Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Coleman pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 121.989 grams of crack cocaine, which subjected him to a statutory imprisonment range of five to 40 years. With past convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and for sexual assault of a child, the court determined that he was a career offender, increased the sentencing range to 188-235 months, and imposed a sentence of 225 months. Subsequently, the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Begay v. United States, held that the residual clause of the crime-of-violence definition encompasses the types of crimes that categorically involve purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct. The Seventh Circuit then held, pursuant to Begay, that conviction for sexual assault under the relevant Wisconsin statute, which prohibits “sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years,” is not a “crime of violence” under the career offender designation because it is a strict liability offense. The district court recalculated, excluding that career offender designation and finding that a reduction in the base offense level was appropriate because the Guidelines range for the drug offense had been lowered. The court sentenced Coleman to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, with instructions to reinstate the conviction and sentence. Error in applying the career offender provision in determining the advisory Guidelines range is not cognizable in a section 2255 motion. View "Coleman v. United States" on Justia Law

King was in custody awaiting a probable cause determination in 2007. After being rapidly tapered off psychotropic medication by jail medical staff, complaining of seizure-like symptoms, and being placed in an isolated cell for seven hours, King was found dead. His estate sued La Crosse County and individual employees. After a remand, six weeks before the trial date, King’s counsel asserted in a letter to the defendants that the correct standard for jury instructions was one of objective reasonableness, not the deliberate indifference standard that had been used by both parties in the pleadings, the summary judgment briefing, the subsequent appeal, and post-remand pretrial preparations. The assertion was correct, but defendants moved that King be precluded from arguing the applicability of the objective reasonableness standard because of her tardiness in asserting the argument. The district court ordered that the case be tried as scheduled under the deliberate indifference standard. The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging that King’s long, unexplained delay in asserting the correct standard was puzzling and problematic, but stating that the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation of how the defendants would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. The court subsequently clarified that the reversal applied only to the individual defendants, not the county.View "King v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Socha was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide in 2002. He simultaneously pursued direct appeal and state post-conviction relief. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed; the state supreme court denied review in 2007. Socha did not pursue certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, he had one year from the date his conviction became final to file his federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). For a state prisoner who does not seek collateral relief, the year runs from the date when the judgment becomes final by expiration of the time for seeking direct review, including the period during which the prisoner is pursuing certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. AEDPA suspends the running of that one year for state prisoners who seek state collateral relief, but only for the period when the state courts are considering the case, not including time during which certiorari may be sought. Socha’s petition was untimely. After a remand, the district court denied equitable tolling, finding that Socha had not been diligent in pursuing his rights and that the state had not placed intentional barriers in the way of his petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting the unusual obstacles that confronted Socha, his repeated attempts to obtain his record and comply with the deadline, and the court’s initial grant of an extension.View "Socha v. Haine" on Justia Law

Walton was a passenger in a rented Suburban driven by Smoot, when they were pulled over by an Illinois state trooper. According to the trooper, the two were nervous and gave an implausible description of their travel plans. The trooper decided to extend the stop for 20 minutes so that a police canine could smell around the car. The dog allegedly alerted. Troopers searched the vehicle and found seven kilograms of cocaine. At the time, Walton was on parole in Kentucky, with a condition that he could not leave that state without permission. He was subject to searches by his parole officer. Walton was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. He moved to suppress the narcotics, arguing that he was subject to search only by his parole officer, not by a law-enforcement officer who was ignorant of his parole status, and offering evidence that his license was valid.. The district court denied the motion, finding that Walton lacked a subjective expectation of privacy because he knew he was in violation of his parole and had rented the vehicle without a valid license, in violation of the rental agreement. Walton entered a conditional plea. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Walton’s alleged illegal acts did not deprive him the opportunity to vindicate his privacy interests against a government search and seizure of his rental vehicle. View "United States v. Walton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit against the City and the police deputy superintendent who had ordered him to be processed criminally for allegedly driving his personal vehicle while drinking alcohol. A breathalyzer test detected no alcohol in plaintiff's bloodstream but he was cited for driving a motor vehicle with an open container. The charge was dropped after testing of the contents of the container indicated that it did not contain alcohol. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment and state-law claims. The court concluded that, given the eyewitness accounts and the presence of a bottle labeled as containing an alcoholic beverage in plaintiff's car, a reasonable person would have believed that plaintiff had committed a DUI offense; there was probable cause to administer the breathalyzer test with a warrant given the exigent circumstances; the deputy superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity; and plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim failed. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Seiser v. City of Chicago, et al." on Justia Law

