Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Aurora hired Gosey as a chef’s assistant in 2008. In September 2009 she applied for an open position as food-services manager at the hospital. The job posting stated a preference for someone with “five to seven years of progressively responsible experience in managing a food service operation,” including experience in managing “staff, budgets and multiple human resources functions.” There were more than 150 applicants. Aurora interviewed Gosey, but ultimately hired a white woman. Gosey filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, alleging that she had been denied the promotion, was assigned extra duties, and disciplined for sham infractions because of her race. She accused Aurora’s managers of trying to manufacture an excuse to fire her by altering her attendance records. Two months later, Aurora fired her. Gosey sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). The district court granted Aurora summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to claims of harassment and failure to promote, but concluded that further proceedings are necessary on claims that Aurora fired Gosey because of race and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination.View "Gosey v. Aurora Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Since 1994, Harper has served as Fulton County Treasurer, an elected position with a four-year term. The 21-member County Board sets salaries for elected officials. From 1983–2002, the County Treasurer and County Clerk were paid the same salary. When Rumler, the County Clerk, announced his retirement, the board increased his salary in order to allow him to receive greater retirement benefits. From 2003–2006, the County Clerk’s salary exceeded the County Treasurer’s salary. After Rumler’s retirement, the new County Clerk, James Nelson, and the County Treasurer were paid the same salary from 2007–2010. In the meantime, disputes between Harper and the Board apparently prompted the Finance Committee to recommend against increasing the County Treasurer’s salary in 2010. The Board adopted the recommendation, 10–8, but voted (16–2) to give the County Clerk annual pay raises. Harper filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging sex discrimination in compensation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harper failed to show that the Board’s concerns about the content and timeliness of her reports were merely excuses covering sex discrimination. View "Harper v. Fulton Cnty." on Justia Law

Bryn Mawr Chicago nursing home, a Medicaid provider, is subject to Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) inspections. In 2010, IDPH inspected the facility following allegations that a resident had been sexually assaulted. Bryn Mawr was eventually cited for three deficiencies, 42 C.F.R. 488.301, two based on sexual abuse and one based on failure to sufficiently monitor a resident. Bryn Mawr challenged the findings by Informal Dispute Resolution, which involved exchange of written information without a live hearing. IDPH simultaneously conducted internal review and found that the deficiencies based on allegations of sexual abuse were not sufficiently supported by credible evidence, but the third party upheld the deficiency findings. Ultimately IDPH maintained the deficiency findings. Meanwhile, Bryn Mawr also engaged in a parallel process to “correct” deficiencies. At the follow-up inspection, IDPH determined that the deficiencies had been corrected, so that remedies would not be imposed. IDPH passed the deficiency findings on to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which published them on its website and factored them into its 5-Star Rating System. Bryn Mawr’s rating was supposed to fall from five to four stars because of the deficiencies, but CMS mistakenly reduced it to two stars. Regardless of a partial correction, Bryn Mawr was displeased that it had not had the opportunity to challenge the findings at a hearing and sued to compel a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bryn Mawr Care, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Davis, in prison following a guilty plea, sought federal collateral relief more than a year had expired, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) had expired. He claimed equitable tolling, asserting that his mental limitations excused untimely filing. A magistrate judge found that ability to make such a motion indicated mental competence. The Seventh Circuit vacated, referring to “Catch 22” reasoning and noting that someone else may have drafted and mailed the motion. Davis claimed that a fellow prisoner had done so. Mental incompetence can support tolling of federal statutes of limitations; the likelihood that mentally marginal prisoners will lack the assistance of guardians or lawyers means that, for them, such tolling is especially important. Something more than general inability to cope with legal matters is required, such as inability to understand the charges and assist in one’s own defense. The court declined to limit the range of possibilities, but noted that a report prepared by Wisconsin’s prison system concluded that he has an IQ of 49, is illiterate and uneducable, and cannot cope with any legal subject. The court remanded to allow the district court can take evidence and determine Davis’s abilities. View "Davis v. Foster" on Justia Law

