Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rollins had driven into a store parking lot and gotten out of his car when a police officer emerged from a police car that had pulled up behind him and ordered him to get back into his car and show his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. He refused to cooperate, was arrested, and two months later pleaded guilty to driving on a suspended or revoked license. He then brought suit, charging that the police had no basis for ordering him back into his car, and that their doing so constituted an unreasonable seizure of him. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a section 1983 suit can’t be brought if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply that his conviction in a prior proceeding had been invalid. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that because Rollins pleaded guilty, a finding that the defendant was illegally seized would therefore have no relevance to the validity of his guilty plea and ensuing conviction. The judge also ignored the fact that there was no evidence that the police seized Rollins lawfully by ordering him back into his car—the action that precipitated his arrest.View "Rollins v. Willett" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Wheeler sued the prison’s medical director, Dr. Talbot, for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Wheeler claims that he experiences excruciating pain from “large and protruding” keloids (growths of scar tissue) on his chest, hips, and legs; that he tested positive for a stomach infection caused by the bacterium helicobacter pylori; and that Dr. Talbot ignored both conditions. The district court allowed the keloid claim to proceed but dismissed the h. pylori claim because the blood-test results that Wheeler attached to his complaint establish that he tested negative for the infection. The court then denied a motion requesting an order requiring Dr. Talbot to refer Wheeler immediately to “a suitable doctor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even ignoring the lack of advance notice to Dr. Talbot, there was enough in the record to demonstrate that immediate referral was unwarranted. The limited evidence established neither that Wheeler will experience irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction nor that his deliberate-indifference claim against Dr. Talbot has a reasonable likelihood of success.View "Wheeler v. Talbot" on Justia Law

Campbell pleaded guilty in state court to first degree sexual assault of a child (his 10-year-old daughter). The maximum sentence was 60 years. The state agreed to dismiss three other counts and recommend a sentence of no more than 20 years, with no more than five to seven years’ initial confinement and the balance as extended supervision. The presentence report recommended 20-40 years’ initial confinement and seven to 10 years’ extended supervision. The state recommended a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. The court sentenced Campbell to 30 years’ initial confinement and 10 years’ extended supervision. On remand, the prosecutor did not refer to the plea agreement not did defense counsel object to the omission, but the court was made aware of the agreement. The prosecutor spoke of the need to protect Campbell’s daughter and the public. The court imposed an initial term of 34 years. The state appeals court affirmed. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in deciding that Campbell could not establish that counsel was ineffective in failing to object because the prosecutor had not materially and substantially breached the plea agreement.View "Campbell v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1981 the plaintiff began working as one of two hairdresser-manicurists at a nursing home. Mondays and Tuesdays the plaintiff would transport residents in their wheelchairs from their rooms to the nursing home’s beauty shop, do their hair, then return them to their rooms. Other days she mainly did the hair of ambulatory residents and of residents confined to their rooms. She had unrelated duties, such as helping in the laundry and carrying trays. In 2010 the plaintiff had a hysterectomy. Her doctor gave her permission to return to work eight weeks later, with the notation that she could not push over 20 pounds, raised to 50 pounds five months later. The doctor advised “you can’t be pushing and lifting” people in wheelchairs, because, over time, that would tear loose the mesh lining “and you’ll be back in for bladder repair.” The plaintiff notified her supervisor, who stated that he would not accommodate her disability. She quit. Until she was replaced, the remaining hairdresser received assistance from other staff in transporting residents. There was no indication that this diversion of staff from their normal duties was costly or impaired the care provided the residents. The district court rejected plaintiff’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the employer would have a difficult time establishing that a reasonable accommodation would be a hardship.View "Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC" on Justia Law

The Wiggintons receive Social Security disability benefits. They applied to Bank of America for a mortgage to be repaid using those benefits. The Bank asked for information from their physicians, or the SSA, showing that the benefits would last for at least three years. When no such information was forthcoming, the Bank declined to make the loan. An administrative complaint and negotiations followed; the seller pulled out of the transaction. The Wiggintons sued, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the suit on the pleadings, noting that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691(b)(2), provides that it does not constitute discrimination (for purposes of that statute) for a bank to collect information about “whether the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program if such inquiry is for the purpose of determining the amount and probable continuance of income levels, credit history, or other pertinent element of credit-worthiness.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not allege that the Wiggintons were treated worse than other applicants. The court noted that the Bank has since settled a suit by the Department of Justice and promised not to ask for the sort of information it sought from the Wiggintons.View "Wigginton v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaining that during nine months while he was a pretrial detainee in a Porter County, Indiana jail he was denied medical care for a bullet wound to his abdomen, and other essential medical care. The district court, while fully crediting his testimony, dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. There was no record in the jail’s grievance log of the plaintiff filing a grievance. He testified that he never received, or been given access to, a copy of the jail’s grievance procedure, though he knew from other inmates that there was such a procedure and had asked a guard for, but was never given a grievance form. Another prisoner testified that he overheard the plaintiff ask for the grievance form. The plaintiff eventually met with the Warden, who promised to speak to the medical staff and “take care of the problem.” He did not suggest that the plaintiff file a grievance. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the plaintiff asked a supervisor whether he should file a grievance and was told “not to worry about it.” When a jail official invites noncompliance with a procedure the prisoner is not required to follow the procedure.View "Swisher v. Porter Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

