Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff has a commercial driver’s license and drives school buses, but wanted to drive vehicles that ferry equipment and people involved in movie and television productions. In Chicago such drivers belong to the Movie/Trade Show Division of Teamsters Local 727 and are paid twice what plaintiff earns as a bus driver. The Division has about 300 members, but in 70 years, has never referred a female driver to any production company. Because of agreements with those companies, the union effectively determines who is hired. In 2010 plaintiff applied, paid the union’s initiation fee, and began making dues payments. Months later, having received no referrals, she called the business agent, who told her to stop calling him. She received a similar response from a Transportation Coordinator. She claims that her résumé was never included with those of other applicants for referral. Referrals are not based on seniority and there is no shortage of work. She obtained an EEOC right to sue letter. The district court dismissed on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit reversed and directed assignment to a different judge, noting “the abruptness and irregularity” of the handling of the case and “tone of derision that pervades his opinion.” View "Stuart v. Local 727, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters" on Justia Law

Keith, caring for 13-month-old Christopher, called 911 and stated that she had “killed a baby.” During a videotaped interview she admitted hitting Christopher to make him stop crying, lifting Christopher by his feet and placing his body weight on his head, slapping and choking Christopher, and attempting to resuscitate Christopher by inserting a hairbrush down his throat to induce vomiting. Keith also stated that she abused a second child in her care by burning her feet with hot water and slapping her so hard that Keith covered her face with a scarf to prevent Keith’s husband from noticing. Keith was convicted of reckless homicide. Keith sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, contending that the state judge unduly limited the testimony of a psychologist, Kula. The judge had allowed Kula to testify about the general characteristics of people with Keith’s diagnoses, but did not allow Kula to testify about Keith’s history of abuse. Kula testified that Keith suffered from schizoid personality disorder, major depressive disorder, general anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, and that Keith had an IQ of 74. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the trial was fundamentally fair. View "Keith v. Schaub" on Justia Law

Brown, age 22, was in his Green Bay apartment with two friends, when there was knocking on his door and a yell of “police, search warrant!” As the police began to force open the front door, Brown ran upstairs to his bedroom and grabbed an unloaded shotgun. Police followed. As they reached the top of the stairs they saw him standing in the bedroom pointing the shotgun at them. Officer Secor shot Brown dead. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that claimed that the police search was executed in an unreasonable manner. According to the estate, when Brown peered out of his front window after the knocking, he saw Secor—holding an automatic rifle, dressed in a dark hoodie, with long hair, earrings, a goatee, and sideburns,. Brown turned yelled “What the … we are getting robbed again” and fled upstairs. The estate argued that the police had no need to conduct the search after dark because they were looking for some loot of modest value. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the trial court’s rejection of a report by plaintiff’s expert, criticizing police procedure. View "Estate of Brown v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Several people interrogated by the infamous Jon Burge and other officers he trained or influenced sought damages under 42 U.S.C.1983. Between 1972 and 1991, while employed by Chicago’s police force, Burge regularly tortured people to extract statements. After the statute of limitations for prosecuting Burge about that misconduct expired, he was convicted of lying about his practices. The last interrogation about which any of the five plaintiffs complains occurred in 2004, and the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Illinois is two years. The last adverse event that might have been influenced by the interrogations was Freeman’s conviction in 2009, more than two years before the suit was filed and more than three years before Freeman joined the suit. The others are in prison following convictions for serious crimes; each conviction is supported by evidence independent of confessions induced by misconduct during interrogation. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs waited on the sidelines hoping that the acts of others would tarnish Burge’s reputation and make a suit easier to win. That is not the sort of diligence required to establish equitable tolling. View "Estate of Jones v. Burge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Chicago police officer, is black, and claimed racially motivated harassment, and retaliation for complaining about the harassment, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act. While that suit was pending, he was fired. He claims retaliation for the internal complaints about harassment that he had made before he filed suit. Rather than amend his state court complaint to add a charge concerning his firing, he filed a federal suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district judge stayed the federal suit while the state suit was pending. Brown dismissed the state case without prejudice. The district judge dismissed one count, alleging state claims, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction and the other claims, retaliation and racial discrimination, on the merits, as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit modified to place dismissal of the first claim on the district court’s supplemental state-law jurisdiction, acknowledging that it may be so similar to the state law claims as to merit dismissal, but reversed with respect to the dismissal of the due process claim in that count. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Brown v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Pyles, an Illinois prisoner, injured his back when he slipped on wet stairs at Menard Correctional Center. Pyles sometimes used those stairs when showering, and a month before his fall he had alerted the warden, Gaetz, that this stairway can be treacherous because of the water tracked from the nearby showers. Pyles sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Gaetz was deliberately indifferent to the hazard, and that Wexford Health, which provides contract medical care to Menard inmates, and a Wexford physician, Fahim, were deliberately indifferent to his back injury. Pyles alleged that, after initially being treated for his fall, he suffered ongoing, significant pain, yet Dr. Fahim refused to investigate its cause. At screening, (28 U.S.C. 1915A) the district court dismissed the claim against the warden. A magistrate judge later granted summary judgment for Wexford and Dr. Fahim on the medical claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The slipping hazard about which Pyles complained was not sufficiently dangerous to support an Eighth Amendment claim. From the evidence submitted at summary judgment, a finder of fact could not reasonably conclude that Pyles’s medical claim rests on more than a disagreement with Dr. Fahim about the appropriate course of treatment. View "Pyles v. Fahim" on Justia Law

