Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Illinois State Police Officer Zeigler pulled over Mordi’s vehicle. A trained dog discovered drugs in the car. Zeigler arrested Mordi, took him to the station, and left him in an interrogation room. Other officers interviewed Mordi. Mordi is a Nigerian national. Nigeria and the U.S. are parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Convention. Mordi told Zeigler that his name was Nigerian, but Mordi does not recall mentioning that he was a Nigerian national. Zeigler listed Mordi’s place of birth as Nigeria, but asserts that he was unaware of Mordi’s citizenship. Mordi did tell the interviewing officers about his citizenship. Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed a detainer notice and federal authorities took over the prosecution. Mordi was represented by a federal public defender, who was aware of his nationality. Mordi pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and is serving a sentence. At no point during criminal proceedings was he informed about his right under the Convention to have the Nigerian consulate notified about his status. He did not learn about the Convention until a year later, from another inmate. He wrote to the Nigerian consulate, but did not follow through. Mordi instituted, but dismissed, habeas proceedings, arguing ineffective assistance. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied summary judgment motions by Zeigler and the interviewing officers, based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the specific legal principle on which this case turns was not clearly established.View "Mordi v. Zeigler" on Justia Law

Welton buys, sells, and rents residential real estate and, from 1994-2001, maintained a collateralized line of credit with the NBI. In 2002, NBI declined to extend that line of credit and gave him 90 days to pay off the account. Initially, Welton was unable to make payments, but by 2006 he reached an agreement with NBI. Under that agreement, Welton sent monthly checks to NBI. Those checks were never cashed. In 2007, realizing the checks remained uncashed, Welton sent a certified check in the amount of the uncashed checks. Keely, NBI’s Vice President, contacted Indianapolis Police Officer Anderson to initiate a criminal investigation. After meeting with Keely, Anderson submitted an affidavit in support of probable cause charging Welton with theft and fraud on a financial institution. Welton was arrested, processed, and released. After a trial in 2011, Welton was found not guilty. In 2013, Welton filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that several of Anderson’s statements were knowingly false and that Keely provided many of the statements, resulting in a malicious prosecution and denial of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Welton’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim was foreclosed by circuit precedent; that there is no constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause and that bare allegations of “fundamental unfairness” were insufficient to implicate the Due Process Clause.View "Welton v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Rollins had driven into a store parking lot and gotten out of his car when a police officer emerged from a police car that had pulled up behind him and ordered him to get back into his car and show his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. He refused to cooperate, was arrested, and two months later pleaded guilty to driving on a suspended or revoked license. He then brought suit, charging that the police had no basis for ordering him back into his car, and that their doing so constituted an unreasonable seizure of him. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a section 1983 suit can’t be brought if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would imply that his conviction in a prior proceeding had been invalid. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that because Rollins pleaded guilty, a finding that the defendant was illegally seized would therefore have no relevance to the validity of his guilty plea and ensuing conviction. The judge also ignored the fact that there was no evidence that the police seized Rollins lawfully by ordering him back into his car—the action that precipitated his arrest.View "Rollins v. Willett" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Wheeler sued the prison’s medical director, Dr. Talbot, for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Wheeler claims that he experiences excruciating pain from “large and protruding” keloids (growths of scar tissue) on his chest, hips, and legs; that he tested positive for a stomach infection caused by the bacterium helicobacter pylori; and that Dr. Talbot ignored both conditions. The district court allowed the keloid claim to proceed but dismissed the h. pylori claim because the blood-test results that Wheeler attached to his complaint establish that he tested negative for the infection. The court then denied a motion requesting an order requiring Dr. Talbot to refer Wheeler immediately to “a suitable doctor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even ignoring the lack of advance notice to Dr. Talbot, there was enough in the record to demonstrate that immediate referral was unwarranted. The limited evidence established neither that Wheeler will experience irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction nor that his deliberate-indifference claim against Dr. Talbot has a reasonable likelihood of success.View "Wheeler v. Talbot" on Justia Law

