Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Campbell was convicted in Illinois state court of first-degree murder for participating in a mob-style beating. No physical evidence linked Campbell to the crime. The state’s case hinged on the testimony of three eyewitnesses; two had been charged with the murder but were granted immunity in exchange for testifying against Campbell. Both had serious criminal histories, and both denied any involvement in the crime when they testified at Campbell’s trial. The third witness testified that Campbell started the fight with the victim, but she saw the fight from inside a van that was parked around the street corner and facing away from the brawl. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Campbell’s habeas corpus petition. The state courts unreasonably applied “Strickland” when they rejected Campbell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without addressing key factual questions: whether Campbell’s lawyer interviewed certain witnesses and whether they would have testified credibly and consistently with their affidavits and statements to the police. Affidavits from two of those witnesses say that Campbell’s lawyer never contacted them, but the affidavits have not been tested through the adversarial process. There is no affidavit from the third exculpatory witness or the lawyer himself, nor a record of live testimony. View "Campbell v. Reardon" on Justia Law

Love, who is African-American, was dismissed from the Milwaukee city hall renovation site, where he worked as a foreman, after a physical altercation with another worker. Cullen was the general contractor; Cullen’s subcontractor (Matthews) employed Union Contracting, which employed Love. Love brought a Title VII action against Cullen, alleging that his dismissal was racially motivated. Union, which had no contractual relationship with Cullen, paid Love’s salary and provided all other benefits, set Love’s hours, and passed Cullen’s instructions on to Love. Cullen only gave specific directions if it reviewed a finished product and found it unsatisfactory. In the event of “serious incidents” involving threats to workplace safety or productivity, Cullen retained the right to investigate its subcontractors’ employees, discipline them, and permanently remove them from the job site. According to Love, there was another physical altercation between two Caucasian workers at the site that resulted in no significant disciplinary action. The district court concluded that Love failed to demonstrate an “indirect” employment relationship and granted Cullen summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Cullen’s involvement in Love’s dismissal was relevant to their relationship, it was not enough to overcome other factors. Cullen, in the aggregate, exercised very little control over Love. View "Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Bailey was detained for 23 days while police investigated a 2009 Chicago schoolyard brawl that resulted in the death of another student. A video of the incident showed an attacker who punched victim as he tried to stand up. Detectives showed the video to Officer Massey, who was assigned to the school and had worked there for several years. Massey identified Bailey and another student as assailants. She claimed that she had known Bailey for 18 months, and recognized his face. They also showed the video to another student (then-suspect) who witnessed the fight; he identified Bailey as one of the attackers and told detectives that he knew him from school. Two school staff members also identified Bailey on the video. The charges against him were ultimately dropped after the investigation revealed that five other persons, but not Bailey, were involved in the fight. Bailey sued, claiming malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the delay was imposed for improper motivations such as punishing Bailey or drumming up evidence to justify his arrest. View "Bailey v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2006, Gerhartz lost control of his vehicle on a rural Wisconsin highway and struck an oncoming car. The Calumet County Sheriff’s Department responded. Paramedic Katalinick, treating Gerhartz, told a deputy that he believed Gerhartz had been drinking alcohol. Sergeant Tyson instructed Richert to follow Gerhartz to the hospital. Tyson then spoke to Zeinert, a first responder and a bartender for a nearby Stockbridge bar. Zeinert stated that, earlier that evening, she had served Gerhartz “three or possibly four glasses of Bud Light beer” and that Gerhartz told her that he had smoked “too much pot tonight.” Tyson instructed Richert to arrest Gerhartz and to obtain a blood sample. At the hospital, Richert ordered, without a warrant, an evidentiary blood draw, pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law. A technician conducted the blood draw about two hours after the accident. Gerhartz was unconscious. His blood-alcohol content was .243g/100ml. Gerhartz was later convicted of injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and of operating a motor vehicle under the influence. Gerhartz sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the officers summary judgment; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol from Gerhartz’s bloodstream was an exigent circumstance sufficient to justify the warrantless blood draw. View "Gerhartz v. Richert" on Justia Law

