Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

King was in police custody awaiting a probable cause determination in 2007. After being rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication by jail medical staff, complaining of seizure-like symptoms, and being placed in an isolated cell for seven hours, he was found dead. His estate sued La Crosse County and individual employees. After a remand, six weeks before the trial date, after unsuccessful settlement discussions, King’s counsel asserted in a letter to the defendants that the correct standard for jury instructions in the upcoming trial was one of objective reasonableness, not the deliberate indifference standard that had been used by both parties in the pleadings, the summary judgment briefing, the subsequent appeal, and remand pretrial preparations. The assertion was correct as a matter of law, but shortly after receiving the letter, defendants moved that King be precluded from arguing the applicability of the objective reasonableness standard because of her tardiness in asserting the argument. The district court agreed and ordered that the case be tried as scheduled under the deliberate indifference standard. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, acknowledging that King’s long, unexplained delay in asserting the correct standard was puzzling and problematic, but stating that the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation of how the defendants would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. View "King v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Tank, who was born in India, worked for T-Mobile as a vice president. After two investigations relating to his treatment of colleagues, he was fired. Tank filed suit alleging discrimination, retaliation, and disparate pay. The district court entered summary judgment for T-Mobile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on the circumstantial evidence Tank provided, no reasonable jury could conclude that T-Mobile fired Tank because of his national origin or race or that the human resources director harbored discriminatory animus or was deliberately indifferent to Tank’s claim. The employees to whom Tank compared himself were not valid comparators.View "Tank v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

