Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Schlemm, a member of the Navajo Tribe, and a prisoner, sought an order requiring the prison to accommodate his religious practices under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. Members of the Tribe honor the dead through dancing, praying, and eating traditional foods. Wisconsin concedes that this celebration is religious and that Schlemm sincerely believes that “traditional foods” should include game meat. The prison rejected his request for game meat or ground beef and his offer to secure a sealed platter from an outside vendor. The prison permits Jewish inmates to have outside vendors supply sealed Seder platters. Defendants maintain that serving venison would be too expensive, would exceed the capacity of institutional kitchens, and would violate a rule limiting prison foods to those certified by the USDA. The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that the denial does not impose a “substantial burden” on Schlemm’s religious exercise; the state has a “compelling governmental interest” in costs and using USDA-inspected meats; and that the denial is the “least restrictive means” of furthering those interests. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the state was not entitled to summary judgment and ordering a preliminary injunction allowing Schlemm to order venison and to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his cell and during group ceremonies. View "Schlemm v. Frank" on Justia Law

In 2004, Thurman, a drug dealer, attempted to bribe four Maywood police officers. They reported the attempt to the State’s Attorney. That Office also learned that an individual arrested by Maywood police had stated that Thurman had officers on his payroll. An undercover sting, “Operation Pocket Change,” began with the officers pretending to be dirty cops and accepting from Thurman weekly payments of $1,200. Monitoring Thurman’s cell phone (with a warrant), revealed numerous contacts between Thurman and Officer Wade, resulting in a wiretap. The team agreed to announce, at a roll call at which Wade was present, that officers should stay clear of an area in which Thurman’s dealers were known to sell. In intercepted telephone calls, Wade warned Thurman that “Granny’s house was hot.” Wade claims that he did not hear the announcement, but made up the tip in an attempt to turn Thurman into a confidential informant. A search of Wade’s home computer uncovered a fraudulent arrest warrant for Thurman. Thurman later stated that Wade helped him rob a supplier by pretending to arrest him and seizing the drugs, using the fake warrant. A jury acquitted Wade, who sued the village and the officers for equal protection violations and malicious prosecution. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Probable cause supported his prosecution. Wade cannot succeed by reframing the claim as a class-of-one equal protection claim. The court noted Wade’s failure to identify a similarly-situated individual who was treated more favorably. View "Wade v. Collier" on Justia Law

Rhodes was charged with two counts of kidnapping. He retained Kovac. A jury acquitted him on one count; a different jury convicted him on the other. Rhodes appealed, claiming that Kovac had rendered ineffective assistance. The case was remanded, based on a problem with the jury. The court appointed a public defender, Kaiser. About two months before the trial was to begin, Kaiser moved to end his appointment. Rhodes wanted to represent himself. The court held a hearing and warned Rhodes, at length, about the dangers of self-representation. Kovac , who was present, said that he believed Rhodes was not engaging in gamesmanship or building a record for appeal, but that Rhodes had not retained him. After receiving a waiver, the judge granted Rhodes’s request. During the weeks that followed, there were several requests for additional time. It was not clear whether Kovac was representing Rhodes. The judge eventually told Rhodes he could not “have it both ways,” refused to grant an adjournment, and denied motions for standby counsel. The jury convicted Rhodes of kidnapping and aggravated battery. Wisconsin courts rejected his appeal. The federal district court granted habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Neither of the state courts’ reasons for rejecting Rhodes’s last-minute request for counsel was unreasonable. View "Rhodes v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Doe, a minor female, was drinking in a group at an apartment complex in Arlington Heights and Mount Prospect. A site manager called 911. Three males began moving Doe to a secluded area. She was so intoxicated that they had to hold her up. Arlington Heights Officer Del Boccio arrived, talked to the males, allowed them to leave with Doe without asking for identification, and left the scene. One of the three, Balodimas, was on probation for armed robbery; Doe and the other males were minors. Del Boccio reported that the subjects were gone on arrival. The three males then carried Doe into a laundry room. When the site manager observed this, he again called 911. Mount Prospect police responded and caught Balodimas sexually assaulting Doe. Doe sued Del Boccio and Arlington Heights, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state claims. The district court dismissed and denied Doe’s motion to amend her complaint to allege that Del Boccio was a racist who wanted harm to come to her because she was a white girl socializing with African-Americans. Doe referred to an incident when Del Boccio, operating an unmarked police car, ran over and killed an eight-year-old African-American boy and lied to cover it up. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Del Boccio did not create the danger, nor did he do anything to make the danger to Doe worse. View "Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights" on Justia Law

Makiel was convicted of the 1988 murder of Hoch and the armed robbery of a gas station where she worked. After exhaustion of state remedies, the district court denied his petition for habeas corpus, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois courts did not apply federal law unreasonably in concluding that Makiel’s counsel was not ineffective in selecting the issues to pursue on appeal: One issue she raised drew a remand, and, although the other two issues did not prevail, each drew a dissenting opinion. An evidentiary ruling preventing impeachment of a prosecution witness with a pending forgery charge was not clearly a stronger issue than those she raised, nor was the exclusion of testimony about the reputations of prosecution witnesses. The state court did not act unreasonably in finding no violation of Makiel’s constitutional right to compulsory process by exclusion of the testimony of an 11-year-old, who would have blamed another young boy for the murder. The proffered testimony was uncorroborated at the time. Its exclusion was an error and was the basis for the state court’s remand. By the time the state courts decided the constitutional issue, however, he had disavowed his proffered testimony, and there was no reason to think it would have been probative or reliable. View "Makiel v. Butler" on Justia Law

