Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Campbell worked at the Forest Preserve District’s Cermak Family Aquatic Center. In 2010, a security camera recorded him having sex with a coworker in the center’s office. Weeks later, the FPD fired him. Nearly two and a half years later, Campbell sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1981, alleging that he was denied progressive discipline in violation of his right to due process; that he was fired because of his race in violation of his right to equal protection of the law; and that his termination violated that statute’s prohibition on racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts. Campbell later conceded that his section 1983 claims were time‐barred. The district court dismissed, finding that section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of section 1981 committed by state actors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 section 1981 provides a remedy against state actors independent of section 1983 and that if we were to allow his claim to proceed directly under section 1981, it would be timely because it would be governed by 28 U.S.C. 1658’s four‐year statute of limitations, rather than the two‐year statute of limitations governing section 1983 claims in Illinois. View "Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

A psychiatrist, called 911 to report that Sutterfield had just left her office, indicating that she had received some bad news, and had remarked, “I guess I’ll go home and blow my brains out.” She informed officers that Sutterfield had worn an empty gun holster, from which she surmised that Sutterfield owned a gun. Officers were unable to locate Sutterfield. Hours later, the doctor told officers that Sutterfield had called minutes earlier stating that she did not need assistance, but did not indicate that Sutterfield no longer posed a danger to herself. Hours later, Sutterfield answered her door but would only state that she had “called off” the police. Officers concluded that they would have to enter forcibly. Sutterfield called 911. After informing Sutterfield of his intention to open the storm door forcibly, an officer yanked the door open and entered. A struggle ensued. Sutterfield can be heard on the 911 recording demanding that the officers let go of her and leave. Officers conducted a protective sweep and observed a compact disc carrying case in plain view. The soft-sided case was locked. An officer surmised from its feel and weight that there might be a firearm inside. He forced the case open and discovered a handgun and concealed-carry licenses from other jurisdictions. They also discovered a BB gun made to realistically resemble a handgun. They seized the guns and transported Sutterfield to a psychiatric hospital. Sutterfield sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court rejected the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances; even if the officers exceeded constitutional boundaries in searching the closed container and seizing the guns, they are protected by qualified immunity.View "Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Avila pleaded guilty in Wisconsin state court repeated sexual assault of an eight-year-old child, producing child pornography and 16 counts of possessing child pornography and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Avila’s appellate counsel identified only frivolous grounds for appeal and submitted a no-merit report to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Avila responded that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney told him that if he pleaded guilty, he would receive just five years of imprisonment and 10 years of supervision. Avila said he was never informed of the true severity of the sentence he faced and he would have refused to plead guilty on those terms. The state appellate court rejected the claims as waived by his guilty pleas. The federal district court denied Avila’s habeas petition and denied him a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the state court applied a rule of law directly contrary to controlling precedent of the Supreme Court (Williams v. Taylor (2000)). The general rule that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal is subject to an exception for ineffective assistance in deciding to enter the plea. View "Avila v. Pugh" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hnin, from the country of Myanmar, began working at TOA’s metal stamping plant. All TOA associates, including Hnin, receive a handbook with a statement that TOA normally employs progressive discipline and attempts to provide notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to improve, but that some infractions warrant probation or dismissal without prior warning, including violations of TOA’s sexual harassment policy. In 2010, Brock began working at TOA, about 22 feet from Hnin’s work station. A month later Brock reported that Hnin had been harassing her for some time, that she had asked Hnin to stop several times, and that the harassment involved a co-worker, Miller. Hnin made body gestures and kissing noises, suggesting that Miller and Brock were together. Brock also stated that Hnin instructed co-workers to slow down so they could work more overtime and acted in an intimidating manner. She identified several witnesses. During an explanation of the investigation, Hnin became aggravated and spoke in an elevated tone. He denied any wrongdoing and asked that the witnesses be brought in so he could confront them. He was told that this request was not in line with TOA’s procedures. TOA terminated his employment. Hnin filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and state law. The district court granted TOA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting national origin discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims. View "Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC" on Justia Law

