Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Zayas worked at the Hospital as an ultrasound technician from 1999 until her discharge, at age 55, in 2011. Griesman, Zayas’ supervisor, was responsible for hiring and terminating Zayas and, before firng her, had warned Zayas about sending disrespectful emails. Zayas is Puerto Rican. She brought a national origin discrimination claim and a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. Her case was based on the fact that she was the oldest technician in the department, and was replaced by a younger employee and on evidence of several incidents during which Zayas believed that Griesman or her co-workers were disrespectful. The district court granted the Hospital summary judgment on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Zayas cited a number of hostile incidents, none were related to her national origin, nor were they objectively severe enough to survive summary judgment. Although Zayas’ coworkers did not like her, it was likely the result of “workplace pettiness,” not her Puerto Rican origin. View "Zayas v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law

Fields sued two Illinois prosecutors, charging them with due process violations (42 U.S.C. 1983), malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. He claimed that they coerced witnesses to give testimony that the defendants knew to be false, resulting in Fields’ conviction of two murders and his imprisonment for 17 years until he was acquitted in a retrial. He later received a certificate of innocence. The Seventh Circuit first affirmed dismissal of the federal claims on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The state law claims remained and the district court reinstated one federal claim, which related to a prosecutor’s investigatory work and was not, therefore, subject to absolute immunity. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to one defendant and reversed as to the other. View "Fields v. Wharrie" on Justia Law

The Aurora School District fired Green from his position as a teacher. His union refused his requests to pursue a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement and to represent him in a suit under the Illinois Teacher Tenure Act. Green sued, won, and was reinstated, then sued, claiming that his union abandoned him because of his race, violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c). Green, who is black, claims that the union has represented comparable white employees in grievance proceedings and litigation under the Tenure Act and that the union retaliated against him because he had opposed earlier discrimination. The district judge called Green’s evidence “conclusory;” concluded that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to employees of state or local government, so the union did not have a duty of fair representation; and stated that Illinois law does not require teachers’ unions to represent teachers by filing grievances under a collective bargaining agreement or suits under the Tenure Act. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that neither 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c) nor 2000e–3(a) makes anything turn on the existence of a statutory or contractual duty violated by the act said to be discriminatory. View "Green v. AFT/IFT Local 604" on Justia Law

Off-duty Officer Macon argued with Richardson about Macon’s former girlfriend. Macon fired his gun at Richardson but missed. When on-duty officers arrived, Macon said that Richardson had struck him with a baseball bat. Richardson was arrested and charged with assault and battery. After the charges were dismissed, Richardson filed suit, with 39 claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against Chicago, Macon, the arresting officers, and others. Chicago was dismissed before trial because municipalities are not vicariously liable under section 1983, and the district judge found that none of the city’s policies (including its training regimens) was constitutionally deficient. The jury rejected claims against the other defendants, but decided in Richardson’s favor on one claim, concerning the shot Macon fired, and awarded $1 in nominal damages plus $3,000 in punitive damages. Macon did not appeal, nor did Chicago, which under Illinois law must indemnify Macon for the $1 but not the punitive award. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, Richardson sought more than $675,000 in fees. The district judge awarded $123,000, noting that the firm’s billing did not allow non‑compensable time to be separated out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award as “generous, considering Richardson’s recovery.” View "Richardson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In Wisconsin, Register of Deeds is an elected position. If a vacancy occurs mid-term, the governor may appoint an interim Register for any unexpired portion of the term. The Marinette County Register announced her mid-term retirement. Chasensky, then employed as Chief Deputy Register of Deeds, sought the interim appointment. Chasensky was interviewed by Esser, Walker’s appointments official, who informed Chasensky that he would forward her application to Governor Walker for appointment to the position. Esser subsequently learned that Chasensky was involved in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. Esser informed Chasensky that Walker would not appoint her as interim Register. Chasensky claims that Werwie, Walker’s official spokesperson, publically broadcast that she was not appointed because she was in a bankruptcy proceeding and that “[d]erogatory comments and innuendo regarding [her] bankruptcy, personal financial matters and character which impugned and harmed [her] professional and personal reputation were intentionally publically disclosed by Governor Walker and Mr. Werwie” when Governor Walker spoke on the FOX television network. Werwie publically announced that Walker had planned to appoint her until he learned of her bankruptcy. In her suit alleging violation of privacy rights, employment rights, and of 11 U.S.C. 525(a) (bankruptcy discrimination), the district court held that the defendants waived qualified immunity by failing to raise it before their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Chasensky’s privacy and equal protection claims. View "Chasensky v. Walker" on Justia Law

