Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

King filed a civil rights lawsuit, claiming that he was forced to wear a see-through jumpsuit that exposed his genitals and buttocks while he was transported from county jail to state prison and that this amounted to an unjustified and humiliating strip-search in violation of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court reviewed King’s complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915 and determined that King had not stated a viable claim of cruel and unusual punishment, but allowed him to proceed on his theory of unreasonable search. The court later granted summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, finding that King failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that he exhaust the jail’s administrative remedies before suing, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed. King’s transfer to the state prison made it impossible for him to comply with the jail’s grievance procedures, so there were no available remedies to exhaust. King alleged a plausible Eighth Amendment claim that the use of the unusual jumpsuit had no legitimate correctional purpose but was used to humiliate and inflict psychological pain, but as a convicted prisoner, King is not entitled to argue that requiring him to wear the jumpsuit subjected him to an unreasonable search. View "King v. McCarty" on Justia Law

Hutchens is a black woman. A large-scale layoff in the Chicago public schools system’s Professional Development Unit, where she worked, required the unit to decide whether to retain her or a white woman, Glowacki, who Hutchens argues was less qualified. She claimed that the unit’s director, Rivera, preferred whites to blacks. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that their justification for the replacement that was not merely a “pretext.” The Seventh Circuit reversed as to racial discrimination (42 U.S.C. 1983) and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. A reasonable jury could credit Hutchens’ evidence while rejecting that of the defendants, and impressed by Hutchens’ credentials, her seniority over Glowacki, her earlier receipt of National Board Certification, her other credentials superior to Glowacki’s, her writing skills, and her toughness in teaching inmates of Cook County Jail year after year, could conclude that she was better qualified for the job than Glowacki. That reasonable jury might nevertheless deem Hutchens a victim not of racism but of error, ineptitude, carelessness, or personal like or dislike, unrelated to race. View "Hutchens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

In 1999, Nelson, riding his bike away from a liquor store, received a fatal blow to the head. Eyewitnesses, Johnnie and Evans, identified Owens from a photo array and from a lineup. Owens was the only person in the line-up who also was in the array. At trial, though Owens was in the courtroom, Evans twice pointed to someone else in the photo array as being Owens. Evans testified that there had been two assailants, Johnnie that there had been one. Evans, but not Johnnie, testified that Nelson had spoken with the assailants. Nelson had crack cocaine on his person that appeared to be packaged for individual sale. No evidence was presented that Owens knew Nelson, used or sold illegal drugs, or had any gang affiliation. There was no physical evidence linking Owens to the murder, which occurred almost two hours after sunset. After closing arguments the judge made statements about Owens knowing that Nelson was a drug dealer and found Owens guilty. The appellate court found the error harmless because Johnnie’s eyewitness identification of Owens was sufficient to establish guilt. The federal district court denied Owens habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed: a judge may not convict on the basis of a belief that has no evidentiary basis. View "Owens v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Richardson was arrested by Indiana police in December 2011, for domestic battery and intimidation with a deadly weapon. A same-day search of his home revealed guns, a violation of state and federal law because he had been convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. Days later, the U.S. Attorney filed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause and a detainer. A complaint that charges a felony can establish a basis for an arrest warrant and initiate or expand an investigation, but unlike an indictment or information, cannot initiate felony prosecution. A detainer merely informs the jail that a person being held is wanted on other charges, so that the jail should notify the issuing agency of the prisoner’s imminent release. The federal court issued a warrant for Richardson’s arrest, which was not executed while he remained in jail. In March 2013, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to time served. The next day the federal warrant was executed, and he was jailed. The following month he was indicted. He moved to dismiss, citing his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district judge denied the motion. Richardson pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has held that the clock does not begin to tick until a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Dr. Simpson, an African-American was recruited to apply for a position at BDCH in 2010. BDCH’s CEO offered Simpson employment with the concurrence of BDCH’s COO. Both were aware of Simpson’s race. BDCH paid the recruiter $12,000. BDCH’s Physician Employment Agreement stated that Simpson “must apply for, obtain and maintain” active medical staff membership and clinical privileges. BDCH was to pay Simpson a $20,000 signing bonus “within five (5) days after first day of employment,” contingent on Simpson’s obtaining medical staff privileges and fulfilling other conditions of the employment agreement. Simpson applied for medical staff privileges at BDCH, stating that he was certified with the American Board of Family Physicians and held an unrestricted license to practice medicine in Indiana and Illinois. He also indicated that he was a defendant in two medical malpractice cases involving wrongful death, but did not disclose that these claims were not covered by malpractice insurance. Simpson noted that he had been placed on academic probation during his first year of residency. The Committee denied his application for staff privileges. Simpson sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of BDCH. Simpson failed to show that the Committee’s concerns were untrue, unreasonable, or pretexts for discrimination. View "Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps." on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Campbell was convicted in Illinois state court of first-degree murder for participating in a mob-style beating. No physical evidence linked Campbell to the crime. The state’s case hinged on the testimony of three eyewitnesses; two had been charged with the murder but were granted immunity in exchange for testifying against Campbell. Both had serious criminal histories, and both denied any involvement in the crime when they testified at Campbell’s trial. The third witness testified that Campbell started the fight with the victim, but she saw the fight from inside a van that was parked around the street corner and facing away from the brawl. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Campbell’s habeas corpus petition. The state courts unreasonably applied “Strickland” when they rejected Campbell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without addressing key factual questions: whether Campbell’s lawyer interviewed certain witnesses and whether they would have testified credibly and consistently with their affidavits and statements to the police. Affidavits from two of those witnesses say that Campbell’s lawyer never contacted them, but the affidavits have not been tested through the adversarial process. There is no affidavit from the third exculpatory witness or the lawyer himself, nor a record of live testimony. View "Campbell v. Reardon" on Justia Law

