Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For 13 years Sklyarsky worked as a custodian at a Chicago office building, through different employers. In 2010, new supervisors began disciplining Sklyarsky. He complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights that the company was treating him unfairly because of his Ukrainian national origin. Sklyarsky was fired in 2013, and after exhausting administrative remedies, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2000e-2, e-3, e-5(f).1 During discovery Sklyarsky, an experienced pro se litigant, concluded that the building’s management company had been involved in the discrimination and sought leave to join it as a defendant. Judge Kocoras denied that motion, telling Sklyarsky that Means-Knaus had “nothing to do with the employment contract” and that, if he wanted to sue MeansKnaus, he would have to file a separate action. Sklyarsky did that. Judge Gottschall, assigned to the new suit against Means-Knaus, screened Sklyarsky’s pro se complaint and dismissed it sua sponte, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), finding that the doctrine of claim preclusion foreclosed a separate suit. Judge Kocoras refused to reconsider and entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any procedural missteps were harmless. View "Sklyarsky v. Harvard Maint., Inc." on Justia Law

A woman of Sudanese extraction, the plaintiff worked in Jeffboat’s shipyard in Jeffersonville, Indiana as a welder from 2006 until she was laid off in 2011. She had been u a welder first class, doing the most difficult and dangerous jobs, such as overhead welding and welding in confined spaces. In a two-week period in June 2011, the plaintiff, who had on 12 previous occasions sought first aid for work-related injuries, experienced two more such incidents, becoming dizzy and nauseous while welding in confined spaces. Jeffboat demoted her to welder third class, reducing her pay from $21.10 per hour to $15.69 per hour. The plaintiff claimed that the company demoted her in retaliation for her having complained to the EEOC the previous February that the company was discriminating against her because of her sex and national origin. She was subsequently laid off, but the layoff was part of a general reduction in force based on seniority and a few months later she was notified that she was being recalled. She failed to reply within the deadline and never returned to work. Her discrimination claims were rejected. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff's lack of evidence View "Ani-Deng v. Jeffboat" on Justia Law

Champaign County Detectives executed a search warrant at the Olson home, looking for stolen items. They found nothing. Although they had no reason to believe that the Vinsons were involved in the purported theft and possessed no warrant for the Vinson property, they met a Vermillion County Deputy to search the Vinsons’ Vermillion County home. Vinson is the Olsons’s daughter. The plainclothes officers arrived in unmarked cars as the Vinsons’ 14-year-old daughter, C., was checking the mailbox. C., home with her nine-year-old brother, was alarmed. She went inside, locked the door, and called her mother, who was in a high-risk pregnancy, stating that a man was peering through a window. The man then told C. that he was a police officer and “had to conduct a search.” C. went upstairs with her brother, and, through a window, watched the offices search the attached garage and curtilage. The officers found nothing and left. The Vinsons sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for common law trespass, naming the Counties as responsible for payment under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. The district court rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An average citizen might call the police based on the behavior described. That there was no forced entry and nothing was seized is irrelevant a Fourth Amendment claim. View "Vinson v. Vermilion Cnty, Ill." on Justia Law

Bruce’s high-school boyfriend told a school official that Bruce had attempted to kill herself. The official contacted police. Officer Harris went to the home where Bruce was staying and detained her until a sheriff’s deputy, Guernsey, arrived and took Bruce, against her will, to a hospital where she was subjected to a mental health examination. Guernsey said that he had a copy of a physician’s medical examination, but no doctor had examined Bruce, and wrote that Bruce told him that she was thinking of suicide, but Bruce denies making that statement. Harris and Guernsey took no account of her father’s statements contradicting the report and her calm demeanor. Bruce filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court held that probable cause for the seizure was apparent on the face of Bruce’s complaint and that Guernsey had arguable probable cause and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in favor of Harris, but reversed and remanded as to Guernsey, who overstepped the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment in taking Bruce to the hospital and making false statements that resulted in a more prolonged seizure. View "Bruce v. Guernsey" on Justia Law