On September 16, 2003, Matz and others were on the porch of a Milwaukee apartment when officers assigned to the warrant squad were driving through the area in an unmarked squad on an unrelated matter. On the porch they saw and recognized Salazar, who they believed was a suspect in two homicides and several shootings. By the time Klotka made a U-turn and approached, everyone on the porch was leaving. Matz admits seeing the police, who were in uniform, but claims that he had already left the porch. He acknowledges hearing someone say “detects” as he was leaving. The officers pursued the individuals into an alley, drawing guns while shouting, “Police! Stop!” Eventually, Matz was handcuffed and put into a patrol car; the car he was driving was stolen. Salazar was arrested. According to Matz, he was questioned for several hours after stating that he did not want to talk and wanted an attorney; was kept in a cell and never provided with medications he had been taking for psychosis and depression; and was recovering from pneumonia when he admitted his involvement in two homicides. He later recanted his inculpatory statement and named Salazar as the shooter, although he admitted being present. Matz nonetheless pleaded guilty to first-degree reckless homicide and felony murder with robbery as the underlying crime and was sentenced to 60 years imprisonment. Matz filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in 2010. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Matz v. Klotka" on Justia Law

2011 Wis. Act 23 required a photo ID for voting, similar to an Indiana law, which the Supreme Court upheld in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008). After the district court enjoined enforcement of the law, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed two similar injunctions issued by state courts but ordered state officials to make it easier for registered voters to obtain documentation (such as birth certificates) that they may need to obtain photo IDs, or to waive the documentation requirement if obtaining birth certificates proves difficult or expensive. With the state injunctions lifted, the state requested a stay of the federal injunction so that it could use the photo ID requirement in this fall’s election. A divided Seventh Circuit granted a stay and denied reconsideration, noting Wisconsin’s “strong prospect of success on appeal’ and the public interest in using laws enacted through the democratic process, until the laws’ validity has been finally determined. The burden of getting a photo ID in Wisconsin is not materially different from the burden that Crawford deemed acceptable. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law

Springfield has an ordinance that prohibits panhandling in its “downtown historic district”—less than 2% of the city’s area but containing its principal shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas, including the Statehouse and many state-government buildings. The ordinance defines panhandling as an oral request for an immediate donation of money. Signs requesting money are allowed; as are oral pleas to send money later. Plaintiffs have received citations for violating this ordinance and allege that they will continue panhandling but fear liability. They unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The parties agreed that panhandling is a form of speech, to which the First Amendment applies, and that if it drew lines on the basis of speech’s content it would be unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the ordinance, which it called “indifferent to the solicitor’s stated reason for seeking money, or whether the requester states any reason at all…. Springfield has not meddled with the marketplace of ideas.” The prohibition is based on where a person says something rather than what position a person takes.View "Norton v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

“Jane Doe” was born in Russia and came to the U.S. at age two when she was adopted by American parents. During her sixth and seventh grade years, male classmates bullied her, sometimes hurling gendered or ethnic insults. The bullying turned violent. Three boys were charged with criminal battery and were expelled or withdrew from school. Doe sued Elmbrook School District and administrators under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, claiming that the bullying was motivated by her sex and ethnicity, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “Although Doe’s classmates’ actions were inexcusable,” the defendants are not legally responsible for those actions. Knowing how thoughtless and cruel children can be to one another, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VI and Title IX to impose a demanding standard for holding schools and school officials legally responsible for one student’s mistreatment of another. School officials must have had “actual knowledge” of harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Even assuming Doe’s harassers were motivated by her sex or ethnicity, once the defendants gained actual notice of behavior that could qualify as severe and pervasive, they took action against the wrongdoers. View "Doe v. Galster" on Justia Law