Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Shannon McNamara was killed in her college apartment. McNamara’s window screen was cut. A box cutter handle and a credit card bearing the name “Anthony Mertz” were found in the apartment. Mertz claimed that he was drinking with friends the night of the murder and could not remember anything after a certain time. In an initial interview, investigators noticed Mertz’s scratches, bruises, and red knuckles. Tests on DNA scrapings from under McNamara’s fingernails were inconclusive, but did not exclude Mertz. Latex gloves were found in Mertz’s apartment, and a box cutter went missing from his work place the day that McNamara was killed. Convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, and first-degree murder, Mertz was sentenced to death. The governor commuted his sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At sentencing, the government presented evidence that Mertz committed assaults on several other women and men and that Mertz committed an unsolved 1999 murder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Mertz’s habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to rebut evidence that Mertz committed an uncharged murder and arson, finding that Mertz could not show prejudice. View "Mertz v. Williams" on Justia Law

When Keller was admitted to the Terre Haute Penitentiary, he told the intake psychologist, Bleier, that he suffered from mental illness that affected his ability to function and feared that he would be attacked if placed in the general prison population. Bleier placed Keller in the general population. While on his way to lunch Keller was attacked by another inmate without provocation. The attack lasted several minutes. No guard saw the attack. Keller was eventually spotted lying face‐down, unconscious on the ground. Examinations by the prison medical staff and a hospital emergency room revealed extensive injuries to his face and head. Keller sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, alleging that prison employees violated mandatory regulations: Bleier did not examine all of his available medical documents before releasing him into the general prison population and the guards failed to monitor their assigned areas of the yard. The district court granted the government summary judgment based on the discretionary function exception under the Act. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the government did not sustain its burden to prove as a matter of law that the discretionary function exception shielded it from liability. View "Keller v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has a commercial driver’s license and drives school buses, but wanted to drive vehicles that ferry equipment and people involved in movie and television productions. In Chicago such drivers belong to the Movie/Trade Show Division of Teamsters Local 727 and are paid twice what plaintiff earns as a bus driver. The Division has about 300 members, but in 70 years, has never referred a female driver to any production company. Because of agreements with those companies, the union effectively determines who is hired. In 2010 plaintiff applied, paid the union’s initiation fee, and began making dues payments. Months later, having received no referrals, she called the business agent, who told her to stop calling him. She received a similar response from a Transportation Coordinator. She claims that her résumé was never included with those of other applicants for referral. Referrals are not based on seniority and there is no shortage of work. She obtained an EEOC right to sue letter. The district court dismissed on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit reversed and directed assignment to a different judge, noting “the abruptness and irregularity” of the handling of the case and “tone of derision that pervades his opinion.” View "Stuart v. Local 727, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters" on Justia Law

Keith, caring for 13-month-old Christopher, called 911 and stated that she had “killed a baby.” During a videotaped interview she admitted hitting Christopher to make him stop crying, lifting Christopher by his feet and placing his body weight on his head, slapping and choking Christopher, and attempting to resuscitate Christopher by inserting a hairbrush down his throat to induce vomiting. Keith also stated that she abused a second child in her care by burning her feet with hot water and slapping her so hard that Keith covered her face with a scarf to prevent Keith’s husband from noticing. Keith was convicted of reckless homicide. Keith sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, contending that the state judge unduly limited the testimony of a psychologist, Kula. The judge had allowed Kula to testify about the general characteristics of people with Keith’s diagnoses, but did not allow Kula to testify about Keith’s history of abuse. Kula testified that Keith suffered from schizoid personality disorder, major depressive disorder, general anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, and that Keith had an IQ of 74. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the trial was fundamentally fair. View "Keith v. Schaub" on Justia Law

