Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Medlock, an Indiana University sophomore, lived, by choice in a dormitory, where he was required to allow inspections of his room by graduate students employed by IU. Medlock was given a week’s notice by email and inspection of his floor was announced by intercom on the day of the inspection. On that day, a student inspector entered Medlock’s unoccupied room and saw a clear tube on the desk. Based on his training, he believed that it contained marijuana. Another inspector concurred and called University Police Officer King. They also noticed burned candles, an ashtray containing ashes, and a rolled‐up blanket at the bottom of the door. Smoking of any kind is forbidden in the dormitory, as are “open flame materials,” such as candles. Medlock’s closet was ajar. Officer King saw that it contained six‐foot‐high marijuana plant. He obtained a warrant; further search revealed marijuana paraphernalia, a grow light, and 89 grams of marijuana. Medlock was charged with felony possession of more than 30 grams of marijuana. For unexplained reasons, charges were dropped. The university suspended Medlock for one year. After a year obtained readmission to IU. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which he sought destruction of the record of his expulsion, and damages from the student inspectors and King. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the ”in‐your-face” flagrancy of violations of university rules and of criminal law. The case is “near frivolous,” suing the student inspectors “offensive,” and “most surprising … is the exceptional lenity.” The court opined that the relation of students to universities is “essentially that of customer to seller.” View " Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

Manitowoc police brought in a man suspected of stabbing a police officer. The suspect apparently refused to eat, and officers believed he was mentally unstable. Police Chief Kingsbury arranged for the suspect’s mother to bring him a home-cooked meal, but the chief’s wishes were not communicated until after officers, including Swetlik, had already taken the suspect to the county jail for booking. Kingsbury called the jail and spoke with Swetlik. Swetlik told other police officers that Kingsbury had told him to lie to the jailers and had threatened him and reported the same to a deputy chief. The police union later took a vote of no confidence in Kingsbury and compiled a list of grievances, including Swetlik’s complaint. A private firm was engaged to investigate and ultimately recommended that both Swetlik and Kingsbury be terminated, concluding, based on a recording of the call, that Swetlik lied about the incident. The city council voted to bring termination charges against both. Swetlik was placed on paid leave until a hearing officer recommended dismissal of the charge. Swetlik was reinstated, but sued, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment by bringing charges against him for his complaints about Kingsbury. The district court rejected the claim, finding that Swetlik’s statements were not protected speech because they did not address a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants were justified in bringing the charge based on the investigation.View "Swetlik v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In 2008 the EEOC received a charge of discrimination from a woman who claimed Mach Mining had denied her applications for coal mining jobs because of her gender. After investigation, the agency determined there was reasonable cause to believe Mach had discriminated against a class of female job applicants at its Johnston City site and notified the company of its intention to begin informal conciliation. The parties did not reach agreement. In 2011, the EEOC told Mach that further efforts would be futile and filed a complaint two weeks later. Mach asserted failure to conciliate in good faith. The district court certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether an alleged failure to conciliate is subject to judicial review in the form of an implied affirmative defense to an EEOC suit. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with other circuits and responded that it is not. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act directs the agency to try to negotiate an end to an employer’s unlawful employment practices before seeking a judicial remedy, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b), but finding the requirement to create an implied failure-to-conciliate defense would add an unwarranted mechanism by which employers could avoid liability for unlawful discrimination. Such a defense would be contrary to the statutory prohibition on using what was said and done during conciliation “as evidence in a subsequent proceeding.” View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Mach Mining, LLC" on Justia Law

Riding as a prisoner in the back of a patrol van, Fluker was injured when the van stopped short to avoid a collision and he tumbled off his seat. Roy and his wife filed suit, alleging various injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) by filing a grievance, and alternatively, because the Flukers’ suit could not succeed on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fluker v. Kankakee Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into law a statute that prohibits a doctor, under threat of heavy penalties, from performing an abortion unless he has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than 30 miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Wis. Stat. 253.095(2). Planned Parenthood and others challenged the law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court noted that the seven doctors affected by the law had applied for, but after five months, had not been granted, admitting privileges; that all Wisconsin abortion clinics already have transfer agreements with local hospitals to facilitate transfer of clinic patients to the hospital emergency room. A hospital emergency room is obliged to admit and to treat a patient requiring emergency care even if the patient is uninsured, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1). Had enforcement of the law, with its one-weekend deadline for compliance, not been stayed, two of the state’s four abortion clinics would have had to shut down and a third clinic would have lost the services of half its doctors. View "Planned Parenthood of WI v. Van Hollen" on Justia Law

