Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Washington was arrested as a suspect in a double homicide. While charges were pending, he filed a civil suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against Officer Parkinson, alleging that she kicked him in the face and hit him with a flashlight while he was transported. The district court judge conducted voir dire. Juror Evans answered questions concerning his family background without incident. Asked whether he had ever been involved with the civil or criminal justice system, Evans responded, “Not that I know of.” Upon examination, Evans said he did not understand the question. The judge broke the question down and Evans admitted he had been arrested and requested a sidebar. He explained that he had a DUI pending and had suffered head injuries in the accident, but did not have difficulty sitting and listening or any lasting cognitive problems. Evans spoke slowly and frequently closed his eyes. Washington unsuccessfully challenged Evans for cause. At trial, Washington interrupted several times. He fired his appointed counsel and proceeded pro se. The judge asked Washington whether he wanted to continue with jurors who had seen him argue with his attorney. Washington consented to continue with the original jury. He later returned to allowing representation by counsel, who had not left. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Parkinson. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Washington waived his challenge to Juror Evans. View "Washington v. Parkinson" on Justia Law

Chicago police obtained a warrant and searched a two-bedroom apartment leased by Tucker’s mother. Tucker's mother and his niece were present. Officer Edwards found a rifle and documents bearing Tucker’s name under a mattress in a bedroom. Officers found eight clear baggies of heroin inside a potato chip bag and ammunition. Another officer apprehended Tucker a few blocks away and stated that officers had found the gun. Tucker responded that the rifle was not his and that he was holding it for someone. His mother testified that Tucker did not have keys to the apartment, was not listed on the lease, and did not keep possessions there, but only visited. His niece corroborated the testimony, adding that a neighbor brought Tucker’s mail to the apartment. Edwards testified that an officer asked Tucker’s mother which bedroom was Tucker’s, and that she pointed to the bedroom where the rifle was found. Tucker was convicted of possessing a firearm after conviction of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment longer than a year, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims based on sufficiency of the evidence of constructive possession and that Tucker was denied a fair trial because the court indicated it would admit evidence of six prior felonies if he testified. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Re and Leach owned warehouses in Englewood, Florida. After leasing space in Leach’s warehouse, Daughtry told his agent that he did so because Leach stated that a sewer line essential to Re’s warehouse crossed Leach’s property without permission and lacked permits. The agent shared the information who Re, who hired assailants to beat Leach and threaten worse unless he broke the lease. Re was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for using extortion to injure Leach’s business in interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Re claimed that his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance: trial counsel by stealing from Re and appellate counsel by omitting an argument certain to prevail. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that threatening someone without “obtaining” money, or value, in return, does not meet the Hobbs Act definition. A jury could find that Re’s goal in having Leach beaten was to obtain Daughtry as a tenant to get rental payments. A post-trial crime by a lawyer against his client does not spoil the trial as a matter of law; prejudice must be shown. Re could not establish prejudice. The lawyer who embezzled his funds played only a peripheral role in the trial. View "Re v. United States" on Justia Law

Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, “It’s Her Fault,” in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig’s employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district’s interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that “It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at Craig’s school because some students, learning of the book’s hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig’s advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) investigated Burkhardt, a correctional officer at LCC and determined that Burkhardt had taken his cell phone inside and used it to make 30 calls from inside the facility, in violation of IDOC policies and of Illinois law. State’s Attorney Hahn filed felony charges against Burkhardt. A few days later, another correctional officer told other employees that Burkhardt was being prosecuted for accidentally bringing a cell phone into LCC. In response, Volkman, a casework supervisor, called Hahn and left a message that “as a citizen” he did not believe that incarceration should be pursued in Burkhardt’s case, and that Hahn should consider allowing the matter to be handled through the IDOC disciplinary process. Hahn called Volkman back. News of the conversation reached the internal affairs investigator at LCC, who investigated. Volkman received a written reprimand and was suspended for five days. Volkman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was retaliated against for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that, even if they were not, Volkman had not proven his case as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Volkman v. Ryker" on Justia Law

