Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chaib, born in France in 1957, married an American, immigrated, and became a citizen in 1991. In 2008, Chaib began work at a maximum security prison. During her probationary period, Chaib alleged, training officer Van Dine made sexually offensive remarks. Van Dine admitted to making remarks to another co-worker while Chaib was present, but denied making comments to her. Chaib completed her probation and was granted permanent status. Van Dine claims Chaib was regularly sent back to him for retraining because she had trouble with supervisors. After Van Dine yelled at Chaib to do her job and pointed his finger in her face, Chaib filed an internal personnel complaint. Human resources found no evidence of harassment, but noted evidence that both had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. Both received reprimands. Van Dine ceased all harassing behavior. During two-and-a-half years of employment, Chaib had several encounters with other coworkers that she identified as discriminatory. Her evaluations were not satisfactory. Chaib complained to the EEOC, which resulted in a conclusion that her “appraisal was properly administered” and that its result was proper. Chaib was subsequently denied a transfer and, after an incident involving an inmate, requested time off based on stress, anxiety, and depression. While on FMLA leave, Chaib resigned, filed a second EEOC complaint, and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, reasserting previous complaints and alleging retaliation. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Chaib v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Ruhl and Serio were convicted of the first-degree murder of Neubauer in separate trials in Illinois. After exhausting his state court remedies, Ruhl sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his conviction was the result of violations of various constitutional rights. The district court denied his petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate as to Ruhl’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed, rejecting claims concerning the attorney’s failure to present testimony from two detectives who had voiced concerns about the credibility of a witness; interview and present testimony of several witnesses who would have impeached that witness; investigate telephone records to show that the witness had not called Neubauer’s cell phone; investigate facts surrounding a traffic stop on the morning of the murder; present expert testimony, which counsel had referenced in his opening statement, that would have undermined the state’s case; object to hearsay testimony inculpating Ruhl; and present corroborating witnesses at the pretrial hearing on the state’s motion to exclude testimony that another admitted to shooting Neubauer. View "Ruhl v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Carter, a police officer for 13 years, was with other officers outside a residence while a Tactical Enforcement Unit went inside to check for threats to the officers who would perform a search. Carter was taking Colonix, a nonprescription supplement to clean his colon, in an effort to lose weight. Carter went to his car after the tactical unit gave the all clear and drank Colonix, knowing that it made him need to frequently use the restroom. During the search, the resident complained that cash was missing. A supervisor ordered the officers to “freeze everything” until the Professional Performance Division arrived. Officers were not to leave. About 30-45 minutes later, Sergeant Eccher arrived. Feeling the Colonix and sweating profusely, Carter told Eccher that he needed to use the bathroom and did not want to use the residence bathroom because of its filthy condition. Eccher put his palm straight out, and said, “You can’t leave until I search you.” Eccher patted Carter down; he did not pat down Carter’s genital area and did not take Carter’s badge or police identification. Officer, Lopez, also needing to leave, was searched, but was allowed to keep his boots on. The searches were in plain view of the residents. The officers left. After PPD arrived, another officer was allowed to leave without being searched. The district court rejected a suit by Carter and Lopez under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging illegal search and seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable officer in Carter’s position would have feared arrest or detention if he did not comply with the search request.View "Carter v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Andrews, a white woman, started working at a Cracker Barrel restaurant in 1999. In 2002 she filed a discrimination claim, which settled. Stewart, a black man, then an associate manager, told Andrews that if he became manager, he would fire her. After Stewart became general manager in 2006, he said he was going to make the restaurant the first all-black Cracker Barrel. He also made daily comments about Andrews’s age, calling her “old woman” and “grandma.” Andrews complained to an associate manager and attempted to complain to the district manager, but the person responsible for scheduling an appointment never did so. In 2007 Andrews complained to an Employee Relations Specialist, who determined that no action needed to be taken. Eventually Andrews asked Stewart to initiate her transfer to another restaurant. She claims he told her that the transfer went through, but he denies doing so. She never made contact with the other restaurant and, after three weeks during which she did not work, the company’s system listed her as having quit. In the meantime, Stewart was fired for violating an asset-protection policy. The district court rejected claims that Stewart fired Andrews because of her sex, age, and race and that he retaliated for her prior Title VII suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Andrews did not suffer an adverse employment action, but quit in anticipation of a transfer that never occurred. View "Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc." on Justia Law

