Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Greengrass sued her former employer, IMS, alleging that IMS retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the U.S. EEOC against the company by naming her in its annual SEC filings and casting her complaint as “meritless.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of IMS on the ground that Greengrass lacked evidence showing a causal link between her EEOC filing and the alleged retaliatory act. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Greengrass made out a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity when she filed her EEOC charge, that IMS engaged in an adverse employment action when it listed her name in its SEC filings, and that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that IMS listed her name because Greengrass filed the EEOC charge. View "Greengrass v. Int'l Monetary Sys., Ltd." on Justia Law

Swanigan was arrested and jailed for more than 50 hours by Chicago police officers who mistakenly thought he was a serial bank robber. Following his release, Swanigan sued individual officers and the city alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law claims. Swanigan’s “Monell” policy-or-practice claim against the city became a separate lawsuit, which was stayed while the suit against the individual officers proceeded. A jury awarded $60,000 in damages. Swanigan moved to lift the stay and to amend his complaint in light of the jury’s verdict. The judge interpreted the motion as a waiver of all but two of Swanigan’s Monell theories and held that the remaining claims were not justiciable, based on the city’s promise to indemnify its officers and to pay nominal damages of $1 for any Monell liability. The judge dismissed the Monell suit. The Seventh Circuit remanded: the judge wrongly assumed that Swanigan was waiving all but two Monell theories and, under FRCP15(a)(1)(B), Swanigan was entitled to amend his complaint within 21 days of a responsive pleading, which would have been the next step after the stay was lifted. A sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim, a merits adjudication was improper. View "Swanigan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Sultan claims that medical providers and prison staff forced him to live in unsanitary conditions and denied him medical care. He moved to proceed in forma pauperis and attached a certified statement from his prison trust account, which was $300 overdrawn. The court assessed an initial partial filing fee of $2.02. He earns $10 per month from a prison job. The prison did not remit payment. Responding to an order to show cause, Sultan stated that the administrator was at fault, and that his daughter had tried to wire the money. Sultan tendered a grievance he submitted complaining that staff had not complied with the court’s order to send the fee and a Western Union receipt. The judge gave Sultan another 30 days. Sultan sought 30 more days to pay. The judge dismissed Sultan’s suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Prison trust “accounts” are not like bank accounts in which the depositor has creditor status, nor does any rule require state administrators to pay a federal court before they satisfy an inmate’s debt to the prison. There is a conflict in asking the prison to process a payment to permit a lawsuit against it. Section 1915(b)(4) provides that no prisoner shall be prohibited from bringing a civil action for lacking means to pay the fee. View "Sultan v. Fenoglio" on Justia Law

Borostowski pled guilty to receiving child pornography, five counts of distributing child pornography, and three counts of possessing child pornography, reserving his right to appeal denial of motions to suppress. The district court sentenced him to 293 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Borostowski challenged findings that he was not in custody when officers questioned him on the day a search warrant was executed at his home, and that a hard drive seized from his mother’s car was within the scope of the warrant. The Seventh Circuit remanded the issues of whether Borostowski was in custody during his interrogation and when he invoked his right to counsel. A reasonable person in Borostowski’s circumstances might not have felt free to end the interview and leave, given the strong police presence, the use of handcuffs and a de facto two-man guard as restraints, the extended length of interrogation, and confinement to a small crowded room, despite being told that he was not under arrest or in custody and that the tone never became hostile or combative. The court affirmed with respect to the contents of the hard drive retrieved from the car and found no plain error in the procedure used in sentencing. View "United States v. Borostowski" on Justia Law

