Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being acquitted in a state court of aggravated battery, the plaintiff sued two Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution. He claimed that the officers had prepared false police reports and used them to persuade a state prosecutor to file the charge. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a federal suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not provide an adequate remedy, which Illinois does. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a federal suit for malicious prosecution can be based on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the due process clause, and that all that the plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment is that he was wrongfully in detention at some point. Because the initial seizure was supported by probable cause and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the deprivation of liberty lasted longer than it should have, is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment does not regulate the length of detentions. View "Llovet v. City of Chicago " on Justia Law

Ashburn was convicted in Illinois state court of the first degree murder of Muckenstrum. After appealing his conviction and filing a collateral challenge in Illinois state court, Ashburn filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Ashburn’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his state appellate counsel did not raise a speedy trial claim; that Ashburn was denied due process because of the admission of a knife unrelated to the murder; that Ashburn was denied due process by the state’s purported use of perjured testimony; and that Ashburn was denied due process by the giving of an accountability instruction to the jury. View "Ashburn v. Atchison" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die, Webster does not contend that the law or his mental condition have changed since the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on direct and collateral review. View "Webster v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Dewitt’s eye problems began in 2007 during his first incarceration at an Indiana Department of Corrections facility. Dewitt submitted the first of many Requests for Healthcare to Corizon stating something was wrong with his bloodshot left eye. After attempts to receive treatment from IDOC providers, Dewitt was released on parole in 2008. A doctor determined that Dewitt had a form of glaucoma and advised that he undergo laser-eye surgery to prevent future attacks. He underwent a surgical procedure on his right eye. His left eye continued to have higher than normal intra-ocular pressure. Dewitt was again incarcerated in 2009 and filed another Request for Healthcare. After several more attempts to obtain care, in 2012, he underwent surgery to remove part of his left eye’s ciliary body. Dewitt filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting deliberately indifference to his glaucoma condition. The district court denied three requests for appointed counsel, finding that Dewitt’s claims were not overly complex or meritorious. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions for recruitment of counsel and that those denials affected Dewitt’s ability to develop and litigate his case. View "DeWitt v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

A warrant was issued for Ball’s arrest based on an affidavit prepared and signed by Indianapolis detective Jones. Law enforcement had been investigating a drug trafficking gang, the Detroit Boys, and had obtained authority to monitor telephone “call centers” that took calls from customers and directed them to one of two drug distribution houses. According to the Jones affidavit, 13 of the intercepted calls either were placed by or made reference to “MamaToni.” Based in part on Jones’ and another detective’s familiarity with Ball’s voice, Ball was believed to be the person making or referenced in these calls. The affidavit also averred that Ball had been seen at the drug distribution houses. Ball was arrested by Jones and charged with narcotics possession. She posted bond. Prosecutors concluded that the wrong person had been arrested and charged. The state dismissed all charges. Ball filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court dismissed claims against the state defendants and granted judgment on the pleadings to the municipal defendants, leaving only a Fourth Amendment claim against Jones. Ball then was allowed to amend her complaint to abandon remaining federal claim and assert only state-law claims against Jones. The court remanded the case to state court, where it had originated. Ball appealed the adverse rulings on her other claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Ball v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

In 1990, Carter went to Stegemiller’s home because Stegemiller had filed a small claims case against his mother. Carter asked to discuss the case, then forced his way into Stegemiller’s home, started to strangle her, and struck her in the head with a tire iron. Carter held Stegemiller down and removed her jewelry while Carter’s accomplice, Mitchell, raped her. Before she lost consciousness, Stegemiller saw the men taking a stereo speaker from her home and heard one say “[M]ake sure she’s dead … she can identify us.” The two removed the telephones and locked and barricaded the doors so that Stegemiller could not leave or seek help. Stegemiller survived, with serious injuries. Convicted of felony burglary, robbery, rape, and attempted murder, Carter was sentenced to 90 years. A month later, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “an instruction which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing.” On direct appeal, Carter’s attorney failed to argue that the attempted murder jury instruction given at Carter’s trial constituted fundamental error. Carter lost his appeal. Rejecting a petition for post-conviction relief, the Indiana Supreme Court found that Carter did not suffer sufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside the verdict. The district court rejected a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carter v. Butt" on Justia Law

In 2006, Matthews, an African-American woman, applied for two open positions in Waukesha County: Economic Support Specialist and Economic Support Supervisor. She was not hired, and filed suit, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983.Matthews dismissed her claim related to the Supervisor position. With respect to the Specialist position, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the county articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its hiring decision. View "Matthews v. Waukesha Cnty." on Justia Law

Bell was employed as a substance abuse counselor at an Indiana maximum security prison. An investigator, looking for security breaches, discovered that night-shift employees were having sex on Bell’s desk and told her that he was not concerned about night-shift staff having sex but suggested she wash her desk every morning. The superintendent said that, as long as inmates were not involved, he was not concerned. Immediately thereafter, the superintendent discovered that Bell was having an affair with the Major in charge of custody (allegedly involving sex on his desk) and both were terminated. The prison settled the Major’s appeal to the State Employees’ Appeals Commission and called him to testify against Bell at her appeal. Major was able to keep his benefits, including his pension, to quickly get unemployment benefits, and to subsequently begin working at the prison as a contractor. Bell was not afforded similar benefits and opportunities and filed suit, alleging Title VII claims of sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, concluding that Bell was not similarly situated to the Major, that she failed to prove retaliation, and that the sexual tenor of the prison’s work environment was not severe or pervasive enough to qualify as hostile. The Seventh Circuit reversed with regard to the discrimination and hostile environment claims, but affirmed with regard to her retaliation claims. View "Orton-Bell v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

Jewel Foods employed Reeves as a bagger from 1997 until his dismissal in 2005. Reeves has Down syndrome and received vocational tutoring from Jewel; a social service agency sent a job coach to work with Reeves. Jewel’s Service Manager provided individual training. Jewel instituted supervision policies that applied only to Reeves. Reeves, unlike the other baggers, was exempted from collecting shopping carts from the parking lot after he was found directing customers how to park their cars. Reeves sometimes had trouble complying with workplace rules. He cursed at a manager when the table at which he usually ate lunch was used for a tasting; he once cursed within earshot of a customer about another customer. In 2005, Reeves took an American flag pin from a store shelf without paying for it, apparently not realizing the pins were for sale. Despite its usual policy, Jewel decided not to fire him. Reeves’s parents asked if Jewel could bring back a job coach. Reeves’s supervisor deemed the extra instruction unnecessary. Reeves was later terminated for cursing at another employee within earshot of a customer and other employees. The EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe both that Jewel discriminated against Reeves because of his disability and that Jewel engaged in a pattern and practice of denying reasonable accommodations to disabled employees. The district court dismissed his Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, failure‐to‐accommodate claim, citing numerous accommodations Jewel had made and the fact that Jewel did not explicitly reject the Reeves’s job coach suggestion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Townsend, a prisoner at the Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), sued GBCA officials for civil rights violations. Townsend suffered from significant mental illness and engaged in disruptive behavior, including suicide attempts and fighting. Townsend was repeatedly subjected observation placements and Behavioral Action Plans (BAPs). The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, but otherwise vacated. Townsend has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the imposition of the BAP violated his due process rights by imposing an atypical and significant hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life, without appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether the BAP imposed conditions of confinement that denied Townsend the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities. View "Townsend v. Cooper" on Justia Law