Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Locke, a parolee, sued Haessig, a state official, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause, based on how Haessig responded to Locke’s complaint that her subordinate, a parole officer, was sexually harassing Locke. Locke provided evidence that Haessig was told of the harassment, failed to intervene or investigate, and then threatened to retaliate against Locke for complaining. The district court denied Haessig’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Haessig’s claim that she lacked the required intent to discriminate. Accepting Locke’s version of the facts, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Locke. Haessig was told of Locke’s complaints, but never met with him to discuss the allegations or tried to protect him from further harassment. According to Locke, after hearing of his complaint, Haessig expressed anger toward Locke and said he would never get off of his electronic ankle monitor until he was discharged from parole. A reasonable jury could infer intent to discriminate. That was clearly established law in 2008 when the events took place. Haessig had reasonable notice that her alleged actions were unlawful and so is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Locke v. Haessig" on Justia Law

Mintz started at Caterpillar in 2005. In 2007, Mintz was promoted to manufacturing engineer: an intermediary between the design department and the production floor, supervised by Turpen. Mintz moved to a different assembly line and, in 2011, began reporting to Rumler. Mintz’s duties included managing “grief” and engineering change orders; grief refers to discrepancy between what was ordered and what employees are scheduled to build. Mintz’s 2010 evaluation, prepared by Turpen, included an overall rating of “3B-Valued Performance.” The section that involved grief and change orders stated “does not meet.” His first review of 2011 resulted in a lower “3C” rating. Mintz, the only African American engineer working in the area at Caterpillar, believed that his rating was based on race. For the third quarter, Mintz received a “4-Needs Improvement,” indicating potential termination. Rumler assigned others to assist Mintz in resolving deficiencies. He allowed Mintz to work overtime and during a shutdown. Mintz’s 2011 year-end evaluation was “4”with a “does not meet” assessment of grief and change orders. His performance had worsened, causing tear down hours and assembly line down time. Mintz claimed racial discrimination. The year-end evaluation resulted in a $9,500 difference in his bonus payment. Mintz had no evidence of any race-related comments or jokes. He did not identify any Caterpillar employee that he believes was treated better than him. In 2012, Mintz transferred to another department where he remains employed. In his suit, claiming violation of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Caterpillar. Mintz was not meeting legitimate expectations and had no evidence that his complaint of race discrimination caused his evaluation. View "Mintz v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

Stern worked at St. Anthony’s Health Center (SAHC) as Chief Psychologist, with supervisory, administrative, and clinical responsibilities. In 2010, Stern received an annual performance evaluation that assigned an overall score of 2.54/4, citing concerns over administrative responsibilities. Weeks later, a subordinate resigned and, during her exit interview, said Stern had “cognitive issues.” There had been patient complaints. Other coworkers expressed similar concerns about “possible dementia.” SAHC required Stern to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation and placed him on a paid leave of absence. SAHC agreed to Stern’s choice of the Chief of Clinical Neuropsychology at Washington University Medical School, for the evaluation. The final report indicated short-term memory deficiencies, with a level of memory functioning below expectation and stated “Stern is not believed to be fit for duty in his current position.” Stating that it could not provide a position with reduced responsibilities, SAHC terminated Stern. Stern sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted SAHC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stated that it was troubled that SAHC failed to engage in an interactive process to find reasonable accommodations to permit Stern to continue his employment, but that Stern failed to create an issue of fact as to whether he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Taylor sued prison officials alleging civil-rights violations. His complaint included misjoined claims, one of which was a failure-to-protect claim against Officer Brown. A magistrate issued a show-cause order indicating that he was inclined a remaining claim concerning medical indifference, but that Taylor could avoid a severance order and a second filing fee if he dismissed one of the misjoined claims voluntarily. Taylor drafted a response voluntarily dismissing his claim against Brown. Two days before the judge’s deadline, Taylor gave the document to a prison librarian to be e-filed. He was immediately transferred to another correctional facility. The court clerk never received the dismissal, however, and the judge severed the claim, opened a new case, and assessed a second filing fee. Both Taylor and the officer argued that Taylor’s voluntary dismissal was timely under the prison mailbox rule, but the court never addressed the issue. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the district court did not provide an opportunity to prove that the late-received documents were filed in a timely manner. The court noted that a nonjurisdictional deadline was at stake, and the opposing party conceded below that the mailbox rule applied. View "Taylor v. Brown" on Justia Law

