Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hankins, convicted in Arkansas of felony battery, was re-released on parole in March 2007. She moved to Illinois, where she came under the supervision of Illinois Department of Corrections parole officer Lowe. Hankins filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she asked him when her parole would expire and that he refused to tell her, saying that Arkansas would determine when it expired and would revoke her parole if she asked Arkansas authorities for the date. In February 2011 Lowe informed her that her parole had expired. Hankins claimed she was subjected to the restrictions imposed on her by the conditions of her parole for 13 months beyond when her parole had actually ended. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of an Eighth Amendment claim, stating that Lowe “was guilty of deliberate indifference or its equivalent, recklessness deliberately” when he “withheld essential information that he was required to obtain, and could readily have obtained and given her.” The court remanded for determination of when Hankins’ parole actually ended. View "Hankins v. Lowe" on Justia Law

Castro, Brooks, and Florez sued their former employer, DeVry University, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that DeVry retaliated against them by terminating their employment for complaining about their supervisor’s racially and ethnically derogatory remarks. DeVry transferred the supervisor three months after plaintiffs complained. After that, he neither supervised plaintiffs nor participated in the termination decisions. Evidence concerning their individual circumstances and job performance varies. The district court granted summary judgment to DeVry on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the claims by Castro and Brooks, but reversed as to Florez. Castro was terminated 30 months after the complaint because of poor performance over a sustained period. Brooks was terminated 15 months after the complaint because of multiple instances of dishonesty and inconsistent performance. Neither Castro nor Brooks raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether these reasons were pretexts for retaliation. Florez, however, raised a genuine issue of material fact about motive. He was terminated 10 months after the complaint for inconsistent performance and “volatile behavior.” DeVry has conceded that Florez’s performance did not justify his termination. Florez offered evidence that DeVry’s “volatile behavior” explanation was a pretext. View "Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc." on Justia Law

Pidgeon pled no contest to second-degree sexual assault of a child; other counts were dismissed. Pidgeon claims that he accepted the plea because his attorney and the prosecutor told Pidgeon that, if he did not accept the plea, he was subject to the Wisconsin persistent offender law, Wis. Stat. 939.62(2m). Under that law, a third “serious felony” conviction results in mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Counsel apparently thought that Pidgeon’s 1991 aggravated battery conviction constituted a serious felony; a conviction for the sexual assault would constitute a second serious felony; and Pidgeon faced a third possible conviction (third-degree sexual assault of an adult) in a case in which Pidgeon had not yet been charged. If Pidgeon agreed to the plea bargain, the district attorney’s office agreed not to prosecute. Both attorneys were wrong; the 1991 conviction does not constitute a serious felony. After exhausting state remedies, Pidgeon sought federal habeas corpus relief. The court found that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective, allowing Pidgeon to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on Pidgeon’s failure to call former counsel as a witness during the hearing, as would be required in an ineffective assistance hearing in Wisconsin state court. View "Pidgeon v. Smith" on Justia Law

Armstrong was imprisoned for 29 years for a rape and murder. He maintains his innocence. His conviction was set aside in 2005. In 2009 a Wisconsin state judge dismissed the charges because the prosecution had destroyed key exculpatory evidence. Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging shocking prosecutorial misconduct, including: destroying potentially exculpatory evidence from the crime scene; arranging for highly suggestive hypnosis of an eyewitness; contriving suggestive identification show-ups; concealing a later confession from a third party that was relayed by a person with no apparent motive to fabricate the report; and enlisting lab technicians to perform an inconclusive DNA test that consumed the last of a sample that could have proven Armstrong’s innocence and identified the true killer. The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; federal due process claims based on destruction of exculpatory evidence are not barred by the availability of state tort remedies for the same wrongs. At the time of the original investigation, it was clearly established that bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence would violate a suspect’s due process rights. A reasonable police officer or prosecutor would not have concluded that he could destroy evidence to avoid disclosing it. If Armstrong can show that unconstitutional destruction of exculpatory evidence caused him to a deprivation of liberty, he can sue for that injury without a second trial. View "Armstrong v. Norsetter" on Justia Law

