Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Indiana pawnbrokers must obtain license from the state’s Department of Financial Institutions (DFI). Saalwaechter, owns Fares Pawn in Evansville, Indiana. He applied for a license in 2009, but DFI denied his application, citing concerns about previous operations on the property and about his store manager’s criminal history. The property has been used as a pawnshop for about 20 years, but different businesses with overlapping ownership. Saalwaechter received a license after he signed an agreement to comply with certain conditions, in particular not employing the manager. Saalwaechter sued DFI, alleging violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Saalwaechter did not contend that DFI treated him unfavorably on account of some identifiable characteristic, such as age, sex, or race, but that the state had singled him out for disparate treatment without a rational basis. The district court granted DFI summary judgment on the “class of one” claim, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that DFI treated Saalwaechter differently from similarly situated applicants without a rational reason. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fares Pawn, LLC v. IN Dep't of Fin. Insts." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Michigan City Area Schools hired Nichols as a temporary, substitute janitor. Nichols worked at Joy Elementary School without incident. He then went to Springfield Elementary School as a replacement until a permanent janitor could be found for a recently retired janitor. He claims that employees there spoke to him in a mocking tone, tried to entrap him into taking a purse because he is African-American, and acted in a “bullying” manner. Other employees claimed that they felt threatened by Nichols’s strange behavior, which included taking pictures of one of them. Nichols was told that the custodial position had been filled with a permanent employee and that they would call him if they needed his services, but they never did. Nichols filed a pro se complaint asserting racial harassment and discrimination. The district court granted Michigan City summary judgment, finding that the complained-of conduct did not give rise to Title VII liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Nichols v. MI City Plant Planning Dep't" on Justia Law

Groves was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 240 months in prison, 120 months on each count, to run consecutively. The Seventh Circuit court affirmed in 2009. In 2011, Groves filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255). The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the Presentence Investigation Report’s characterization of his 1995 burglary conviction as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a), 4B1.2(a)(2) and “in failing to fulfill movant’s intention to plead guilty.” The court noted extensive evidence that Groves wanted to go to trial and looked at counsel’s performance “as a whole.” View "Groves v. United States" on Justia Law

Montanez sued the City of Chicago and Officers Fico and Simon, alleging that Fico used excessive force while arresting him for drinking on a public way and Simon failed to intervene. He sustained minor injuries and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law. The state-law claims were dismissed as time-barred. The city conceded its obligation to indemnify, so the section 1983 claims proceeded to trial. Fico was found liable, Simon was cleared, and the jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. Montanez’s lawyers submitted a bill for more than $426,000 in attorneys’ fees and about $6,500 in costs and expenses. The judge scrutinized the bill line-by-line, discounted entries where more than one partner oversaw the same activities, or where the lawyers researched or drafted motions that were never filed, excluded hours spent on a full-day mock trial and entries related to matters that were essentially administrative matters, and reduced the hourly billing rates. After these and other reductions, the final award of costs was $3,051.94 and the court awarded $108,350.87 in fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the city’s “scorched-earth” defense strategy and the need for trial judges to exercise their broad discretion to adjust bloated bills for attorney’s fees after the fact and case-management authority during the litigation. View "Montanez v. Simon" on Justia Law

Henderson has been an inmate since 1995. He was diagnosed with high blood pressure and diabetes 1999-2000. He received medical treatment. In 2009, he suffered diabetic hypoglycemia and tremulous convulsions and was taken to Stateville’s emergency room. A month later Henderson had surgery in order to undergo hemodialysis several times a week. In 2010, Henderson sued, alleging that health care providers and prison officials acted with deliberate indifference; that testing revealed that his toxic waste levels were “out of range;” but he was not notified nor treated until he had reached Stage 5 kidney disease. Henderson sought to proceed in forma pauperis and moved for recruitment of counsel (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1)), noting that he had a fifth grade education and a low IQ. The district court allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis, but denied recruitment of counsel. Henderson filed an amended complaint and a motion for a discovery order, with a request to depose defendants, and a settlement proposal. After problems during discovery, Henderson filed another motion for recruitment of counsel. Henderson’s discovery motions were denied. Henderson claimed that his documents had been confiscated during a shakedown. The court ultimately rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Henderson needed counsel at every phase of litigation and there was a reasonable likelihood that counsel would have made a difference in the outcome. “In the sea of indigent litigants without counsel, Henderson should have stood out as someone who needed counsel the most.” View "Henderson v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Brown submitted a probable cause affidavit, stating that confidential informant “Doe” had stated that a felon, known to Doe as “T.Y.,” possessed a semiautomatic and a .38-caliber revolver; that Doe had seen the guns in T.Y’s house the day before and many times during the last six weeks; that T.Y. needed the guns because he sold heroin; and that T.Y. was a member of a gang and part of a crew that robbed people. The affidavit described corroboration of the address and Does’ identification of a police photograph of Glover as “T.Y.” Glover had two felony convictions. Doe identified the house at Glover’s address. The affidavit did not include any information on Doe, an informant for six years. He had been affiliated with a gang; had 14 convictions, including four for crimes committed while working as an informant; had used aliases when questioned by police; and had previously been paid for information. That evening officers executed the warrant and found guns, ammunition, 14 grams of heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Doe was paid $450. After the district court denied a motion to suppress, Glover entered a plea, reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a Franks hearing. The affidavit provided an insufficient basis for the warrant; it omitted all information regarding the informant’s credibility. The affidavit was not so “bare bones” that officers’ good faith reliance on it was unreasonable, but that omission is sufficient to raise an inference of reckless disregard for the truth that could undermine the good faith exception. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