Hamilton claimed that Lorincz, dying of Parkinson’s disease, hired her to help him at home. She was a friend of Lorincz’s daughter, a former physician who was serving jail time. After Hamilton had worked 88 hours, Lorincz gave her a check for $10,000. Hamilton told Lorincz’s other adult children, by phone, that their father was dying and had given her a $10,000 check. Knowing that Hamilton had a criminal conviction, they told the police that Hamilton was taking advantage of their impaired father and went to their father’s house. Although Lorincz told the police that he wanted Hamilton to have the money and wanted the police to leave, they remained for about two hours and learned that Hamilton had been a psychologist, but her license had been revoked after her felony conviction for a $435,000 Medicaid fraud, and that Lorincz already had professional home health aides when Hamilton had “rushed” to his side. Hamilton had a history of bizarre lawsuits against government officials. Hamilton claims that the police would not allow her to leave while they were there and, when they left, required her to leave without the check, although she wanted to stay. The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging police misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hamilton v. Village of Oak Lawn" on Justia Law

Four white male Chicago police officers, in plain clothes, in an unmarked car, were driving in a high-crime area that is largely nonwhite. A woman signaled them and, when they stopped, stated that men were gathered in a lot nearby and one of them, wearing a white jacket, was selling “rocks” (crack cocaine). The officers drove past the lot and saw a juvenile and three men; Morrow, age 20, wearing what appeared to be a white jacket. Officer May parked and watched the men, through binoculars, from across the street. May saw Morrow selling drugs and Bell, age 14, collecting money. Passersby were attracted by the yells of “rocks, rocks” from two older men. The drugs were in a vial on the ground. After about 20 minutes with three sales, May radioed the other officers and told them to arrest the group. May picked up the vial. At the police station the four were searched. Bell had $100 on him. All were charged. Morrow was charged with felony possession of an illegal drug. After being acquitted, Morrow sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure and conspiracy. A jury exonerated all the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of procedural error.View "Morrow v. May" on Justia Law

Balthazar lived in one of two apartments on the third floor. Police had a warrant to search the other apartment. Both had rear doors about opening on a common landing. The officers climbed the stairs to the landing and used a battering ram on the door of Balthazar’s apartment. According to Balthazar they entered the apartment, screaming profanities and pointing guns; handcuffed Balthazar and her cousin; ransacked the apartment, dumping food on the floor, opening drawers, flipping mattresses, and throwing clothing; and left after about 15 minutes when another officer appeared and said they were in the wrong apartment. The officers claim that, while they did hit the wrong door, they immediately realized the mistake and none of them entered Balthazar’s apartment. Balthazar’s attorney later claimed that even looking inside the apartment constituted an illegal search. Neither a claims adjuster who visited the apartment the day of the incident, nor the Independent Police Review Authority employee who took a report, noted complaints about anything other than damage to the door. A jury rejected Balthazar’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A search resulting from an innocent mistake is not unreasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even accepting Balthazar’s alternative theory, simply looking inside does not always constitute a search. View "Balthazar v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1999 Brumfield was hired as a nonprobationary police officer. In 2006 she began to experience unspecified “psychological problems.” The city required her to submit to four psychological examinations. Each time Brumfield was found capable of continuing her work. Brumfield sued, alleging that subjecting her to psychological examinations amounted to discrimination on account of race, sex, and sexual orientation. The city suspended Brumfield without pay pending discharge proceedings. The Police Board rejected the discharge recommendation but suspended Brumfield without pay for 180 days. Before the suspension expired the city again suspended Brumfield pending discharge proceedings. Before the Police Board issued its second suspension order and before Brumfield returned to work, the city initiated a third discharge proceeding. Brumfield filed another lawsuit, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) and dismissed the first case. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Brumfield filed a third suit, alleging violation of Title I of the ADA, which was dismissed as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title II of the ADA does not cover disability discrimination in public employment; such a claim must be brought under Title I, but Brumfield waived her challenge to dismissal of her Title I suit. The Rehabilitation Act claim fails because Brumfield has not alleged that she was suspended or fired by reason of disability.View "Brumfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Grandberry sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a disciplinary sanction, loss of “good time” credits, imposed against him by a state prison. He claimed that the Indiana prison’s disciplinary proceedings failed to provide him with minimal due process protections. The district court denied the petition on the merits. The Seventh Circuit held that a certificate of appealability was not required in a habeas case challenging state prison disciplinary proceedings because in such cases, “the detention complained of” is the additional time the prisoner must stay in prison as a result of the disciplinary proceedings. The detention does not “arise out of process issued by a State court.” View "Grandberry v. Knight" on Justia Law