Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Riding as a prisoner in the back of a patrol van, Fluker was injured when the van stopped short to avoid a collision and he tumbled off his seat. Roy and his wife filed suit, alleging various injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) by filing a grievance, and alternatively, because the Flukers’ suit could not succeed on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fluker v. Kankakee Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into law a statute that prohibits a doctor, under threat of heavy penalties, from performing an abortion unless he has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than 30 miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Wis. Stat. 253.095(2). Planned Parenthood and others challenged the law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court noted that the seven doctors affected by the law had applied for, but after five months, had not been granted, admitting privileges; that all Wisconsin abortion clinics already have transfer agreements with local hospitals to facilitate transfer of clinic patients to the hospital emergency room. A hospital emergency room is obliged to admit and to treat a patient requiring emergency care even if the patient is uninsured, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1). Had enforcement of the law, with its one-weekend deadline for compliance, not been stayed, two of the state’s four abortion clinics would have had to shut down and a third clinic would have lost the services of half its doctors. View "Planned Parenthood of WI v. Van Hollen" on Justia Law

Charleston began his fourth year at the College of Medicine in 2010, having finished his Obstetrics and Gynecology clinical rotation in June. In September, Charleston’s preceptors submitted a complaint, asking that Charleston be required to repeat the rotation, alleging that Charleston had committed errors in written work (including plagiarism), did not complete quizzes until after the rotation’s conclusion, did not have required signatures in his case log, spent four weeks without a preceptor, and he did not perform well enough to pass. The Student Progress Committee held a meeting; Charleston was not permitted to attend, but submitted a letter. The Committee recommended that Charleston be assigned a mentor in the future. Without notice to Charleston, the complaint and Charleston’s letter were forwarded to the Executive Committee with a new letter from Hall, Associate Dean for Student Affairs for the College of Medicine, alleging that in 2008, Charleston had acted “unprofessionally” while serving as a teaching assistant. Charleston had no opportunity to address Hall’s allegation, which, he claims, was false. The Executive Committee decided that Charleston should be dismissed. Internal appeals failed. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection violations, was dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts to establish a protected property interest in his continued education, nor to demonstrate that the university singled him out for unfavorable treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

Diadenko began working at Schurz High School in 2009 and became aware of practices relating to Individualized Education Plans for the school’s special education department that, in her opinion, were problematic. After voicing her concerns to school administrators, Diadenko wrote Chicago Mayor Daley His office forwarded her letter to the Board of Education. A Chicago Public School investigator looked into Diadenko’s allegations, but in the interim Diadenko was suspended twice for violating school policies. Diadenko and three others filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under Illinois law by retaliation for speaking out and for refusing to engage in illegal activity occurring within the school. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Diadenko failed to present evidence that the principal was aware of her letter to the Mayor before taking disciplinary action against her. View "Diadenko v. Folino" on Justia Law

Inmate Verser began a hunger strike in response to perceived unwarranted prison discipline against him. Prison protocols involve moving a hunger striker to a separate cell after he misses three meals. Verser alleges that two prison officials deposited him in an isolated cell and held him down while two others punched him in the stomach in retaliation for his hunger strike and his previous grievance against another officer. The defendants deny that any assault occurred. Verser filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The judge sent Verser back to the prison rather than keep him in the courthouse to await the verdict. When the jury then announced its verdict in favor of the defendants, no immediate effort was made to notify Verser. After the verdict, a juror made a statement: This was very hard for us. Many of us—the majority feel that the defendants all had a part to play in what happened to Mr. Verser, but, because there was a lack of evidence, we could not find the defendants guilty. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Verser‘s total exclusion from the proceedings prevented him from exercising his right to poll the jury (FRCP 48(c)) and a poll might have made a difference.View "Verser v. Corr. Officer Robinson" on Justia Law

Klinkhammer initiated a traffic stop after he clocked Hanson speeding. Hanson got out and Klinkhammer told Hanson to get back into his car. He later testified that Hanson was yelling and acting bizarrely. Hanson testified that Klinkhammer was screaming. Klinkhammer extended his baton and Hanson returned to the car. Klinkhammer approached, took Hanson’s license, and walked toward his cruiser, Hanson left the car again. Klinkhammer brandished his baton and eventually stated that Hanson was under arrest. Hanson ran for his car. Klinkhammer grabbed at Hanson’s shirt and struck him with the baton. Hanson got into his car, drove off and called 911, stating that Klinkhammer was endangering his life. The dispatcher told him not to move because backup was on the way, but Hanson drove to the police station. Another police car tried to block Hanson, but Hanson navigated around it. Hanson stopped at a red light; police surrounded his car with guns drawn. Hanson turned off his engine and put his hands up, but would not move, so the officers smashed a window to pull him out. Charged with felony fleeing‐and‐eluding, Hanson was not allowed to introduce testimony from a school principal with whom Klinkhammer had worked that Klinkhammer had a reputation as confrontational, aggressive and hot‐tempered. The court concluded that this was a “victimless crime” to which the exception for propensity evidence did not apply. Sentenced to 60 days in jail, Hanson petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming that the ruling abridged his right to present an effective defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the last state‐court decision addressing this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. View "Hanson v. Beth" on Justia Law