Mendoza convicted of drug conspiracy and other drug offenses, was sentenced to multiple terms of life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mendoza then petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that he was denied due process when the district court moved one of his Spanish-speaking interpreters from the defense table to interpret for a Spanish-speaking witness at trial and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to this interpreter arrangement and failing to translate discovery and adequately review it with him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and took testimony from Mendoza, his trial counsel, and the three interpreters who participated in the trial, then denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that none of the alleged errors changed the outcome of the trial. View "Mendoza v. United States" on Justia Law

A couple, driving through Madison, saw a man in a Jeep holding what appeared to be a handgun pointed at the ceiling of the Jeep. They called the police. Asked whether the driver was threatening anyone, the caller replied, “[N]o … we couldn’t tell if it was real.” She stated that the man had parked at Dexter’s Pub and that he had been driving “badly.” Officers Lomas, Chaney, and others arrived. As they approached the Jeep, Gibbs walked out of the bar. He matched a description that had been provided. Gibbs complied with instructions to put his hands on the wall. Lomas handcuffed Gibbs. Chaney frisked him. Gibbs stated that he was the driver of the Jeep. Lomas placed Gibbs in the squad car and explained that someone had seen him pointing a gun in the car. Gibbs stated that he had airsoft guns in his car and had been returning from an airsoft event where he had been a referee. Airsoft guns are replicas of firearms. Lomas claims that Gibbs consented to her looking in the Jeep. Gibbs testified that he had denied permission, but had offered to get the items for her. Lomas searched the Jeep and found airsoft guns and a plastic knife. The officers issued a misdemeanor citation for disorderly conduct, which was later dismissed. Gibbs sued Lomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He did not sue any of the other officers. The district court denied Lomas’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if Gibbs had a constitutional right to be free from this arrest and search, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. View "Gibbs v. Lomas" on Justia Law

In 2007 Huang, a systems and software engineer, had worked for CNA commercial insurance for eight years. In March, Huang was transferred to a new, four-member team. CNA required every member of Huang’s team to be on “pager duty” every fourth weekend, carrying a pager at home and being available to respond 24 hours a day throughout the assigned weekend. Huang repeatedly refused pager duty, citing family obligations, even after his supervisor and human resources reminded him that he could be fired for refusing. Huang offered to work from the office on Sundays in exchange for having Mondays off but refused pager duty. Around this time, Huang’s supervisor stated, for reasons unrelated to pager duty, that Huang was “pissing [him] off.” Huang emailed the human resources department to complain. Two years earlier, Huang had complained about another supervisor’s “favoritism.” Four months after Huang’s first refusal of pager duty, Huang’s supervisor and a human resources agent gave him one final opportunity to comply. When he refused, CNA discharged him. Consistent with CNA’s practice, it asked Huang for a list of his belongings so that someone could retrieve them from his desk. When Huang refused and demanded to return to his work station, human resources called security. Police escorted Huang out and arrested him. CNA did not press charges. After pursuing administrative remedies, Huang filed suit, claiming discrimination based on race and national origin (42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2000e-17) and that by firing him and having him arrested, CNA unlawfully retaliated for his earlier complaints. The district court granted CNA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Huang v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

According to the 2010 Census, Hazel Crest was 85.2% black and 10.2% white, but had no black supervisory police officers until 2005. Garofalo and Peers, both white, were sergeants on the police force and were among four front-runners considered for a deputy police chief position, which ultimately went to a black officer who was not one of those four candidates. They claimed that the village discriminated against them by promoting a black officer they contend is unqualified and sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and under Illinois state law. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Garofalo and Peers failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that they were the object of unlawful discrimination. Defendants offered evidence that Garofalo suffered from a lack of leadership and deficiencies in decision-making abilities. Peers had a reputation for a “volatile and unstable personality,” and did not have the respect of the men he supervised. Garofalo and Peers did not present evidence to counter that explanation and permit a finding of pretext. View "Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law