After exhausting the EEOC process, Carlson brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, against her employer, CSX, a railway company, and brought a related contract claim based on a settlement she had reached with CSX of an earlier discrimination lawsuit. CSX argued that the claims were implausible and that some were precluded by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) because they were based on company decisions justified by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed most of Carlson’s claims for failure to state a claim, and held that the RLA precluded the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the allegations in her complaint ‘easily sufficient” to state claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. The RLA, which requires that claims arising under collective bargaining agreements in the railway and airline industries be decided in arbitration, does not preclude Carlson’s claims, which arise under Title VII and a private contract between Carlson and CSX. View "Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Illinois law bars persons convicted of certain crimes from holding public office, 10 ILCS 5/29-1-5. Parker sought to run for a seat on the Peoria school board. The state’s attorney sought to bar Parker, who had been convicted of felony theft in the 1980s, from pursuing that office. After a brief hearing held on short notice, a state court ordered Parker’s name removed from the ballot and enjoined him from running. Parker sued in federal court, arguing violations of due process and equal protection by denying him a chance to defend himself and targeting him based on his race (African American), and challenging the constitutionality of the law on its face. The district court dismissed the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, immunity, and claim preclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that immunity, not Rooker-Feldman, bars the enforcement claims and that, even if claim preclusion did not preclude a facial attack on the statute, that challenge fails on the merits. View "Parker v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Hutt worked for Solvay Pharmaceuticals as a sales representative, 2001-2007. Her supervisor, who had recruited her to Solvay from a different company, gave her satisfactory ratings in most categories, but repeatedly informed Hutt that she needed to improve her punctuality and consistency in submitting internal reports. When her supervisor retired, Lozen was appointed the new Indianapolis sales district manager by Westfall, himself a newly‐appointed regional manager. Hutt worked under Lozen and Westfall 2008-2011 and had several conflicts with them, which resulted in several disciplinary actions. She was ineligible for bonus pay while on warning status for seven quarters. In 2009, Hutt filed a complaint with the EEOC, followed by a lawsuit, alleging age discrimination and retaliation and violation of the Indiana Wage Payment Statute. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hutt established no causal connection between the filing of the EEOC charge and adverse employment actions. A claim that Hutt and another were singled out for worse treatment based on their age was only asserted with “reliance on speculation.” View "Hutt v. Solvay Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004 Fox was charged with the sexual assault and murder of his three-year-old daughter. Detectives coerced a confession and delayed testing of DNA evidence, leaving Fox imprisoned for eight months, separated from his wife and son. His defense finally obtained the DNA evidence and had it tested at a private lab; the results excluded Fox and charges were dropped. Fox sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law alleging due process violations, malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A St. Paul policy required the insurer to defend the detectives to its policy limit, $1 million. Will County also had excess liability policies for $5 million from AAIC (secondary) and Essex (tertiary). Under AAIC’s policy it was not required to assume “settlement or defense” until the underlying policy had been exhausted. None of the policies covered punitive damages. The detectives were represented by a firm retained by St. Paul. The jury awarded $15.5 million, including $6.2 million in punitive damages. Offers to settle for less, before and after the verdict, were rejected. St. Paul exhausted its policy limit; AAIC assumed the defense. The detectives assigned to the Foxes any claims against the insurers in exchange for a covenant not to seek punitive damages from the detectives’ personal assets. The Seventh Circuit upheld $8,166,000 of the damages awarded, including $3.4 million in punitive damages. Fox sought a declaratory judgment that AAIC breached its good faith duties to reasonably settle the claims and inform the detectives of their conflicts of interest. The district court dismissed, reasoning that AAIC, as excess insurer, never had any control over the defense before judgment and therefore had no duty to settle the claims or alert the detectives to any potential conflicts of interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Fox v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Jennifer’s seven-year-old daughter, Liza, was diagnosed with a rare brain tumor that is almost always fatal. Jennifer learned that marijuana oil might be beneficial; some medical evidence supports the belief. The legal status of cannabis oil was unclear, but Jennifer decided to grow her own marijuana and extract the oil. Her father-in-law, Curtis, a Chicago police officer, advised her of the legal risks, but supplied specialized light bulbs and periodically checked the crop. Liza died on July 10, 2012. The funeral was held three days later. Jennifer kept Liza’s body at home, so that the family, including three younger siblings could grieve as Jennifer thought appropriate. Curtis objected. There was conflict about the obituary, who could attend services, the display of religious symbols, and Curtis attempting to take possession of the ashes after Liza’s cremation. After the funeral, Curtis and another officer prepared an affidavit for a warrant to search Jennifer’s house, based on Curtis’s observation of marijuana plants in Jennifer’s basement. The affidavit did not disclose the relationship between them. On the fourth day after the funeral, 12-15 DEA officers searched Jennifer’s home. They found no marijuana. Jennifer had discarded the plants upon Liza’s death. No criminal proceedings were brought. Jennifer sued the officers and the city, alleging violation of her Fourth Amendment rights by including falsehoods in the affidavit and by failing to train officers to prevent irresponsible behavior. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing Curtis’s behavior as “atrocious,” but noting that there was no allegation that he knew the marijuana was gone. The application was misleading, but candor would not have undermined the existence of probable cause. An officer’s motive in applying for a warrant does not invalidate the warrant. “Illinois might be wise to require slightly more information in affidavits in support of warrant applications.” View "Scherr v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2010 Price was a full-time tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher who was working in a program to improve the class-room teaching skills of other teachers. In all of her evaluations, she was rated excellent or superior. In 2010, the Board of Education authorized the discharge of 1,289 teachers, some of whom were tenured. At the same time as the layoffs, Price alleges CPS was continuing to hire teachers to fill vacant positions, including new hires with no prior experience. Price alleges that she was not considered for any vacant positions, nor was she given any notice of existing vacant positions before her layoff and that the Board did not implement procedures to allow laid-off tenured teachers to show they were qualified to fill vacant positions. Price filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit one year later on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated teachers. The district court dismissed because Price did not identify any protected property interest that could give rise to a due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that tenure did not create the claimed property rights. View "Price v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2002, Alexander was 55 years old and weighed 138 pounds. He had a limp and suffered from emphysema. Jones was 33 years old and weighed 230 pounds. Jones and Harris were using crack cocaine at Alexander’s Indianapolis apartment when Alexander asked them to leave. Harris left. Harris later saw Jones carrying Alexander’s television. Jones sold the television. Police discovered Alexander’s body. After identifying Jones as the person last seen in Alexander’s apartment, police discovered that Jones was wanted on outstanding warrants. Jones was arrested and signed an advice and waiver of rights, and agreed to give police his clothing and shoes. He admitted that he had spent the weekend at Alexander’s apartment. Changing his story, he later stated that Alexander had given Jones his television in exchange for drugs; that Alexander became angry and came at him with a pocketknife; that he pushed Alexander; that Alexander’s head hit the wall; that Jones hit him in the head; that Alexander was unconscious; that Jones left; that he returned and took the television; and that he returned again and bound Alexander’s hands and feet. At trial, Jones’s counsel argued self-defense. Counsel did not move to suppress admission of Jones’s clothing, his admissions, or a laboratory report tying Jones’s clothing to the crime scene. The court entered a conviction for felony murder and sentenced Jones to 65 years’ imprisonment. Direct appeal, arguing insufficient evidence, was unsuccessful, as was a state petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to seek suppression of the clothing. A federal district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective under “Pirtle.”View "Jones v. Brown" on Justia Law

Officers Mitchell and Bowersock responded to a 911 call by Bumgarner late on a Saturday night in 2008. They learned that Bumgarner and Hawkins had been drinking and got into a heated argument. Hawkins was alleged to have a history of abusiveness, but that night’s argument was “verbal only.” Hawkins had locked Bumgarner out and her keys were in the residence. Bumgarner confirmed with Mitchell that she was not injured. Hawkins did not want to talk to the police. Mitchell prevented him from closing the door, entered his home, and refused to leave after Hawkins called his attorney. Hawkins did not comply with a demand to get off the phone and Bowersock told him he was under arrest, grabbed Hawkins’s left wrist while Mitchell grabbed Hawkins’s right wrist, resulting in a struggle on the floor. The state filed, but later dropped charges against Hawkins. Hawkins sued the officers, claiming that he needed surgery to remove a cyst from above his eye where he was injured and psychiatric counseling for the traumatic encounter. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the officers are liable to Hawkins as a matter of law for seizing him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that on other counts, the court must determine whether his call to the attorney was a motivating factor in arresting Hawkins and whether probable cause existed to arrest Hawkins for disorderly conduct. View "Hawkins v. Mitchell" on Justia Law