Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While at Big Muddy, inmate Roberts broke his hand in a fight. He claims that he received inadequate treatment and that he filed an “emergency” grievance and received no response. Defendants claim there was no grievance. He was transferred to Pinckneyville. He says he told the receiving officer (Alvis) that Big Muddy staff had authorized him to be assigned to the bottom bunk, but that Alvis said to work it out with his cellmate. He claims to have filed a grievance, but Pinckneyville officials deny receiving it. The district court dismissed his pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Roberts forfeited claims against Alvis; his grievance neither mentioned a name nor provided information that should have identified Alvis. Dismissal of the hand-injury claim was too abrupt, absent inquiry into what Roberts could reasonably know about how to proceed against a prison employee in a different prison through the Administrative Review Board, but that grievance was also defective. Regarding other Big Muddy defendants, it was unclear whether Roberts’s emergency grievance, which would bypass normal procedures, was in records that were searched, so the untimely filing with the Review Board is irrelevant. If the defendants want to contest whether the grievance was filed, an evidentiary hearing will be necessary. View "Roberts v. Neal" on Justia Law

Deputy Stanley pulled over Hille for an expired vehicle registration sticker. The Secretary of State’s record was different than the date on the sticker. Stanley was unable to resolve the discrepancy at that time and let Hille go. The Secretary of State’s office later notified her that the sticker was stolen. Possession of a stolen sticker is a felony in Illinois. Stanley proceeded to Hille’s registered address to arrest her, arranging for Deputy Morrison to meet her there. The deputies knocked on the door. Iit was answered by White, Hille’s boyfriend, who owned and lived in the house. White refused to allow them entry without a warrant. Stanley and Morrison claim to have smelled burning marijuana from inside the house. Hille had been smoking marijuana and was later found in the house with a half‐burned joint. White attempted to close the door and retreated into the house and up the stairs. Stanley blocked the door. The deputies tackled him on the stairs. Morrison forced White’s arm behind his back and told White to stop resisting. White claims to have suffered a shoulder injury. The deputies arrested White for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a charge later dismissed. White filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, claiming false arrest and excessive force. The court found that there was no exigency and that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting “fractured case law” concerning entry after smelling marijuana. View "White v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Huff was driving and Seaton was the passenger in a car with Ohio license plates that was stopped in Illinois, as recorded by Officer Reichert’s dashboard camera. Huff provided his driver’s license, insurance, and registration. Reichert explained that Huff crossed the center line without using a signal and then moved back into his own lane. Dispatch related that Huff had been arrested for battery and for marijuana cultivation in 2001, but had no convictions. Seaton had no criminal history. Reichert requested backup, but told Huff that he was letting him go with a warning. Seaton seemed nervous, so Reichert then asked if Huff objected to a search. Huff replied that he would “like to go.” Reichert said that he wanted to walk his drug‐sniffing dog around the car. Huff asked Reichert if he was free to go. Reichert responded, “not in the car.” Huff stated that he felt he had no choice but to consent and that Reichert could use the dog but could not search the car. Reichert repeatedly said, “show me! Find it!” The dog barked. Reichert replied, repeatedly, “good boy!” Reichert later admitted that he was trained not to say these things to his dog. Reichert told Huff that he was going to search his car. Huff responded, “do what you gotta do.” Reichert searched the car, but did not document the presence of drugs nor collect any evidence. About 50 minutes after the stop Reichert told them that they were free to leave. In their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court denied Reichert’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Huff v. Reichert" on Justia Law

Pittman, a pretrial detainee, stated, during intake, that he had no major medical problems, no thoughts about killing or injuring himself, no previous suicide attempts, and no psychiatric history. Weeks later he stated that he was suicidal and was placed on a 15-minute suicide watch. During subsequent evaluations, he denied suicidal thoughts. Staff members were unaware that evaluations for suicidal tendencies had been conducted in connection with an arrest two years earlier. Pittman continued to complain about health issues and to act out in an effort to be housed outside lockdown. The night he attempted to hang himself, Pittman was seen crying in his cell. His guardian claims, but staff denies, that he requested to talk to CRISIS staff. The attempt rendered him severely brain-damaged and disabled. His guardian alleged deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide and willful and wanton failure to provide adequate medical care and to protect him. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that there was a genuine issue of triable of fact with respect to the claims against two defendants and that the county may have vicarious liability on the state law claim for the actions of those defendants. View "Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison" on Justia Law

In 2006 Buechel was incarcerated at FCI-Greenville federal correctional institution, where he contracted Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, (MRSA), a staph infection resistant to certain antibiotics. Buechel was hospitalized for more than 40 days and was left with serious and permanent damage to his heart and lungs. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that his injuries were caused by the prison’s negligence. The district court issued a pretrial order that limited Buechel’s negligence claim to a theory that he contracted MRSA from contact with one fellow inmate, in the prison laundry in July 2006, or more generally as a result of sloppy procedures in handling infected prison laundry. After a bench trial, the court held that Buechel had not proved that he contracted MRSA from either the inmate or the laundry procedures and entered judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that Buechel failed to prove that he contracted MRSA from the inmate or as a result of inadequate laundry procedures, but vacated and remanded for consideration of a broader theory. Buechel’s administrative claim and complaint presented a broader theory that the prison was negligent more generally in its failure to adhere to its MRSA-containment policies.View "Buechel v. United States" on Justia Law

