Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bailey was detained for 23 days while police investigated a 2009 Chicago schoolyard brawl that resulted in the death of another student. A video of the incident showed an attacker who punched victim as he tried to stand up. Detectives showed the video to Officer Massey, who was assigned to the school and had worked there for several years. Massey identified Bailey and another student as assailants. She claimed that she had known Bailey for 18 months, and recognized his face. They also showed the video to another student (then-suspect) who witnessed the fight; he identified Bailey as one of the attackers and told detectives that he knew him from school. Two school staff members also identified Bailey on the video. The charges against him were ultimately dropped after the investigation revealed that five other persons, but not Bailey, were involved in the fight. Bailey sued, claiming malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the delay was imposed for improper motivations such as punishing Bailey or drumming up evidence to justify his arrest. View "Bailey v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2006, Gerhartz lost control of his vehicle on a rural Wisconsin highway and struck an oncoming car. The Calumet County Sheriff’s Department responded. Paramedic Katalinick, treating Gerhartz, told a deputy that he believed Gerhartz had been drinking alcohol. Sergeant Tyson instructed Richert to follow Gerhartz to the hospital. Tyson then spoke to Zeinert, a first responder and a bartender for a nearby Stockbridge bar. Zeinert stated that, earlier that evening, she had served Gerhartz “three or possibly four glasses of Bud Light beer” and that Gerhartz told her that he had smoked “too much pot tonight.” Tyson instructed Richert to arrest Gerhartz and to obtain a blood sample. At the hospital, Richert ordered, without a warrant, an evidentiary blood draw, pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law. A technician conducted the blood draw about two hours after the accident. Gerhartz was unconscious. His blood-alcohol content was .243g/100ml. Gerhartz was later convicted of injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and of operating a motor vehicle under the influence. Gerhartz sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the officers summary judgment; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol from Gerhartz’s bloodstream was an exigent circumstance sufficient to justify the warrantless blood draw. View "Gerhartz v. Richert" on Justia Law

Austin, an Indiana inmate, was assigned, for one day, to do construction work in the crawl space of a parole office near the prison. Austin was punished in a prison disciplinary proceeding for having attempted to traffic in tobacco. He lost 60 days of good-time credit, was demoted from “credit class 1” to “credit class 2” (inmates in the first class earn one day of good time credit for each day of imprisonment; in the second class they earn one day for every two days), was given 20 hours of extra work duty, and was denied access to the commissary for 25 days. The evidence consisted of a guard’s statement: shaking down the crawl spase [sic] at the Gary Parole Office … found 5 packs of Bugler cigarette papers, 1 ziploc bag that appears to have tobacco in it, 2 ziplock [sic] bags filled with more ziplock [sic] bags … Austin … was assigned to this area. Austin sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief, ruling that the evidence, though scanty, was adequate to prove “constructive possession” of tobacco. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that, convicted without evidence of guilt, Austin was denied due process of law. View "Austin v. Pazera" on Justia Law

McManus, on trial for murdering his wife and young daughters, decompensated during testimony. He had several panic attacks; his symptoms required two trips to the emergency room. He was treated with a combination of psychotropic drugs—including one that knocks out memory—and an opioid painkiller. He remained on mind-altering medications for the duration of the trial. The judge never ordered a competency evaluation, but focused on getting McManus “fixed up” enough to complete the trial, and sentenced him to death. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal, but on post-conviction review the trial judge found McManus intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty (IND. CODE 35-36-9-6). The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed and reimposed the death sentence. McManus sought federal habeas review. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While McManus is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim of categorical ineligibility for the death penalty, the powerful effect of the medications alone created substantial doubt about his fitness for trial. The approach taken by the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal framework for competency questions. The Indiana Supreme Court recited the correct legal standard but did not actually apply it. View "McManus v. Neal" on Justia Law

