercial signs, The ordinance provided exceptions to the permit requirement for government signs and certain noncommercial signs. If a proposed sign was ineligible for a permit, the applicant could apply for a use variance, which required specific findings.The district court granted GEFT summary judgment and enjoined the permitting scheme and the variance procedures. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, first declining to extend the injunction to encompass the entire ordinance. Monroe County’s substantive sign standards do not need a permitting scheme to function. Indiana law provides that local government entities can enforce their own ordinances through civil penalties or injunctions. The court reinstated the variance procedure. That procedure is a “prior restraint” but is not unconstitutional; it does not involve consideration of content, permits ample alternatives for speech, including displays of messages on signs, and it does not give the Board of Zoning Appeals so much discretion that it violates the First Amendment. View "GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County Indiana" on Justia Law

Perry died from gunshot wounds sustained during a fight with Shirley. In 2008, Shirley was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide. Shirley uses a prosthetic device below his knee. Although he can walk, during his trial Shirley was in a wheelchair with his legs shackled. To prevent the jury from observing the shackles, fabric was draped over both counsel tables. During voir dire, Juror 34 stated, if he’s in cuffs, "he did something.” Juror 34 separately confirmed he had seen the restraints, had not mentioned them to other jurors, and that his observations did not bias him. Shirley and his counsel said they were satisfied with those responses and did not request accommodations to muffle the noise of the shackles while Shirley was on the witness stand.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected claims that his presumption of innocence was violated because Juror 34 noticed his restraints, that being shackled inhibited his right to present a complete defense because it limited his ability to approach exhibits, make demonstrations and show the jury which leg his prosthesis was on. The court could not locate an explanation in for the restraint decision but found Shirley “had little difficulty communicating” in an “intelligent and articulate” manner from the witness stand. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shirley’s petition for habeas relief. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that the decision to shackle a criminal defendant while testifying violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. View "Shirley v. Tegels" on Justia Law