Kerr shot his wife’s lover at point‐blank range, turned himself in, was convicted of first degree intentional homicide, and was sentenced to life in prison, with eligibility for parole after 21 years. His petition for habeas corpus claimed that assistant district attorney Williams offered a plea agreement under which Kerr would plead guilty to first degree reckless homicide, a Class B felony. Kerr claims that his attorney, Boyle, failed to advise him correctly about the penalties he would face if he accepted. Kerr says that he rejected the alleged offer because the sentencing range was the same as the one for intentional homicide. Following a remand, the district court heard from four witnesses: Kerr, Williams, Boyle, and Boyle’s co‐counsel, his daughter Bridget Boyle. Boyle and Williams testified that there was no offer at all. Kerr, some of Bridget’s statements, and letters between Bridget and Kerr since his incarceration, supported Kerr’s position. A sealed transcript, created after Kerr’s sentencing, recounted a discussion between Kerr, Williams, Boyle, and the trial judge concerning the issue. The district court found that the state never offered Kerr a plea bargain and again denied Kerr’s petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kerr v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Kingsley was a pretrial detaineel. A deputy noticed a sheet of yellow paper covering the light above Kingsley’s bed and ordered him to take it down. Kingsley refused, stating that he had not put the paper there. When the deputy later returned, he again ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. During morning rounds, another officer ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. Kingsley did not comply. Minutes later, an officer delivering Kingsley’s medication ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. After several requests, Kingsley still refused. Kingsley refused an order from the administrator, who said jail staff would remove the paper and would transfer Kingsley to another cell in the interim. Five officers arrived, ordered Kingsley to stand up and to back up to the door with his hands behind his back. After being warned to follow the order or be tasered, Kingsley continued to lie facedown on his bunk. The parties dispute what followed, but an officer applied a taser for five second. Kingsley was placed on a medical watch, but refused the attention of a nurse. Months later, Kingsley, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants; a claim of excessive force against two officers proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court conflated the standards for excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and wrongly instructed the jury to consider the defendants’ subjective intent. View "Kingsley v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Debenedetto was arrested for transmitting threatening communications (18 U.S.C. 875(c)). The district court ordered a mental competency evaluation. After a hearing, the court determined that Debenedetto suffered from mental disease or defect that rendered him incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he be placed in a federal medical center, Butner. Months later, the court reviewed the result of a second examination and held a hearing regarding the need to medicate Debenedetto without his consent. Defense counsel argued that he believed that Debenedetto, already in custody for 16 months, had already served the guidelines range for his offense and raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of the drugs. After an adjournment, counsel represented that Debenedetto had agreed to go back to Butner and, “if they feel involuntary medication is appropriate, that should be done, but they should also review or consider less intrusive measures.” Debenedetto spoke, expressing concerns that he had previously had seizures and indicated his belief that medication was not necessary. Debenedetto filed a pro se appeal from the subsequent commitment order. After the government indicated intent to execute the order promptly, his attorney moved to stay the order and to withdraw as counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the hearing and written findings did not establish the elements necessary to justify involuntary medication.View "United States v. Debenedetto" on Justia Law

Bryant, riding his bike on a Chicago street, was stopped by police officers, searched without a warrant, and arrested for possessing a controlled substance. He was arraigned in September, 2010. He was released after the evidence was suppressed and the case dismissed. He is now in custody for a different crime. In 2012, Bryant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and state law claims. He sought to compel disclosure of the identities of the police officers. The district court screened Bryant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915A) noting that the section 1983 claims were subject to a two-year limitations period. Bryant had until August 20, 2012, to file his false-arrest claim, September 23 for the false-imprisonment claim and December 13 for the malicious-prosecution claim. The filing date of the complaint was unclear. The court deemed it filed on September 18, the earliest date that Bryant could have given it to jail officials for mailing. The court observed that. Bryant’s malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, but was not actionable in federal court, and that his remaining federal claims were time-barred. The court expressed doubt that Bryant could identify the arresting officers within the limitations period. The court ultimately dismissed, stating that incarceration did not constitute a disability to toll the limitations period, that Bryant’s “belated attempts” to identify his arresting officers were not grounds for equitable tolling, and that identifying the officers as Doe and Roe was insufficient. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Bryant exercised reasonable diligence and that the court erred in disregarding his discovery request. View "Larry Bryant v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

A.H.’s Greensburg, Indiana school has a policy: Hair Styles which create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete are not acceptable….. Each varsity head coach will be responsible for determining acceptable length of hair for a particular sport. The head varsity basketball coach has established an unwritten hair-length policy, providing that each player’s hair must be cut above the ears, eyebrows, and collar, to promote “team unity” and project a “clean cut” image. The boys’ baseball teams have a similar policy; the track and football teams do not. No girls’ team is subject to a hair-length policy. When A.H. refused to comply, he was removed from the team. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and rejected substantive due process claim, acknowledging that one’s choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but noting that public schools have authority to enact and enforce dress and grooming policies and may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon a greater degree of regulation than imposed on students generally. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the policy treats boys and girls differently; there was no evidence of comparable grooming standards applied to girls playing basketball. The evidence supported the sex discrimination claims.View "Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty Sch. Corp." on Justia Law