Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Grandberry sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a disciplinary sanction, loss of “good time” credits, imposed against him by a state prison. He claimed that the Indiana prison’s disciplinary proceedings failed to provide him with minimal due process protections. The district court denied the petition on the merits. The Seventh Circuit held that a certificate of appealability was not required in a habeas case challenging state prison disciplinary proceedings because in such cases, “the detention complained of” is the additional time the prisoner must stay in prison as a result of the disciplinary proceedings. The detention does not “arise out of process issued by a State court.” View "Grandberry v. Knight" on Justia Law

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hardaway v. Meyerhoff" on Justia Law

Serino was employed as a soccer coach at Oakland City University in Indiana. In September 2008, the university’s Vice President informed Serino that he was suspended from his position then contacted Hensley, Chief of the Oakland City Police Department, and told him to come to the university athletic center to speak to Serino. Hensley complied. He confronted Serino and told him that he was trespassing. Serino refused to leave and Hensley then arrested him. Serino was arraigned on charges of trespass and resisting law enforcement. The state ultimately dismissed both charges. In 2012 Serino sued Hensley and Oakland City, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution, with Indiana tort claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, finding the section 1983 and state‐law false arrest claims time‐barred; that the section 1983 malicious prosecution claim was not cognizable as a constitutional claim; and that his state‐law claims for malicious prosecution and IIED were barred by the defendants’ immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Serino v. Hensley" on Justia Law

Devbrow, an Indiana prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting that prison officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and destroying his legal papers in retaliation for a prior lawsuit (concerning medical care) he filed. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Devbrow failed to show that prison officials actually destroyed his legal documents or took his papers for retaliatory reasons. The court noted testimony that Devbrow had created a fire hazard by stacking excess property by his bed, that prison officials had allowed him to keep some legal materials by his bed, that Devbrow stored the rest of them, and that the officials were unaware of Devbrow’s pending litigation. The court further reasoned that Devbrow did not suffer any actual injury from the alleged actions: Devbrow’s medical indifference suit had been terminated not on the merits, but on grounds of untimeliness and that Devbrow had not submitted any admissible evidence to discredit the officers’ explanation that they had removed his property from the dorm room because it was a fire hazard. View "Devbrow v. Gallego" on Justia Law

A 1980 fire in a Chicago apartment building killed 10 children. Kidd became a suspect following his arrest on unrelated charges. At his 1987 trial on charges of arson and 10 counts of murder, Strunck, a public defender, represented him. Kidd was convicted and sentenced to death. In 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. At his new trial, Kidd waived assistance of counsel and represented himself, despite the judge’s repeated warnings and advice. Kidd expressed dissatisfaction with the public defender and requested that Dan Webb or Jenner & Block represent him. Kidd was unable to find private counsel. Strunck represented him at the penalty phase and presented evidence that Kidd was borderline mentally retarded. Kidd was convicted again and is serving a life sentence. In unsuccessful state postconviction proceedings, before the same judge who presided over his trial, Kidd argued that the court should have ordered a formal competency hearing because Kidd was taking psychotropic drugs under medical direction and that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary. The state denied his habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Sixth Amendment arguments. View "Kidd v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Steidl and Whitlock were convicted of 1987 murders, largely based on testimony by two supposed eyewitnesses. Long after the convictions, an investigation revealed that much of the testimony was perjured and that exculpatory evidence had been withheld. The revelations led to the release of the men and dismissal of all charges. Steidl had spent almost 17 years in prison; Whitlock had spent close to 21 years. They sued. By 2013, both had settled with all defendants. Because the defendants were public officials and public entities, disputes arose over responsibility for defense costs. National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the defense of former State’s Attorney, McFatridge, or Edgar County, agreeing to pay their costs under a reservation of rights until the issue was resolved. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of National Casualty. In another case McFatridge sought a state court order that the Illinois Attorney General approve his reasonable expenses and fees; the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim. In a third case, National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that another insurer was liable for costs it had advanced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the other company is liable. It would be inequitable for that company to benefit from National’s attempt to do the right thing, especially since it did not do the right thing and contribute to the defense costs under a reservation of rights. View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. White Mountains Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Foster was charged with distributing crack cocaine and a separate conspiracy-to-distribute charge. Against the advice of appointed counsel, Kupsis, Foster rejected two proposed plea agreements, each of which would have resulted in a sentence of about 20 years imprisonment. Foster faced a possibility of a life sentence, if convicted of the conspiracy charge. The government filed an information, pursuant to 21 U.S.C 851, 10 days before trial, stating that Foster had a prior felony drug conviction, which increased the mandatory minimum penalty on each count from 10 to 20 years. Kupsis had not anticipated the information and had not advised Foster that it was a possibility. After receiving notice of the information, Kupsis suggested to Foster that they attempt to revive one of the earlier proposed plea agreements. Foster refused. Kupsis successfully defended Foster against the conspiracy charge, but he was convicted on the distribution count and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Foster filed a Section 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held that Foster could not establish that he was prejudiced by Kupsis’ representation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Foster v. United States" on Justia Law

An Illinois inmate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that a nurse practitioner and a correctional counselor were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition, hypertension (high blood pressure). He had been diagnosed in 2007 at age 22 and did not receive his prescribed medication for a three-week period in 2009. The district judge dismissed, reasoning that the nurse practitioner did not know that plaintiff was not receiving his medication and the correctional counselor, not a member of the prison’s medical staff, assumed the medical staff would deal with it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after criticizing the failure, by the court and lawyers, to use scientific resources to determine the effect on the plaintiff’s health of a temporary interruption in the medication. “The legal profession must get over its fear and loathing of science.” The court also noted “that this plainly meritless suit was filed … more than four years ago. … A stronger judicial hand on the tiller could have saved a good deal of time, effort, and paper.” View "Jackson v. Pollion" on Justia Law

Williams was returning home from work late at night. He smelled smoke, saw that his neighbor’s house was on fire, and went to the porch of the burning home to rouse anyone who might be inside. Chicago police officers O’Brien and Byrne also spotted the smoke and found Williams on the porch. They arrested him on suspicion of arson. A prosecutor declined to file arson charges that night. Officers O’Brien and Byrne then charged Williams with criminal trespass, but that charge was dismissed. Williams brought suit against O’Brien and Byrne under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and against the officers and the City of Chicago under state law for malicious prosecution on the trespass charge. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Whether there was even arguable probable cause to arrest and charge Williams depends on disputed issues of fact. View "Williams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Lavalais is the only black police officer employed by the Village of Melrose Park, which has about 75 officers. He has been a Melrose Park officer for more than 20 years. In 2010, Lavalais filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging race discrimination. He filed a second charge in January 2011, alleging that he was disciplined for filing the first charge. In early February 2011, Lavalais was promoted to sergeant and placed on the midnight shift. More than a year later, he was denied a requested a change of assignment from the midnight shift, and again filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter. The district court dismissed his claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of the discrimination claims, but affirmed dismissal of the retaliation claims. View "Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park" on Justia Law