After drinking vodka, Ford rode with Grace to Ford’s home. The men passed 15-year-old Hodge, sitting next door. Ford and Hodge greeted each other. Inside Ford’s house, Ford said, “I can’t stand that mother fucker. I’ll be back.” Ford left the house; Grace soon heard a popping sound. He looked out and saw Hodge lying in the street. Ford came inside and said, “I got to get the fuck out of here … meet me … and pick me up.” Grace located a police officer and led him to the crime scene. Hodge, shot in the back of his head, died the next day. Gary Police Officer Quasney immediately spoke with witness Simmons, who stated that he had seen the victim talking to a black male in a black hooded sweatshirt, who shot Hodge. At a second trial, following a mistrial, Simmons was unavailable. The trial court denied the state’s request for admission of prior testimony, but admitted Quasney’s testimony recounting Simmons’s statements under the excited utterance exception. During closing arguments, Ford’s attorney argued that the state had failed to explain why Ford would shoot Hodge. In response, the prosecutor asserted that motive could not be known because the victim was dead and “If that person who committed the offense don’t talk, how would we ever know?” Convicted, Ford was sentenced to 50 years. Direct appeals and petitions for state post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. The federal district court dismissed his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify. Even assuming that an objection would have been sustained, Ford failed to show prejudice.View "Ford v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Olson shared a cell with Russell for about a week in 2007. Olson approached Sergeant Schneider and stated: “[M]y celly, Russell, has twice tried to swing off on me and I want him moved … I fear he’s gonna try to do it again … he isn’t taking his meds and hears voices that tell him to attack people.” Schneider asked other officers about Russell, but nobody had heard of any problems or of any issues with Russell’s medication. Schneider asked the officer supervising distribution to be sure Russell took his medication. The next evening Russell attacked Olson, damaging one of Olson’s teeth. The nurse on duty recommended that the tooth be pulled, but about a month passed before Olson saw a dentist. Olson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of an attack by Russell and to his dental needs. The district court declined to appoint counsel, finding that Olson was a competent pro se litigant and that his claims were not complex, and ultimately granted summary judgment against Olson on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that Schneider was subjectively aware that Russell was dangerous or that the staff failed to act promptly once aware of Olson’s serious medical needs.View "Olson v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Lee was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide plus two counts of armed robbery, based on evidence that he and Thomas traveled to Meyers’s residence in Oshkosh, to collect a drug debt. Four people were present when they arrived: Meyers’s half-brother Johnston, Meyers’s friend Paez and her two-year-old daughter, and Meyers. A fight broke out; Lee pulled a gun and fatally shot Meyers in the abdomen. Lee and Thomas left the apartment and drove to Milwaukee where they met with Johnson. Johnson drove them to a gas station and then dropped Lee off at a street corner. Shortly thereafter, Johnson and Thomas were pulled over by Milwaukee police and arrested. Lee was apprehended in Chicago a month later. Lee’s conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that an in-court identification of Lee violated his rights to due process and that admission of an out-of-court statement at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. An adequate and independent state ground precluded consideration of Lee’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Lee v. Baenen" on Justia Law

Macon runs group homes for disabled individuals and has a policy requiring any employee who “witnesses, is told of, or has reason to believe an incident of abuse or neglect … has occurred” to report the incident. A 2009 Illinois law requires a report to a state agency. Baker, hired in 1991, twice saw a coworker, Carter, use his finger to flick a resident’s neck. She told supervisors. A decade later state officials investigated allegations that Carter had abused the same resident. Cross, a 39-year-old caregiver, told investigators that she had seen the resident agitated and gesturing at his genitals after Carter had worked the overnight shift. Cross asked the resident “who did that to him,” but could not understand his answer. A week later, she overheard Carter state, “Yes, I pulled it,” and a month later, she saw the resident point to his genitals and toward Carter. Though Cross and Baker discussed Cross’s observations, Cross did not report. Baker and a third caregiver described seeing Carter flick the resident in the neck. The third caregiver told investigators that she had heard Carter “joking” about squeezing the resident’s testicles. The report concluded that the resident had been abused and recommended that Macon address the failure of the employees to comply state law. A disciplinary report for Cross observed that she had “direct evidence” of and “suspected” abuse. The report for Baker and the third worker found that each had been “an eyewitness” and failed to report. Macon fired Baker, age 56, and a 61-year-old caregiver, but suspended Cross for three days. Baker sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed; a jury reasonably could find that Macon discriminated based on age by treating a younger employee more leniently.View "Baker v. Macon Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Banks sued her former employer, the Board of Education, and her former supervisor, Gonzales, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and related violations of federal and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims; 29 after the district court entered judgment, Banks filed “a motion to alter the entry of summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),” which the district court denied six days later. Banks then filed a notice of appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Because Banks missed that deadline, her motion was not effective as a Rule 59(e) motion that could have tolled the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment. Treating her post‐judgment motion as a Rule 60(b) motion that did not toll the time to appeal the summary judgment, her notice of appeal was timely only as to the district court’s denial of her post‐judgment motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying that motion. View " Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested Venson for possession of a controlled substance and solicitation of an unlawful act, and he spent 19 days in jail. After a preliminary hearing resulted in the dismissal of charges for want of probable cause, Venson sued the officers involved in his arrest for false arrest, illegal search, and malicious prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties had differing accounts of the events that resulted in the arrest, which apparently involved someone in the vicinity yelling “rocks.” A jury found in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “This was a swearing contest, and nothing precluded the jury from crediting the defendants’ account of what occurred.” View "Venson v. Altamirano" on Justia Law