Morjal sued Chicago and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, conspiracy, false imprisonment, assault and malicious prosecution. Morjal accepted an offer of judgment under FRCP 68(a), which provided that the “Defendants offer to allow judgment to be taken against them … [$10,001.00] … plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs accrued to date.” The parties were unable to reach agreement as to the amount of attorneys’ fees. Morjal sought $22,190.50. After contentious litigation the district court awarded $17,205.50. Morjal then sought additional attorneys’ fees of $16,773.00 for time spent in litigating the fee petition. The defendants responded that Morjal was bound by the terms of the offer of judgment, which limited fees to those “accrued to date.” The district court concluded that, in some instances opposition to fees was “overly aggressive” and “arbitrary with no objective standard provided,” but awarded only $2,000 “to compensate for time spent responding to challenges to the fees that were unsupported and improper.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the court had authority to award fees under section 1988, and did so only as to conduct of the defendants that fell outside the provisions of the offer of judgment. View "Morjal v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Ripberger, born in 1951, began working for IDOC as a substance abuse counselor in 1991. She lost her job in 2010, when IDOC contracted out its counseling program to Corizon. Ripberger alleges that Corizon’s decision not to hire her stemmed from previous events in 2009, when Orton-Bell and Ripberger complained that their desks were being used after hours. According to Ripberger, they were told it was “just” staff members, not inmates, using their desks for sex, and that they could simply wash down their desks. It came to light that Orton-Bell was having an affair with the Major in charge of custody. Orton-Bell and the Major were terminated, but the Major quickly received unemployment benefits, kept his benefits, and began working again at the prison on a contract basis. Orton-Bell filed suit. Ripberger supported Orton-Bell’s sex discrimination complaint. Ripberger sued Corizon, claiming sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court granted Corizon summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Ripberger was the unfortunate victim of a reduced workforce. View "Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

Parker asserted that “Scheck Industries” had fired him after just a few months on the job because of his race and several complaints he made to management about workplace discrimination. The EEOC issued Parker a right-to-sue letter, explaining that the agency had investigated but was unable to confirm his allegations. The agency’s letter did not suggest that “Scheck Industries” never employed Parker or that an entity with that name did not exist. In fact, Parker’s employer apparently used that name in dealing with the EEOC, since the agency’s letter to Parker was copied to “Scheck Industries.” Parker drafted a pro se complaint. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of service but explained that the company’s liability insurer failed to file an answer after misidentifying the complaint; that Scheck Mechanical never employed Parker; and that Parker’s claims under Title VII were untimely. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting Scheck Mechanical’s position, that Parker sued only Scheck Mechanical; the complaint included multiple references to Scheck Industrial. It may not matter which company employed Parker if, as Parker asserts, the line between the companies is blurred. View "Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp." on Justia Law

A Catholic school in Fort Wayne, Indiana, discharged a language-arts teacher because she underwent in vitro fertilization in violation of the moral teaching of the Catholic Church. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order was not final and that the case did not qualify for collateral order review. View "Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend" on Justia Law

Taylor-Novotny sued her former employer, Health Alliance Medical Plans under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. She contended that Health Alliance failed to accommodate her multiple sclerosis as the ADA required, discriminated and retaliated against her based on her disability, interfered with her FMLA rights, and discriminated against her based on her race. She also asserted a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for Health Alliance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Taylor-Novotny did not establish that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and did not meeting Health Alliance’s legitimate expectations for punctuality and accountability. Her failure to meet Health Alliance’s legitimate expectations also foreclosed her race discrimination claim. With respect to her ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, she did not establish that the additional accommodation that she sought was reasonable. The evidence was insufficient to form a convincing mosaic suggesting that Health Alliance retaliated against her because she sought accommodations for her multiple sclerosis. Health Alliance never denied Taylor-Novotny FMLA leave. View "Taylor-Novotny v. Health Alliance Med. Plans, Inc." on Justia Law

Whitaker, formerly employed by Milwaukee County, alleged that she was discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 when the county failed to accommodate her disability by refusing to extend her period of medical leave, refusing to transfer her to another position, and then terminating her for reasons related to her disability. The district court granted the County summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s conclusion that the complaint impermissibly went beyond the scope of the EEOC charge and that the County was not her “employer” under the statute. Although Milwaukee County was Whitaker’s official employer and was responsible for her compensation, it had no involvement in the principal decisions that she claims violated the statute and no authority to override those decisions, made by the State Department of Health Services. With respect to whether the County is liable for any of its own actions,. Whitaker’s allegations on these matters were outside the scope of her EEOC charge, and, therefore, not subject to judicial consideration. View "Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty." on Justia Law