Runnion was active in a troop run by Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago and Northwest Indiana, the largest regional Girl Scout organization in the United States. Megan is deaf. For several years she had sign language interpreters provided by the Girl Scouts that enabled her to participate fully in the troop’s activities. Girl Scouts then stopped providing interpreters. When her mother complained, Megan’s entire troop was disbanded. Megan alleges that the Girl Scouts violated the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. 794) by refusing to provide her with sign language services and then by disbanding her troop because her mother complained. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the court erred when it rejected as futile the “principally engaged” theory of Rehabilitation Act coverage in plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint. View "Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of state gun crimes arising out of a shootout. He sought state post-conviction relief. The court denied his motion; the court of appeals affirmed. Johnson had 30 days to seek review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. He applied for a loan to help cover the cost of the paper, photocopying, and postage. Wisconsin law permits inmates to borrow $100 annually for that purpose. The prison business office denied the request. Johnson contends that he met eligibility requirements. Johnson sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the wrongful denial of his loan request should excuse his failure to petition the state supreme court for review. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. Johnson did not establish that the denial of his application was an objective, external impediment to his ability to comply with procedural rules or that it actually prevented him from petitioning for review. Johnson argued that the business office misinterpreted or misapplied prison policies. No state court has ruled on that question. For a federal habeas court to excuse a procedural default based on its own interpretation of a state prison policy, without guidance from the state courts, would be contrary to principles of federalism and comity that constrain federal habeas review. View "Johnson v. Foster" on Justia Law

Hill pleaded guilty to attempted extortion and to making a false statement to federal investigators concerning his extortion of bribes from liquor licensees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence in 2011. Hill filed a civil suit, claiming that FBI and IRS agents forced their way into his house with drawn weapons, searched the house, seized and kept his lawfully owned handgun, and twirled a loaded gun making Hill “so scared” that he was “in tears.” While being questioned he felt disoriented, was crying from pain in his head, and blacked out, but the agents did not call for medical assistance. He later learned that he had suffered a stroke. The district court dismissed, citing a Supreme Court holding that a person who has been convicted of a crime cannot seek damages or other relief under federal law (a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or “Bivens”) for violation of his rights by officers who participated in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal charge, if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff [in the civil suit] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that only his claim that his false statement to the officers was coerced is barred. View "Hill v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, citing the Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die. If the district court concludes that Webster meets the requirements of Atkins, it should issue the writ stating that Webster is entitled to relief from the death penalty. View "Webster v. Daniels" on Justia Law

In 2004, Miller sought to build a four-unit condominium project on her Monona lot. The process stalled while Miller bought another lot, amended the plan, and abated an unexpected asbestos problem. She had unsuccessful negotiations with her neighbor, a former mayor, who trespassed on her property at the direction of city officials and took photographs for use at a planning commission meeting to oppose her project. Citations were issued for creating a public nuisance and working without a proper permit; the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a “stop work” order because of asbestos; Miller was required to erect a fence; and she was told that weeds were too high and was ordered to remove various structures. A court rejected three out of four citations issued against her, stating that, although “some of the efforts to enforce compliance were unreasonable,” Miller had not pointed to any similarly situated person who had been treated differently. Monona refused to adjust the taxes on Miller’s property to reflect the demolitions. Officials continued to trespass by parking cars on her property. In 2010, Miller filed suit, asserting equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, finding that Miller had not identified a suitable comparator and that there was no evidence that Miller had been treated unfairly because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting conceivable rational reasons for various actions and requirements. View "Miller v. City of Monona" on Justia Law

There was a burglary of the Buhr property. Olson’s neighbor had placed a deteriorated, unlicensed trailer on the Olsons’ property. Believing that it was abandoned, Olson fixed and painted the trailer, leaving it near the road. The trailer disappeared. Olson did not file a police report. Detective Sherrick discovered the trailer in a ditch and suspected that Olson had stolen the trailer and used it to transport lawn mowers stolen from Buhr. He obtained warrants that authorized the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints and a search of the Olsons’ property. Despite obtaining no evidence implicating Olson, Detectives Sherrick and Shaw allegedly told assistant state’s attorney Ziegler that Olson should be charged. Ziegler had no personal knowledge. He swore that the facts set forth in the information were true, relying on the detectives’ statements. Olson was arrested. Charges were later dismissed. The district court dismissed Olson’s suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The prosecutor allegedly swore to the truth of facts to obtain the warrant. Acting as a witness, not as a state advocate, he is not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Neither the detectives nor the prosecutor are entitled to qualified immunity. The complaint permits a reasonable inference that the detectives, the prosecutor, or all three gave false information to the judge who issued the warrant. View "Olson v. Champaign County" on Justia Law