Until 1998, Vanaria was employed by the Cook County Probation Department. He was terminated following investigation of allegations that he had sought sexual favors in exchange for looser conditions of probation. In 2002 the county rehired Vanaria, who was a political operative. He began working at a county hospital in a position excluded from decrees prohibiting hiring decisions based on politics. The hospital did not conduct background investigations of patronage hires. A pharmaceutical representative alleged that Vanaria had attempted to condition her participation in a hospital program on her giving him a massage. An investigation resulted in oral counseling for Vanaria, but no discipline. In 2007, Vanaria offered Krystal, an unemployed massage therapist, a position as a physical therapist. When she stated that she was not qualified as a physical therapist, he explained that he could make things happen because people owed him favors. He provided her with legitimate application forms and insurance paperwork. When Krystal returned to his office with her Social Security card, Vanaria asked Krystal to close the door and told her that if she truly wanted the job, she had to kiss and massage him. Krystal agreed to have Vanaria visit her at her home massage studio, where they had sexual contact. Krystal eventually called the hospital’s HR department and learned that no position had ever existed, Vanaria eventually pled guilty to official misconduct and bribery. The district court rejected Krystal’s Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), equal protection, and due process claims and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Wilson v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Officers arrived at Helman’s residence to execute warrants for his arrest. They hoped for a peaceful surrender. Helman exited the home and spoke with officers. In response to questions as to whether he was armed, Helman lifted his shirt to show a semi-automatic handgun. Helman handed the officers papers and returned to his house. The officers informed other members of the state police that Helman was carrying a loaded firearm. A six-hour stalemate followed, after which Helman walked into his yard carrying water and a cup. The Emergency Response Team moved in to prevent him from retreating back into his home and activated a flash bang device to distract Helmanhim. According to the officers, Helman turned, and, seeing the ERT, attempted to draw his handgun. Officers shot Helman multiple times. Helman claims that he did not reach for his weapon until after that device went off and shots were fired. Helman pled guilty in state court to resisting law enforcement with a deadly weapon. Helman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Helman’s version of the facts would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and, under the facts found in that conviction, the response of the officers was reasonable. View "Helman v. Smeltzley" on Justia Law

Wourms, age 16, was killed in a crash; he was driving erratically when an officer, warned by a 911 call from Wourms’ mother that her son was drunk and “going crazy,” turned on his emergency lights to signal him to pull over. Wourms increased his speed to about 80 mph in an area posted for 25 mph. His father sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the crash was caused by the police car intentionally ramming Wourms’s car, resulting in an unconstitutional seizure of his person and property. The officer denied that his car touched Wourms’s car. The district court entered summary judgment, finding the evidence insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the cars had collided. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without a collision, Wourms was entirely responsible; the police officer had every legal right to signal Wourms to pull over. Even ramming a recklessly driven car to induce the driver to stop or cause the car to crash, need not be unreasonable. In this case, however, there were no marks on the police car that matched marks on Wourms’s car, no debris on the road where Wourms started to swerve, and no skid marks from the police car. Witness testimony indicated that the police could not have caught Wourms in time to hit his car before the crash.View "Wourms v. Fields" on Justia Law

A large group of African-American police officers and firefighters sued the City of Indianapolis, alleging that the examination process it uses to rank candidates for promotion in the police and fire departments has a disparate impact on black candidates and is intentionally discriminatory. They filed lawsuits targeting promotion decisions made in successive promotion cycles starting inv2002, but most of the challenged decisions were based on scores generated by testing administered by the police department in 2008 and the fire department in 2007. The district court dismissed many of the claims as either time-barred or substantively flawed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court mistakenly assumed that allegations of intentional discrimination necessarily defeat a disparate-impact claim, here the disparate-impact claims fail because they are stated as legal conclusions, without any factual content to support an inference that the examination procedures caused a disparate impact on black applicants for promotion. The disparate-treatment claims lacked evidentiary support and were properly resolved on summary judgment. Although the second complaint concerns a different set of promotion decisions, it attacked the same eligibility list that was at issue in the first case and was, therefore, barred. View "Adams v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

In November, 2005, Rooni and others went hunting. They shot three deer, which they took to a DNR post in a gas station for registration. While DNR employees tagged the deer, Rooni went inside. DNR agent Biser arrived and asked Rooni how many deer he had. Rooni did not respond. Biser proclaimed, loudly, that Rooni did not like the DNR. Rooni said “no, just people like you.” Biser left the station and leaned against the trailer while speaking to DNR employees. Rooni came out and attempted to walk around Biser. He had to pass closely because of slush on the ground. Biser extended his leg to block Rooni’s way. Rooni stopped and said, “let me get through,” and “brushed” between Biser and the trailer. Biser allegedly spit food at Rooni. As the encounter escalated, Rooni told his son to call the police. Biser told Rooni he was under arrest. While handcuffing Rooni, Biser allegedly jerked him back and made the cuffs too tight. While in the jail, Rooni did not seek medical attention. He had discoloration under his skin, painful hands and swollen fingers. Charges of disorderly conduct and obstructing an officer were dismissed. In April 2006, Rooni was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the handcuffing claim, citing qualified immunity. The court remanded Rooni’s arrest claim; taking his reasonable allegations as true, neither probable cause nor “arguable” probable cause supported an arrest.View "Rooni v. Biser" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adkins of attempting to possess heroin with intent to distribute and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 90 months. In a separate case, Adkins pled guilty to receipt of child pornography. In consolidated appeals, he challenged evidentiary decisions, jury instructions, allegedly improper statements by the government, and the sentence in the heroin-handgun case. The Seventh Circuit rejected those claims, but vacated his sentence for child pornography, finding a condition of supervised release unconstitutionally vague. The condition stated that “defendant shall not view or listen to any pornography or sexually stimulating material or sexually oriented material or patronize locations where such material is available.” Read literally, the condition might preclude Adkins from using a computer or entering a library, regardless of what he views, because both are “locations” where “sexually stimulating material … is available.” He might not be able to ride the bus, enter a grocery store, watch television, open a magazine or newspaper, read a classic book, or even go out in public, given the ubiquity of advertisements that use potentially sexually oriented or sexually stimulating images. View "United States v. Adkins" on Justia Law