Carmody worked for the University of Illinois for 25 years until he was fired for reasons involving a security breach of the university’s email system. The breach was connected to a state court lawsuit Carmody was pursuing against a university professor, alleging that the professor had assaulted him. Carmody says that he discovered several printed emails, contradicting affidavits filed in the case, in the newspaper box outside his home. Carmody gave the emails to his lawyer. After unsuccessfully appealing his discharge, Carmody filed, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and an Illinois statute designed to protect whistle-blowers. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that Carmody has plausibly alleged that his pre-termination opportunity to be heard was meaningless because he could not answer the university’s crucial questions or respond to its accusations without violating a state court order that required him not to discuss the subject. The university fired Carmody on the same day the state court modified its order to allow him to respond to the charges. Carmody also alleged that he was actually fired based in part on a charge for which he had no prior notice and opportunity to be heard. View "Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

Bass worked as a custodian. In 2002, she was assigned to work at a single-story elementary school. In 2003 a second story was added. A male was responsible for cleaning the second floor. In 2008–09, the District commissioned a study of custodial duties at 11 schools, which revealed that second floor took tasks more time than one shift permitted, while the first floor could be finished in less than one shift. While Bass was on leave, the District had the substitute custodian try a new arrangement. She was able to finish during her shift. The District reassigned second‐floor restrooms to Bass. The study also resulted in seven male custodians being assigned additional duties. Bass then had two suspensions without pay. She did not contest the suspensions; she had failed to complete her duties. Her work improved significantly. Before 2010, Bass had taken two leaves that exceeded the leave to which she was entitled under the collective bargaining agreement. Bass injured her back in August 2010 and again took leave. The District told Bass that she would have no more available leave as of November 3, and would be fired if she failed to return to work. Bass returned to work on November 4. She injured her back again 12 days later and was out for 2.5 days. The District issued a reprimand. On January 3, Bass again did not report to work. She provided a doctor’s note, but exceeded available leave time. When asked when she would be able to return without restrictions, Bass did not reply. She was fired on February 2, for job abandonment. Three male custodians lost their jobs between 2008 and 2011 on the same ground. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on her sex discrimination claims. The district court dismissed her sit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Thomas, an Indiana prisoner, sued prison officials and medical personnel at the Pendleton Correctional Facility under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to his epilepsy in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed without prejudice because Thomas did not pay the initial partial filing fee of $8.40, assessed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1) in response to his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Thomas claimed that when his payment came due he had no money or income, and that any money he does receive is immediately and automatically deducted by the prison to pay for debts he incurred by printing copies of his complaint. The judge did not respond to Thomas’s letter, but later allowed an appeal. After determining that it had jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal because the judge dismissed the suit without determining if Thomas was at fault for not paying. View "Thomas v. Butts" on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

In 1984, Richardson was convicted of armed robbery and murder. A Chicago Police Department firearms examiner testified that rounds fired at the scenes of two 1980 Chicago shootings came from the same gun, and eyewitnesses from both scenes identified Richardson as the gunman. The court sentenced Richardson to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed without addressing any jury selection issues, although the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Batson in the interim. In post-conviction proceedings, the state lower court found that Richardson had not made out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection and that counsel was not ineffective. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Richardson had waived the Batson claim. After a remand, the federal district court granted habeas corpus on the Batson claim. “Other crimes evidence” and ineffective-assistance claims were denied. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the state’s use of peremptory strikes, finding the claim had been waived. Richardson’s judge conducted voir dire and did not allow the parties to question members of the venire. The judge excused, for cause, 24 of 61 persons questioned. Richardson used 20 peremptory challenges. The state used 16. Richardson did not object to the prosecution’s use of peremptories. The court affirmed rejection of the ineffective assistance claim.View "Richardson v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Snyder was involved in a fistfight with another town council member. He was convicted of battery. The court imposed a sentence of six months suspended and six months of home detention, but later determined that Snyder had violated probation. Snyder served the remainder of his sentence at the county jail. While Snyder was incarcerated, the County Voter Registration Board informed him that his voter registration had been cancelled under Ind. Code 3-7-46. Snyder knew that Indiana law permits him to reregister to vote at any time following release from jail. Snyder refused to re-register. He was turned away from voting in a special election. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg; the Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971; and the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. On certification, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana Constitution authorized temporary disenfranchisement of any incarcerated convict. The district court dismissed the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds; held that a county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts done under state or federal law; and held that claims to enjoin de-registration or require reinstatement were not justiciable. Despite all parties arguing to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found the case moot. Snyder waived any challenge to dismissal of the state defendants and failed to state a Monell claim against the county defendants. View "Snyder v. King" on Justia Law