Austin, an Indiana inmate, was assigned, for one day, to do construction work in the crawl space of a parole office near the prison. Austin was punished in a prison disciplinary proceeding for having attempted to traffic in tobacco. He lost 60 days of good-time credit, was demoted from “credit class 1” to “credit class 2” (inmates in the first class earn one day of good time credit for each day of imprisonment; in the second class they earn one day for every two days), was given 20 hours of extra work duty, and was denied access to the commissary for 25 days. The evidence consisted of a guard’s statement: shaking down the crawl spase [sic] at the Gary Parole Office … found 5 packs of Bugler cigarette papers, 1 ziploc bag that appears to have tobacco in it, 2 ziplock [sic] bags filled with more ziplock [sic] bags … Austin … was assigned to this area. Austin sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief, ruling that the evidence, though scanty, was adequate to prove “constructive possession” of tobacco. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that, convicted without evidence of guilt, Austin was denied due process of law. View "Austin v. Pazera" on Justia Law

McManus, on trial for murdering his wife and young daughters, decompensated during testimony. He had several panic attacks; his symptoms required two trips to the emergency room. He was treated with a combination of psychotropic drugs—including one that knocks out memory—and an opioid painkiller. He remained on mind-altering medications for the duration of the trial. The judge never ordered a competency evaluation, but focused on getting McManus “fixed up” enough to complete the trial, and sentenced him to death. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal, but on post-conviction review the trial judge found McManus intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty (IND. CODE 35-36-9-6). The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed and reimposed the death sentence. McManus sought federal habeas review. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While McManus is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim of categorical ineligibility for the death penalty, the powerful effect of the medications alone created substantial doubt about his fitness for trial. The approach taken by the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal framework for competency questions. The Indiana Supreme Court recited the correct legal standard but did not actually apply it. View "McManus v. Neal" on Justia Law

Carter, an African-American male, holds an MBA and is a CPA. CSU’s College of Business hired him in 1986 as a temporary assistant professor. In 1992, CSU granted Carter tenure and promoted him to associate professor. In 1995-1996, he was department chair until he was removed by the university president. In 2006-2007, Carter was dissatisfied with his teaching assignments. Beginning in January 2007, Carter called in sick every Thursday. Carter blamed CSU’s failure to accommodate his sleep apnea. CSU’s Assistant Vice President recommended that Carter be sanctioned. Carter sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and disability. The district court entered partial summary judgment against Carter; the parties settled the remaining claim. On January 22, after the start of the spring 2008 semester, Carter requested FMLA leave to care for his mother. CSU granted the request. When Carter returned on March 20, CSU assigned him non-teaching duties for the remainder of the semester. His supervisor, Simyar was not willing to recommend Carter as Department Chair. The president had previously rejected candidates for other chair positions because they lacked terminal degrees, but at least three other chairs did not have PhDs at the time. Carter sued, alleging retaliation in violation of the FMLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the person chosen as Chair was no more qualified than Carter. View "Carter v. Chicago State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patrick Novak filed suit against Southern Illinois University and three of its professors, alleging that he had been terminated from the University’s doctoral program in Curriculum and Instruction on the basis of his post-traumatic stress disorder, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted the University’s motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination and that, in any event, he had not presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants’ stated reason for terminating him from the program was a pretext for discrimination. After review of plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff could not show that the reason given by the University for his dismissal was pretextual. On that ground, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Novak v. Bd. of Trustees of So. Ill. University" on Justia Law

Ledbetter, a black male, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981 against his former employer, Good Samaritan Ministries of Carbondale, Illinois, a tax-exempt nonprofit organization that provides services to needy people. The suit charged retaliation for Ledbetter’s having filed a charge of racial discrimination and of retaliation with the EEOC. Ledbetter had been warned, based on complaints by shelter residents and co-workers about alleged intimidation and threats. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding too many " loose ends" for summary judgment. View "Ledbetter v. Good Samaritan Ministries" on Justia Law