Charleston began his fourth year at the College of Medicine in 2010, having finished his Obstetrics and Gynecology clinical rotation in June. In September, Charleston’s preceptors submitted a complaint, asking that Charleston be required to repeat the rotation, alleging that Charleston had committed errors in written work (including plagiarism), did not complete quizzes until after the rotation’s conclusion, did not have required signatures in his case log, spent four weeks without a preceptor, and he did not perform well enough to pass. The Student Progress Committee held a meeting; Charleston was not permitted to attend, but submitted a letter. The Committee recommended that Charleston be assigned a mentor in the future. Without notice to Charleston, the complaint and Charleston’s letter were forwarded to the Executive Committee with a new letter from Hall, Associate Dean for Student Affairs for the College of Medicine, alleging that in 2008, Charleston had acted “unprofessionally” while serving as a teaching assistant. Charleston had no opportunity to address Hall’s allegation, which, he claims, was false. The Executive Committee decided that Charleston should be dismissed. Internal appeals failed. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection violations, was dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts to establish a protected property interest in his continued education, nor to demonstrate that the university singled him out for unfavorable treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

Diadenko began working at Schurz High School in 2009 and became aware of practices relating to Individualized Education Plans for the school’s special education department that, in her opinion, were problematic. After voicing her concerns to school administrators, Diadenko wrote Chicago Mayor Daley His office forwarded her letter to the Board of Education. A Chicago Public School investigator looked into Diadenko’s allegations, but in the interim Diadenko was suspended twice for violating school policies. Diadenko and three others filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under Illinois law by retaliation for speaking out and for refusing to engage in illegal activity occurring within the school. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Diadenko failed to present evidence that the principal was aware of her letter to the Mayor before taking disciplinary action against her. View "Diadenko v. Folino" on Justia Law

Inmate Verser began a hunger strike in response to perceived unwarranted prison discipline against him. Prison protocols involve moving a hunger striker to a separate cell after he misses three meals. Verser alleges that two prison officials deposited him in an isolated cell and held him down while two others punched him in the stomach in retaliation for his hunger strike and his previous grievance against another officer. The defendants deny that any assault occurred. Verser filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The judge sent Verser back to the prison rather than keep him in the courthouse to await the verdict. When the jury then announced its verdict in favor of the defendants, no immediate effort was made to notify Verser. After the verdict, a juror made a statement: This was very hard for us. Many of us—the majority feel that the defendants all had a part to play in what happened to Mr. Verser, but, because there was a lack of evidence, we could not find the defendants guilty. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Verser‘s total exclusion from the proceedings prevented him from exercising his right to poll the jury (FRCP 48(c)) and a poll might have made a difference.View "Verser v. Corr. Officer Robinson" on Justia Law

Klinkhammer initiated a traffic stop after he clocked Hanson speeding. Hanson got out and Klinkhammer told Hanson to get back into his car. He later testified that Hanson was yelling and acting bizarrely. Hanson testified that Klinkhammer was screaming. Klinkhammer extended his baton and Hanson returned to the car. Klinkhammer approached, took Hanson’s license, and walked toward his cruiser, Hanson left the car again. Klinkhammer brandished his baton and eventually stated that Hanson was under arrest. Hanson ran for his car. Klinkhammer grabbed at Hanson’s shirt and struck him with the baton. Hanson got into his car, drove off and called 911, stating that Klinkhammer was endangering his life. The dispatcher told him not to move because backup was on the way, but Hanson drove to the police station. Another police car tried to block Hanson, but Hanson navigated around it. Hanson stopped at a red light; police surrounded his car with guns drawn. Hanson turned off his engine and put his hands up, but would not move, so the officers smashed a window to pull him out. Charged with felony fleeing‐and‐eluding, Hanson was not allowed to introduce testimony from a school principal with whom Klinkhammer had worked that Klinkhammer had a reputation as confrontational, aggressive and hot‐tempered. The court concluded that this was a “victimless crime” to which the exception for propensity evidence did not apply. Sentenced to 60 days in jail, Hanson petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming that the ruling abridged his right to present an effective defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the last state‐court decision addressing this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. View "Hanson v. Beth" on Justia Law

At 2:15 a.m., Officer Snyder observed Jones’s vehicle traveling faster than the posted 35 mph limit, and confirmed by radar that Jones was traveling at 53 mph. Snyder observed Jones swerving in his lane. He turned on his emergency lights. When Jones stopped his car, Snyder approached and observed that Jones had alcohol on his breath, red, watery eyes, and slurred speech. Jones stated that he had consumed one beer at 7:30 p.m. Officers used a portable breath test to determine Jones’s blood alcohol content was 0.096%. During a field sobriety test, Jones could not keep his hands at his sides and swayed. Snyder read the Indiana Implied Consent Notice, explaining that he had probable cause to believe that Jones had been operating a vehicle while intoxicated and, that while Jones had a choice to submit to the chemical test, there would be consequences to refusing to consent to the chemical test. Ultimately Jones sued, claiming that officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the claims as vague, listing “a series of irrelevant facts untethered to any legal claims.” The only critical fact was that the officers had probable cause .View "Jones v. City of Elkhart" on Justia Law