After Janet Hahn died of diabetic ketoacidosis when she was a pretrial detainee at a correctional center, her husband and the administrator of her estate filed suit alleging that various government officials and private contractors failed to provide her adequate medical treatment. The district court dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the remaining claims. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the wrongful death claim but erred in dismissing it with prejudice where plaintiffs produced insufficient evidence to permit their claims against Sheriff Walsh and the jail's medical contractor to survive summary judgment. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed the wrongful death claim with prejudice. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Hahn, et al. v. Walsh, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging claims of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that her employer and several managers retaliated against her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 28 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court rejected the idea that the passage of a particular amount of time between protected activity and retaliation can bar the claim as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiff has offered evidence of other retaliatory behavior between her 2003 sexual harassment complaint and the 2006 reorganizations and demotion that bridged the gap between the two events, leaving the issues of causation for a jury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for trial. View "Malin v. Hospira, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Before entering his mother’s wedding reception, Miller smoked marijuana. At the reception, Miller drank three shots of vodka in an hour and a half. Miller then dropped off his girlfriend and went to a Kenosha bar. He smoked more marijuana and had three beers. He left for another bar, where he drank more beer, then bought a final Heineken for the road. He drove to a gas station to use a phone to call his girlfriend. At the same time, Kenosha police received a call about a stabbing that occurred two blocks away from the same gas station. Responding to an inquiry by Officer Gonzalez, Miller denied seeing anyone running. Gonzalez asked Miller his name. Miller, who was driving without a license and had been seen exiting his car with a beer, replied with the fake name. Miller admitted that he was on probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. Gonzalez told Miller, who was becoming increasingly fidgety and nervous, to take his hands out of his front pockets and not to run. Miller took off running with Gonzalez in pursuit. Another officer captured Miller, who was on the ground when Gonzalez jumped a fence and landed on him, breaking his jaw. The district court rejected Miller’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Miller, if believed, presented evidence from which a rational jury could determine that Gonzalez deliberately inflicted the blow that broke his jaw. View "Miller v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2003, Light was convicted in Minnesota district court of firearm possession by a felon. The presentence report suggested that Light was subject the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR referred to two qualifying juvenile acts of violence and prior adult convictions for criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm, third-degree burglary, a third-degree controlled substances crime, and a felony conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The court used a guideline imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months, rather than the 120-150 months range without the ACCA enhancement. In sentencing Light to 235 months, the court did not specify which three convictions supported the armed career criminal designation. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Light filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, challenging the use of the drug offense as a predicate offense. The court held that Light’s “criminal history include[d] a sufficient number of other predicate offenses to support an armed career criminal status without any reliance upon the objected to offense.” In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, concluding that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit denied leave to file successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions. He then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in Indiana, where he is incarcerated, claiming that, under Begay, he was entitled to sentence reduction. The district court dismissed, stating that relief under section 2255 had been available to him and had not been “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Light v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Davis retained Fenton to represent her in a home foreclosure proceeding. Davis later sued Fenton for malpractice. Davis claimed that, although she paid Fenton several thousand dollars, he did virtually nothing to help her and that he targeted her for inferior service based on her race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601. That case is stayed pending arbitration. Fenton brought his own lawsuit in state court, against Davis’s lawyers: Dudley and Sidea, alleging that they intentionally spread false information about him to clients and business associates. Fenton also alleged that Sidea, who had previously worked at Fenton’s law office, had improperly obtained confidential information about Fenton’s clients and shared it with Dudley. The complaint claimed conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, and defamation. Dudley and Sidea filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441, and the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. Days later, despite the ongoing removal proceedings, the Cook County Court entered an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea. The district court found that the case did not meet the removal requirements under either 28 U.S.C. 1441 or 1443 and remanded, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fenton v. Dudley" on Justia Law