King filed a civil rights lawsuit, claiming that he was forced to wear a see-through jumpsuit that exposed his genitals and buttocks while he was transported from county jail to state prison and that this amounted to an unjustified and humiliating strip-search in violation of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court reviewed King’s complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915 and determined that King had not stated a viable claim of cruel and unusual punishment, but allowed him to proceed on his theory of unreasonable search. The court later granted summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, finding that King failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that he exhaust the jail’s administrative remedies before suing, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed. King’s transfer to the state prison made it impossible for him to comply with the jail’s grievance procedures, so there were no available remedies to exhaust. King alleged a plausible Eighth Amendment claim that the use of the unusual jumpsuit had no legitimate correctional purpose but was used to humiliate and inflict psychological pain, but as a convicted prisoner, King is not entitled to argue that requiring him to wear the jumpsuit subjected him to an unreasonable search. View "King v. McCarty" on Justia Law

Hutchens is a black woman. A large-scale layoff in the Chicago public schools system’s Professional Development Unit, where she worked, required the unit to decide whether to retain her or a white woman, Glowacki, who Hutchens argues was less qualified. She claimed that the unit’s director, Rivera, preferred whites to blacks. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that their justification for the replacement that was not merely a “pretext.” The Seventh Circuit reversed as to racial discrimination (42 U.S.C. 1983) and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. A reasonable jury could credit Hutchens’ evidence while rejecting that of the defendants, and impressed by Hutchens’ credentials, her seniority over Glowacki, her earlier receipt of National Board Certification, her other credentials superior to Glowacki’s, her writing skills, and her toughness in teaching inmates of Cook County Jail year after year, could conclude that she was better qualified for the job than Glowacki. That reasonable jury might nevertheless deem Hutchens a victim not of racism but of error, ineptitude, carelessness, or personal like or dislike, unrelated to race. View "Hutchens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

In 1999, Nelson, riding his bike away from a liquor store, received a fatal blow to the head. Eyewitnesses, Johnnie and Evans, identified Owens from a photo array and from a lineup. Owens was the only person in the line-up who also was in the array. At trial, though Owens was in the courtroom, Evans twice pointed to someone else in the photo array as being Owens. Evans testified that there had been two assailants, Johnnie that there had been one. Evans, but not Johnnie, testified that Nelson had spoken with the assailants. Nelson had crack cocaine on his person that appeared to be packaged for individual sale. No evidence was presented that Owens knew Nelson, used or sold illegal drugs, or had any gang affiliation. There was no physical evidence linking Owens to the murder, which occurred almost two hours after sunset. After closing arguments the judge made statements about Owens knowing that Nelson was a drug dealer and found Owens guilty. The appellate court found the error harmless because Johnnie’s eyewitness identification of Owens was sufficient to establish guilt. The federal district court denied Owens habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed: a judge may not convict on the basis of a belief that has no evidentiary basis. View "Owens v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Richardson was arrested by Indiana police in December 2011, for domestic battery and intimidation with a deadly weapon. A same-day search of his home revealed guns, a violation of state and federal law because he had been convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. Days later, the U.S. Attorney filed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause and a detainer. A complaint that charges a felony can establish a basis for an arrest warrant and initiate or expand an investigation, but unlike an indictment or information, cannot initiate felony prosecution. A detainer merely informs the jail that a person being held is wanted on other charges, so that the jail should notify the issuing agency of the prisoner’s imminent release. The federal court issued a warrant for Richardson’s arrest, which was not executed while he remained in jail. In March 2013, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served. The next day the federal warrant was executed, and he was jailed. The following month he was indicted. He moved to dismiss, citing his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district judge denied the motion. Richardson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has held that the clock does not begin to tick until a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Dr. Simpson, an African-American was recruited to apply for a position at BDCH in 2010. BDCH’s CEO offered Simpson employment with the concurrence of BDCH’s COO. Both were aware of Simpson’s race. BDCH paid the recruiter $12,000. BDCH’s Physician Employment Agreement stated that Simpson “must apply for, obtain and maintain” active medical staff membership and clinical privileges. BDCH was to pay Simpson a $20,000 signing bonus “within five (5) days after first day of employment,” contingent on Simpson’s obtaining medical staff privileges and fulfilling other conditions of the employment agreement. Simpson applied for medical staff privileges at BDCH, stating that he was certified with the American Board of Family Physicians and held an unrestricted license to practice medicine in Indiana and Illinois. He also indicated that he was a defendant in two medical malpractice cases involving wrongful death, but did not disclose that these claims were not covered by malpractice insurance. Simpson noted that he had been placed on academic probation during his first year of residency. The Committee denied his application for staff privileges. Simpson sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of BDCH. Simpson failed to show that the Committee’s concerns were untrue, unreasonable, or pretexts for discrimination. View "Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps." on Justia Law