Carter, an African-American male, holds an MBA and is a CPA. CSU’s College of Business hired him in 1986 as a temporary assistant professor. In 1992, CSU granted Carter tenure and promoted him to associate professor. In 1995-1996, he was department chair until he was removed by the university president. In 2006-2007, Carter was dissatisfied with his teaching assignments. Beginning in January 2007, Carter called in sick every Thursday. Carter blamed CSU’s failure to accommodate his sleep apnea. CSU’s Assistant Vice President recommended that Carter be sanctioned. Carter sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and disability. The district court entered partial summary judgment against Carter; the parties settled the remaining claim. On January 22, after the start of the spring 2008 semester, Carter requested FMLA leave to care for his mother. CSU granted the request. When Carter returned on March 20, CSU assigned him non-teaching duties for the remainder of the semester. His supervisor, Simyar was not willing to recommend Carter as Department Chair. The president had previously rejected candidates for other chair positions because they lacked terminal degrees, but at least three other chairs did not have PhDs at the time. Carter sued, alleging retaliation in violation of the FMLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the person chosen as Chair was no more qualified than Carter. View "Carter v. Chicago State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patrick Novak filed suit against Southern Illinois University and three of its professors, alleging that he had been terminated from the University’s doctoral program in Curriculum and Instruction on the basis of his post-traumatic stress disorder, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted the University’s motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination and that, in any event, he had not presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants’ stated reason for terminating him from the program was a pretext for discrimination. After review of plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff could not show that the reason given by the University for his dismissal was pretextual. On that ground, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Novak v. Bd. of Trustees of So. Ill. University" on Justia Law

Ledbetter, a black male, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981 against his former employer, Good Samaritan Ministries of Carbondale, Illinois, a tax-exempt nonprofit organization that provides services to needy people. The suit charged retaliation for Ledbetter’s having filed a charge of racial discrimination and of retaliation with the EEOC. Ledbetter had been warned, based on complaints by shelter residents and co-workers about alleged intimidation and threats. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding too many " loose ends" for summary judgment. View "Ledbetter v. Good Samaritan Ministries" on Justia Law

The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721, prohibits individuals from knowingly obtaining or disclosing “personal information” from a motor vehicle record. Chicago police officers brought suit against Sun-Times Media, alleging that the publishing company violated the DPPA by obtaining each officer’s birth date, height, weight, hair color, and eye color from the Illinois Secretary of State’s motor vehicle records, and publishing that information in a newspaper article that criticized a homicide investigation lineup in which the officers participated. Sun-Times unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the officers’ complaint, arguing that the published information does not constitute “personal information” within the meaning of the DPPA, or, in the alternative, that the statute’s prohibition on acquiring and disclosing personal information from driving records violates the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. DPPA’s definition of “personal information” extends to the details Sun-Times published here; Sun-Times possesses no constitutional right either to obtain the officers’ personal information from government records or to subsequently publish that unlawfully obtained information. View "Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC" on Justia Law

Wagoner, a paraplegic since a 1996 accident, is incarcerated by IDOC. Five years into his confinement, Wagoner filed a complaint, asserting that IDOC failed to accommodate his disability, citing humiliating toileting arrangements; a cell so small that Wagoner had to move his wheelchair to allow his cellmate to use the toilet; sidewalks that caused him to tip out of his wheelchair; no access to the weight room or the library; problems with his wheelchair; failures to provide other medical supplies; exclusion from job training; and transportation in a vehicle not equipped for wheelchairs. IDOC argued that Wagoner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Wagoner sought a “Pavey hearing.” The court denied the motion, stating that Wagoner had not established that a dispute of fact existed and could use his response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion to create a record. Wagoner filed a brief opposing summary judgment and a second Pavey motion, with a deposition excerpt detailing IDOC’s threats when he filed grievances and support for his futility claim. The district court granted IDOC summary judgment, refusing to consider the Pavey motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is better practice to hold a Pavey hearing before considering summary judgment, but there was no reversible error. The court correctly concluded that no material facts were disputed. View "Wagoner v. Ind. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Jones was charged with a 1998 Chicago shooting and convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder. After exhausting state appeals and post-conviction remedies, he sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming: that his convictions were based on insufficient evidence; that he received ineffective assistance from his trial and appellate counsel; and that his rights to due process were violated by the denial of a post-conviction petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court noted that the primary witness’s testimony was corroborated; that, in light of all of the evidence, Jones was not prejudiced by any of his attorney’s claimed failings; and that, absent a constitutional claim, the district court was correct in denying habeas relief for the failure of the Illinois courts to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "Jones v. Butler" on Justia Law