Love, who is African-American, was dismissed from the Milwaukee city hall renovation site, where he worked as a foreman, after a physical altercation with another worker. Cullen was the general contractor; Cullen’s subcontractor (Matthews) employed Union Contracting, which employed Love. Love brought a Title VII action against Cullen, alleging that his dismissal was racially motivated. Union, which had no contractual relationship with Cullen, paid Love’s salary and provided all other benefits, set Love’s hours, and passed Cullen’s instructions on to Love. Cullen only gave specific directions if it reviewed a finished product and found it unsatisfactory. In the event of “serious incidents” involving threats to workplace safety or productivity, Cullen retained the right to investigate its subcontractors’ employees, discipline them, and permanently remove them from the job site. According to Love, there was another physical altercation between two Caucasian workers at the site that resulted in no significant disciplinary action. The district court concluded that Love failed to demonstrate an “indirect” employment relationship and granted Cullen summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Cullen’s involvement in Love’s dismissal was relevant to their relationship, it was not enough to overcome other factors. Cullen, in the aggregate, exercised very little control over Love. View "Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Bailey was detained for 23 days while police investigated a 2009 Chicago schoolyard brawl that resulted in the death of another student. A video of the incident showed an attacker who punched victim as he tried to stand up. Detectives showed the video to Officer Massey, who was assigned to the school and had worked there for several years. Massey identified Bailey and another student as assailants. She claimed that she had known Bailey for 18 months, and recognized his face. They also showed the video to another student (then-suspect) who witnessed the fight; he identified Bailey as one of the attackers and told detectives that he knew him from school. Two school staff members also identified Bailey on the video. The charges against him were ultimately dropped after the investigation revealed that five other persons, but not Bailey, were involved in the fight. Bailey sued, claiming malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the delay was imposed for improper motivations such as punishing Bailey or drumming up evidence to justify his arrest. View "Bailey v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2006, Gerhartz lost control of his vehicle on a rural Wisconsin highway and struck an oncoming car. The Calumet County Sheriff’s Department responded. Paramedic Katalinick, treating Gerhartz, told a deputy that he believed Gerhartz had been drinking alcohol. Sergeant Tyson instructed Richert to follow Gerhartz to the hospital. Tyson then spoke to Zeinert, a first responder and a bartender for a nearby Stockbridge bar. Zeinert stated that, earlier that evening, she had served Gerhartz “three or possibly four glasses of Bud Light beer” and that Gerhartz told her that he had smoked “too much pot tonight.” Tyson instructed Richert to arrest Gerhartz and to obtain a blood sample. At the hospital, Richert ordered, without a warrant, an evidentiary blood draw, pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law. A technician conducted the blood draw about two hours after the accident. Gerhartz was unconscious. His blood-alcohol content was .243g/100ml. Gerhartz was later convicted of injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and of operating a motor vehicle under the influence. Gerhartz sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the officers summary judgment; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol from Gerhartz’s bloodstream was an exigent circumstance sufficient to justify the warrantless blood draw. View "Gerhartz v. Richert" on Justia Law