Brown, age 22, was in his Green Bay apartment with two friends, when there was knocking on his door and a yell of “police, search warrant!” As the police began to force open the front door, Brown ran upstairs to his bedroom and grabbed an unloaded shotgun. Police followed. As they reached the top of the stairs they saw him standing in the bedroom pointing the shotgun at them. Officer Secor shot Brown dead. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that claimed that the police search was executed in an unreasonable manner. According to the estate, when Brown peered out of his front window after the knocking, he saw Secor—holding an automatic rifle, dressed in a dark hoodie, with long hair, earrings, a goatee, and sideburns,. Brown turned yelled “What the … we are getting robbed again” and fled upstairs. The estate argued that the police had no need to conduct the search after dark because they were looking for some loot of modest value. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the trial court’s rejection of a report by plaintiff’s expert, criticizing police procedure. View "Estate of Brown v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Several people interrogated by the infamous Jon Burge and other officers he trained or influenced sought damages under 42 U.S.C.1983. Between 1972 and 1991, while employed by Chicago’s police force, Burge regularly tortured people to extract statements. After the statute of limitations for prosecuting Burge about that misconduct expired, he was convicted of lying about his practices. The last interrogation about which any of the five plaintiffs complains occurred in 2004, and the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Illinois is two years. The last adverse event that might have been influenced by the interrogations was Freeman’s conviction in 2009, more than two years before the suit was filed and more than three years before Freeman joined the suit. The others are in prison following convictions for serious crimes; each conviction is supported by evidence independent of confessions induced by misconduct during interrogation. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs waited on the sidelines hoping that the acts of others would tarnish Burge’s reputation and make a suit easier to win. That is not the sort of diligence required to establish equitable tolling. View "Estate of Jones v. Burge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Chicago police officer, is black, and claimed racially motivated harassment, and retaliation for complaining about the harassment, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act. While that suit was pending, he was fired. He claims retaliation for the internal complaints about harassment that he had made before he filed suit. Rather than amend his state court complaint to add a charge concerning his firing, he filed a federal suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district judge stayed the federal suit while the state suit was pending. Brown dismissed the state case without prejudice. The district judge dismissed one count, alleging state claims, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction and the other claims, retaliation and racial discrimination, on the merits, as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit modified to place dismissal of the first claim on the district court’s supplemental state-law jurisdiction, acknowledging that it may be so similar to the state law claims as to merit dismissal, but reversed with respect to the dismissal of the due process claim in that count. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Brown v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Pyles, an Illinois prisoner, injured his back when he slipped on wet stairs at Menard Correctional Center. Pyles sometimes used those stairs when showering, and a month before his fall he had alerted the warden, Gaetz, that this stairway can be treacherous because of the water tracked from the nearby showers. Pyles sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Gaetz was deliberately indifferent to the hazard, and that Wexford Health, which provides contract medical care to Menard inmates, and a Wexford physician, Fahim, were deliberately indifferent to his back injury. Pyles alleged that, after initially being treated for his fall, he suffered ongoing, significant pain, yet Dr. Fahim refused to investigate its cause. At screening, (28 U.S.C. 1915A) the district court dismissed the claim against the warden. A magistrate judge later granted summary judgment for Wexford and Dr. Fahim on the medical claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The slipping hazard about which Pyles complained was not sufficiently dangerous to support an Eighth Amendment claim. From the evidence submitted at summary judgment, a finder of fact could not reasonably conclude that Pyles’s medical claim rests on more than a disagreement with Dr. Fahim about the appropriate course of treatment. View "Pyles v. Fahim" on Justia Law

Winston sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Officer O’Brien used excessive force while detaining Winston at a Chicago police station, tasering him repeatedly and punching him while he was in handcuffs. Winston’s attorneys sought $ 20,000 in compensatory damages and an unspecified amount of punitive damages. The jury found that O’Brien was liable for $1 in compensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive damages. Winston then sought $336,918 in attorney’s fees under section 1988. The district court found that Winston’s “victory was real, not Pyrrhic,” that Winston’s attorneys could recover fees for all their requested hours but sought too high of an hourly rate, and granted a reduced fee award of $187,467. Winston filed a petition for indemnification and motion for writ of execution against the city. The district court concluded that the city was liable for the fees under the Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/9-102. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The language of the statute gives the city discretion in deciding to indemnify attorney’s fees associated with an award of compensatory damages, and the collective bargaining agreement with the police union did not convert it into a mandate to pay fees. View "City of Chicago v. Winston" on Justia Law

Meade wrote a letter to the League for Innovation in the Community College about her employer, Moraine Valley Community College. Meade, an adjunct faculty member, alleged that poor treatment of adjuncts harmed students. She signed the letter as president of the adjunct faculty union. Two days later, Moraine Valley fired Meade, sending her written notice explicitly citing Meade’s letter. A few weeks later, the college warned Meade that it would regard her further presence on campus as criminal trespass. Believing that Moraine Valley retaliated against her for exercising her right to freedom of speech and violated her due process rights, Meade sued the college under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Meade’s letter did not address matters of public interest and could not serve as the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. It rejected Meade’s due process claim for lack of a cognizable property interest in her employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Meade may not pursue a due process claim based on the deprivation of a liberty interest, but pleaded enough to go forward on the theory that the college deprived her of a protected property interest. She also stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation.View "Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law