O’Gorman worked for Chicago from 1996-2007, as a carpenter and later as a General Foreman, placing city orders with Arrow Lumber, owned by Beal. After an investigation following reports from an Arrow employee, O’Gorman was arrested and charged with theft of city property and violations of City Personnel Rules. The city also pursued a civil case under the Illinois Whistleblower Act and the Chicago False Claims Act, which remains pending. The city issued a press release announcing the charges that he had diverted $50,000 in goods for his own use and tried to cover the theft. Beal pled guilty. O’Gorman’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that the investigation improperly focused on O’Gorman and protected Arrow and Beal for political reasons and that Beal covered up Arrow’s fraud; that the Human Resources Director informed a union representative that if O’Gorman did not resign he would be fired and that any hearing would be a sham; and that supervisors told him that if he resigned, he would be reinstated once he was acquitted. O’Gorman resigned, was acquitted of all criminal charges, and unsuccessfully requested reinstatement. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the termination claims untimely and that there is no property interest in rehiring. View "O'Gorman v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Inmates Sorrentino and Neal purchased several items from Stateville’s commissary, but the prison later forbade inmates to possess those items (fans and a typewriter) in their cells. Their property was removed. They filed a proposed class action, alleging that the confiscation of their property was an unconstitutional taking and a breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that the plaintiffs filed their takings claim in federal court before seeking compensation in an Illinois tribunal. View "Sorrentino v. Godinez" on Justia Law

In 1995, Beaman was convicted of the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Lockmiller. The Illinois Supreme Court overturned his conviction 13 years later, finding that the state violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, by failure to disclose material information about a viable alternative suspect. After release from prison, Beaman filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit against the police officers and prosecutors involved in the investigation and prosecution, claiming that the defendants deliberately conspired to suppress materially exculpatory evidence during the pendency of his criminal case. Several defendants were dismissed. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, three former police officers and the town of Normal, Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Beaman did not present enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer the existence of a conspiracy to conceal the Brady material. One piece of evidence, the report on alternative suspect Gates’s polygraph test, was not Brady material and its non-disclosure could not form the basis of a complaint. As to the other Brady material (the report on alternative suspect Murray’s polygraph test) which the defendants did not turn over, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Beaman v. Warner" on Justia Law

Gilbert was convicted of sexual assault in 1992 and sentenced to prison. In 2006, the state sought Gilbert’s commitment under Wisconsin Stat. 980.02 as a “sexually violent person.” The court found probable cause. Gilbert completed his sentence and was transferred, on parole, to a DHS facility because of the pending commitment proceeding. Gilbert violated parole and was returned to a Corrections facility. Gilbert was again paroled and transferred to the DHS Center. Gilbert violated his second parole and was reincarcerated. A jury found him a “sexually violent person.” the court entered a commitment order. Gilbert was not transferred to a DHS facility until months later because he was serving his sentence for his second parole violation. Gilbert filed a post-conviction motion asserting that his parole revocation meant that the commitment petition must be dismissed. State courts rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his federal habeas petition, rejecting Gilbert’s claim that there was not a “current” determination that he was a sexually violent person when he entered DHS care. The delay between the commitment verdict and Gilbert’s entry into DHS care was caused by Gilbert’s actions and he has continued to be evaluated without any indication that his condition has improved. View "Gilbert v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

Greengrass sued her former employer, IMS, alleging that IMS retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the U.S. EEOC against the company by naming her in its annual SEC filings and casting her complaint as “meritless.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of IMS on the ground that Greengrass lacked evidence showing a causal link between her EEOC filing and the alleged retaliatory act. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Greengrass made out a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity when she filed her EEOC charge, that IMS engaged in an adverse employment action when it listed her name in its SEC filings, and that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that IMS listed her name because Greengrass filed the EEOC charge. View "Greengrass v. Int'l Monetary Sys., Ltd." on Justia Law

Swanigan was arrested and jailed for more than 50 hours by Chicago police officers who mistakenly thought he was a serial bank robber. Following his release, Swanigan sued individual officers and the city alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law claims. Swanigan’s “Monell” policy-or-practice claim against the city became a separate lawsuit, which was stayed while the suit against the individual officers proceeded. A jury awarded $60,000 in damages. Swanigan moved to lift the stay and to amend his complaint in light of the jury’s verdict. The judge interpreted the motion as a waiver of all but two of Swanigan’s Monell theories and held that the remaining claims were not justiciable, based on the city’s promise to indemnify its officers and to pay nominal damages of $1 for any Monell liability. The judge dismissed the Monell suit. The Seventh Circuit remanded: the judge wrongly assumed that Swanigan was waiving all but two Monell theories and, under FRCP15(a)(1)(B), Swanigan was entitled to amend his complaint within 21 days of a responsive pleading, which would have been the next step after the stay was lifted. A sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim, a merits adjudication was improper. View "Swanigan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law