Winston sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Officer O’Brien used excessive force while detaining Winston at a Chicago police station, tasering him repeatedly and punching him while he was in handcuffs. Winston’s attorneys sought $ 20,000 in compensatory damages and an unspecified amount of punitive damages. The jury found that O’Brien was liable for $1 in compensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive damages. Winston then sought $336,918 in attorney’s fees under section 1988. The district court found that Winston’s “victory was real, not Pyrrhic,” that Winston’s attorneys could recover fees for all their requested hours but sought too high of an hourly rate, and granted a reduced fee award of $187,467. Winston filed a petition for indemnification and motion for writ of execution against the city. The district court concluded that the city was liable for the fees under the Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/9-102. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The language of the statute gives the city discretion in deciding to indemnify attorney’s fees associated with an award of compensatory damages, and the collective bargaining agreement with the police union did not convert it into a mandate to pay fees. View "City of Chicago v. Winston" on Justia Law

Meade wrote a letter to the League for Innovation in the Community College about her employer, Moraine Valley Community College. Meade, an adjunct faculty member, alleged that poor treatment of adjuncts harmed students. She signed the letter as president of the adjunct faculty union. Two days later, Moraine Valley fired Meade, sending her written notice explicitly citing Meade’s letter. A few weeks later, the college warned Meade that it would regard her further presence on campus as criminal trespass. Believing that Moraine Valley retaliated against her for exercising her right to freedom of speech and violated her due process rights, Meade sued the college under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Meade’s letter did not address matters of public interest and could not serve as the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. It rejected Meade’s due process claim for lack of a cognizable property interest in her employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Meade may not pursue a due process claim based on the deprivation of a liberty interest, but pleaded enough to go forward on the theory that the college deprived her of a protected property interest. She also stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation.View "Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

In 2009, Illinois State Police Officer Zeigler pulled over Mordi’s vehicle. A trained dog discovered drugs in the car. Zeigler arrested Mordi, took him to the station, and left him in an interrogation room. Other officers interviewed Mordi. Mordi is a Nigerian national. Nigeria and the U.S. are parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Convention. Mordi told Zeigler that his name was Nigerian, but Mordi does not recall mentioning that he was a Nigerian national. Zeigler listed Mordi’s place of birth as Nigeria, but asserts that he was unaware of Mordi’s citizenship. Mordi did tell the interviewing officers about his citizenship. Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed a detainer notice and federal authorities took over the prosecution. Mordi was represented by a federal public defender, who was aware of his nationality. Mordi pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and is serving a sentence. At no point during criminal proceedings was he informed about his right under the Convention to have the Nigerian consulate notified about his status. He did not learn about the Convention until a year later, from another inmate. He wrote to the Nigerian consulate, but did not follow through. Mordi instituted, but dismissed, habeas proceedings, arguing ineffective assistance. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied summary judgment motions by Zeigler and the interviewing officers, based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the specific legal principle on which this case turns was not clearly established.View "Mordi v. Zeigler" on Justia Law

Welton buys, sells, and rents residential real estate and, from 1994-2001, maintained a collateralized line of credit with the NBI. In 2002, NBI declined to extend that line of credit and gave him 90 days to pay off the account. Initially, Welton was unable to make payments, but by 2006 he reached an agreement with NBI. Under that agreement, Welton sent monthly checks to NBI. Those checks were never cashed. In 2007, realizing the checks remained uncashed, Welton sent a certified check in the amount of the uncashed checks. Keely, NBI’s Vice President, contacted Indianapolis Police Officer Anderson to initiate a criminal investigation. After meeting with Keely, Anderson submitted an affidavit in support of probable cause charging Welton with theft and fraud on a financial institution. Welton was arrested, processed, and released. After a trial in 2011, Welton was found not guilty. In 2013, Welton filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that several of Anderson’s statements were knowingly false and that Keely provided many of the statements, resulting in a malicious prosecution and denial of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Welton’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim was foreclosed by circuit precedent; that there is no constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause and that bare allegations of “fundamental unfairness” were insufficient to implicate the Due Process Clause.View "Welton v. Anderson" on Justia Law