At 2:15 a.m., Officer Snyder observed Jones’s vehicle traveling faster than the posted 35 mph limit, and confirmed by radar that Jones was traveling at 53 mph. Snyder observed Jones swerving in his lane. He turned on his emergency lights. When Jones stopped his car, Snyder approached and observed that Jones had alcohol on his breath, red, watery eyes, and slurred speech. Jones stated that he had consumed one beer at 7:30 p.m. Officers used a portable breath test to determine Jones’s blood alcohol content was 0.096%. During a field sobriety test, Jones could not keep his hands at his sides and swayed. Snyder read the Indiana Implied Consent Notice, explaining that he had probable cause to believe that Jones had been operating a vehicle while intoxicated and, that while Jones had a choice to submit to the chemical test, there would be consequences to refusing to consent to the chemical test. Ultimately Jones sued, claiming that officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the claims as vague, listing “a series of irrelevant facts untethered to any legal claims.” The only critical fact was that the officers had probable cause .View "Jones v. City of Elkhart" on Justia Law

Reynolds, a 62-year-old white male with more than 30 years’ experience with the U.S. General Services Administration, was passed over for a promotion from Building Management Specialist, to Building Manager. Bell, a 32-year-old black employee, got the job over Reynolds and three other candidates, all older than 40. Reynolds sued, alleging age discrimination in violation of the “federal sector” provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 633a; he also claimed race, sex, and retaliation discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16. The district court entered summary judgment on the retaliation claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; Reynolds dropped his claims of racial and sex discrimination. After trial, the district court rejected the age-discrimination claim for lack of evidentiary support and refused to allow Reynolds to amend his complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the district court’s findings defeated the age-discrimination claim regardless of whether a “but-for “requirement or a more lenient “mixed motives” standard applied.View "Reynolds v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 1996, Martha Castro saw a man dressed in black leaning over her husband on the ground outside their home. Martha’s nephew, Varela, ran outside. Varela struck the man, who fired a gun before running into the alley. Castro died from a gunshot wound. Castros’ neighbor, Medina, looked outside when he heard gunfire and saw what happened. Nearby, Santana turned into the alley, where the man in black approached her, gun drawn, and took her car and purse. Police looked for a black male in his early twenties, about five foot seven. Seven months later, Medina identified a picture in a police book as “looking like” the man in black, but asked for a more recent photo. An officer returned with an array of five black-and-white photographs. Medina picked McDowell, as the man he saw standing over Castro. Within days, Santana and Varela identified McDowell’s picture. The three viewed a lineup and identified McDowell. There was no physical evidence connecting McDowell to the crime; McDowell’s close friend testified as an alibi. Convicted and sentenced to 103 years, McDowell exhausted direct appeals and state post-trial remedies, and sought a federal writ of habeas corpus arguing that the processes used to identify him were flawed. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, finding that he procedurally defaulted the claims by failing to adequately present them before each level of the Illinois courts. View "McDowell v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Williams filed his complaint listing more than 100 defendants, including the state, its Attorney General, and Illinois State University, claiming that university police arrested him without probable cause and that other defendants pursued baseless criminal charges. After 13 months, the magistrate ordered Williams to explain why the defendants had not been served, warning that he was considering recommending dismissal for lack of prosecution. Williams responded that he had been stymied by the university’s refusal to supply names and home addresses of employees and that he had sent university counsel a request for waiver of service. Two more months passed. The magistrate recommended dismissal. When Williams requested summonses, 16 months had elapsed without service on any defendant. The district court dismissed, explaining that Williams had the burden of identifying the names and addresses and that Williams could have served the governmental defendants, but did not. Williams sought to reinstate the case, but the 28-day deadline had passed. On appeal, Williams argued that he had three extra days to ask for reconsideration because he received the dismissal by mail, FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, reasoning that the rule enlarges the filing time only when the period for acting runs from service of a notice, not when the time begins after entry of judgment. View "Williams v. State of IL" on Justia Law