Nash pleaded no contest to sexual assault of a child. He and his attorney signed and filed a form, acknowledging the 20-day period for filing a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief, which allows a defendant to challenge trial counsel’s performance with new appointed counsel before pursing direct appeal. After several months, Nash sought relief pro se. The circuit court denied the motion, informing Nash of the procedure for reinstating post-conviction and appeal rights. Instead of following that procedure, Nash appealed, arguing ineffective assistance. The court of appeals declined to appoint counsel and affirmed denial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Nash sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance. The district court denied Nash’s petition, concluding that he had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to present it in state court. Nash did not appeal, but nine months later unsuccessfully moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b). The Seventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Later, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel can excuse procedural default if counsel caused the default by abandoning the petitioner without notice. The district court denied a second motion, explaining that Nash caused his own procedural default by failing to adequately present his claims in his pro se attack. Before Nash appealed, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can also excuse procedural default if state law requires raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in collateral proceedings rather than by direct appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the state court advised Nash how he could correct counsel’s procedural error, but he did not do so.View "Nash v. Hepp" on Justia Law

In 1981, a drug dealer (TJ) was shot to death in his Chicago home; the gunmen stole a necklace and ring with the initials “TJ” written in diamonds. Witnesses did not know the gunmen and provided general descriptions. On the day of the crime, they viewed mug shots but did not identify TJ’s murderer. During police interviews, Wright stated that on the day of the murder he was trying to coordinate a drug deal with TJ, that he took two men (one was Coleman) to TJ’s house on the night of the murder and that Coleman had tried to sell him TJ’s jewelry. About two weeks after the murder, witnesses separately viewed a lineup that included Coleman and six others. Two identified Coleman. A third witness did not make any identification. The witnesses later viewed another lineup and identified Barnes as the other perpetrator. Coleman and Barnes were tried together, with separate counsel. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Coleman’s first habeas petition, stating that the facts could potentially demonstrate actual innocence. On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Coleman had not satisfied the actual innocence standard. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Coleman’s evidence that two eyewitnesses were unable to place him at the scene of the crime was not enough to overcome the testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified Coleman as the perpetrator and another who implicated Coleman in the murder. View "Coleman v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Woodridge enacted an ordinance that imposes a $30.00 booking fee on any person subject to a custodial arrest and collects the fee without any hearing. It does not offer an opportunity to challenge the deprivation or seek reimbursement. Markadonatos was charged with retail theft. He was booked and Woodridge collected its fee. A court sentenced Markadonatos to supervision, which he successfully completed. He therefore received an adjudication of “not guilty” on his record. He sued, on behalf of himself and all arrestees who have been charged the fee, arguing that the lack of a procedure to challenge the fee violated their procedural and substantive due process rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the procedural due process argument failed based on balancing the private interest in the $30; the risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards; and the government’s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Markadonatos lacked standing under a substantive due process claim; he was arrested for cause and was adjudicated not guilty only after completing a term of supervision after admitting the factual basis for the charges. View "Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge" on Justia Law

Alexander and Rogers, African‐American women who formerly worked as cocktail waitresses for Casino Queen, claimed race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Their allegations were based on reassignments to less-lucrative floor areas; discipline with respect to absences, tardies, breaks, and eating at work; and requests for days off. The district court granted Casino Queen summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the hostile work environment claim, but reversed as to the race discrimination and retaliation claims. The plaintiffs presented adequate evidence that the floor assignments constituted an adverse employment action. View "Alexander v. Casino Queen Inc." on Justia Law

Gaines questioned the roadworthiness of two different trucks that his employer of five years (K-Five) assigned him. Management took steps to address his concerns, but the trucks never reached the level of safety sought by Gaines. On his last Friday with the company, he informally discussed an alleged steering problem with a K-Five mechanic. He later misreported what the mechanic said. Gaines claims that he honestly believed he was accurately relaying the information but that he botched the details. Citing the false report and instances of alleged insubordination, K-Five fired Gaines. Gaines claimed that he was fired due to his national origin or because he complained about safety issues and that he was owed unpaid overtime. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of K-Five. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded, finding that Gaines presented a triable issue of fact as to whether he was fired for complaining about safety issues. View "Gaines v. K-Five Constr. Corp." on Justia Law