Campbell pleaded guilty in state court to first degree sexual assault of a child (his 10-year-old daughter). The maximum sentence was 60 years. The state agreed to dismiss three other counts and recommend a sentence of no more than 20 years, with no more than five to seven years’ initial confinement and the balance as extended supervision. The presentence report recommended 20-40 years’ initial confinement and seven to 10 years’ extended supervision. The state recommended a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. The court sentenced Campbell to 30 years’ initial confinement and 10 years’ extended supervision. On remand, the prosecutor did not refer to the plea agreement not did defense counsel object to the omission, but the court was made aware of the agreement. The prosecutor spoke of the need to protect Campbell’s daughter and the public. The court imposed an initial term of 34 years. The state appeals court affirmed. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in deciding that Campbell could not establish that counsel was ineffective in failing to object because the prosecutor had not materially and substantially breached the plea agreement.View "Campbell v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1981 the plaintiff began working as one of two hairdresser-manicurists at a nursing home. Mondays and Tuesdays the plaintiff would transport residents in their wheelchairs from their rooms to the nursing home’s beauty shop, do their hair, then return them to their rooms. Other days she mainly did the hair of ambulatory residents and of residents confined to their rooms. She had unrelated duties, such as helping in the laundry and carrying trays. In 2010 the plaintiff had a hysterectomy. Her doctor gave her permission to return to work eight weeks later, with the notation that she could not push over 20 pounds, raised to 50 pounds five months later. The doctor advised “you can’t be pushing and lifting” people in wheelchairs, because, over time, that would tear loose the mesh lining “and you’ll be back in for bladder repair.” The plaintiff notified her supervisor, who stated that he would not accommodate her disability. She quit. Until she was replaced, the remaining hairdresser received assistance from other staff in transporting residents. There was no indication that this diversion of staff from their normal duties was costly or impaired the care provided the residents. The district court rejected plaintiff’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the employer would have a difficult time establishing that a reasonable accommodation would be a hardship.View "Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC" on Justia Law

The Wiggintons receive Social Security disability benefits. They applied to Bank of America for a mortgage to be repaid using those benefits. The Bank asked for information from their physicians, or the SSA, showing that the benefits would last for at least three years. When no such information was forthcoming, the Bank declined to make the loan. An administrative complaint and negotiations followed; the seller pulled out of the transaction. The Wiggintons sued, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the suit on the pleadings, noting that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691(b)(2), provides that it does not constitute discrimination (for purposes of that statute) for a bank to collect information about “whether the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program if such inquiry is for the purpose of determining the amount and probable continuance of income levels, credit history, or other pertinent element of credit-worthiness.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not allege that the Wiggintons were treated worse than other applicants. The court noted that the Bank has since settled a suit by the Department of Justice and promised not to ask for the sort of information it sought from the Wiggintons.View "Wigginton v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaining that during nine months while he was a pretrial detainee in a Porter County, Indiana jail he was denied medical care for a bullet wound to his abdomen, and other essential medical care. The district court, while fully crediting his testimony, dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. There was no record in the jail’s grievance log of the plaintiff filing a grievance. He testified that he never received, or been given access to, a copy of the jail’s grievance procedure, though he knew from other inmates that there was such a procedure and had asked a guard for, but was never given a grievance form. Another prisoner testified that he overheard the plaintiff ask for the grievance form. The plaintiff eventually met with the Warden, who promised to speak to the medical staff and “take care of the problem.” He did not suggest that the plaintiff file a grievance. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the plaintiff asked a supervisor whether he should file a grievance and was told “not to worry about it.” When a jail official invites noncompliance with a procedure the prisoner is not required to follow the procedure.View "Swisher v. Porter Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

On September 16, 2003, Matz and others were on the porch of a Milwaukee apartment when officers assigned to the warrant squad were driving through the area in an unmarked squad on an unrelated matter. On the porch they saw and recognized Salazar, who they believed was a suspect in two homicides and several shootings. By the time Klotka made a U-turn and approached, everyone on the porch was leaving. Matz admits seeing the police, who were in uniform, but claims that he had already left the porch. He acknowledges hearing someone say “detects” as he was leaving. The officers pursued the individuals into an alley, drawing guns while shouting, “Police! Stop!” Eventually, Matz was handcuffed and put into a patrol car; the car he was driving was stolen. Salazar was arrested. According to Matz, he was questioned for several hours after stating that he did not want to talk and wanted an attorney; was kept in a cell and never provided with medications he had been taking for psychosis and depression; and was recovering from pneumonia when he admitted his involvement in two homicides. He later recanted his inculpatory statement and named Salazar as the shooter, although he admitted being present. Matz nonetheless pleaded guilty to first-degree reckless homicide and felony murder with robbery as the underlying crime and was sentenced to 60 years imprisonment. Matz filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in 2010. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Matz v. Klotka" on Justia Law

2011 Wis. Act 23 required a photo ID for voting, similar to an Indiana law, which the Supreme Court upheld in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008). After the district court enjoined enforcement of the law, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed two similar injunctions issued by state courts but ordered state officials to make it easier for registered voters to obtain documentation (such as birth certificates) that they may need to obtain photo IDs, or to waive the documentation requirement if obtaining birth certificates proves difficult or expensive. With the state injunctions lifted, the state requested a stay of the federal injunction so that it could use the photo ID requirement in this fall’s election. A divided Seventh Circuit granted a stay and denied reconsideration, noting Wisconsin’s “strong prospect of success on appeal’ and the public interest in using laws enacted through the democratic process, until the laws’ validity has been finally determined. The burden of getting a photo ID in Wisconsin is not materially different from the burden that Crawford deemed acceptable. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law