In June 2001, Morgan County Deputy Starnes stopped Pruitt’s vehicle. Starnes called in Pruitt’s driver’s license and registration and was told that a recent robbery report suggested Pruitt might be in possession of stolen weapons. Pruitt emerged from his vehicle with a handgun, and the two exchanged gunfire. Starnes was struck by five shots. He underwent surgery, developed an infection, and died. The state charged Pruitt with murder, attempted murder (Pruitt also shot Deputy Starnes’s son, who was accompanying his father as part of a college internship), and related offenses. Indiana state courts affirmed his conviction and imposition of the death penalty. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Pruitt intellectually disabled and categorically and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. His trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence to support his claim of intellectual disability, by failing to investigate and present at the penalty phase mitigating evidence regarding his schizophrenia and its effects. View "Pruitt v. Neal" on Justia Law

Thomas, a Wisconsin prisoner, was injured in the Dane County Jail, while being handcuffed after disobeying an order. Disciplinary proceedings followed. Pending his hearing, Thomas was placed in punitive segregation, where, he alleges, he did not have access to the inmate handbook he had received just the day before. The jail charged Thomas with violating several major rules, including those prohibiting physically contacting staff, acting in a disorderly manner, and expelling bodily fluids at another person. Thomas waived a disciplinary hearing and received 10 days of segregation as punishment, but was transferred back to state custody four days after the incident. About a year later, Thomas sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) the officers involved in the incident. Upon screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the district court dismissed some claims and allowed his excessive force claim and his related claims for failure to intervene, retaliation, and battery to proceed, then dismissed those claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that administrative remedies were not actually available. Thomas could not raise his grievance about the jail guards at his disciplinary hearing. View "Thomas v. Reese" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Kervin alleged, in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that prison officials violated his constitutional rights after he insisted on being allowed to see his lawyer, who had come to the prison to speak with him. The meeting did occur, delayed by a few minutes. He contends that a guard threatened to file a false complaint and that he was placed in segregation as punishment and denied due process of law when his attempts to seek redress through the prison’s grievance system for his wrongful punishment were thwarted by biased grievance officers. Kervin admits he was punished that for defying the guard’s order by asking to be let out of the day room to meet with his lawyer after being told that he could not leave the room just yet. The district judge dismissed on the pleadings, after screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: backtalk by prison inmates to guards, like other speech that violates prison discipline, is not constitutionally protected. Kervin did not allege that he suffered any significant psychological or other injury from segregation . View "Kervin v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Mucha filed suit against two Milwaukee police officers alleging they detained him without a warrant or other justification, thereby violating his Constitutional rights. Plaintiff himself was a Milwaukee police officer: he had been on leave as a result of work-related stress. A psychiatrist that examined plaintiff stated that "Jason Mucha is, in a not very veiled manner, threatening to shoot people in police command. He has a considerable stash of firearms. Hearing this, I cannot send him back to work. This is a public safety issue." The police department received the report shortly before a "SWAT" team was dispatched to plaintiff's home. Plaintiff told officers that he had "dreams" or "thoughts of suicide and hurting himself." Officers decided to detain plaintiff; the record was unclear whether the officers decided to detain plaintiff on their own accord, or if they were under orders. Plaintiff was handcuffed and taken to a mental health facility. Plaintiff was released three days later. Plaintiff argued that the officers did not have probable cause to believe he was mentally ill or posed a danger to himself or others. The issue this case presented for the Seventh Circuit's review centered on whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The Seventh Circuit did not understand the trial judge's determinations that plaintiff was acting "rationally" when police interviewed him prior to taking him to the mental health facility. As such, the Court overruled the trial court's decision to deny the officers immunity, reversed and remanded the case for dismissal against the officer-defendants. View "Mucha v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After an argument with his wife on their wedding anniversary, Jerome Weinmann went to his garage, drank half a bottle of vodka, and put the barrel of a shotgun in his mouth. He was unable to pull the trigger. Susan Weinmann called 911 for help. The officer who responded, Deputy McClone, shot Jerome four times. Jerome survived and sued McClone under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for using unconstitutionally excessive force. McClone invoked qualified immunity, but the district court refused to grant summary judgment in his favor on that basis. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that McClone had decided to kick in the door within three minutes of arriving and did not attempt to communicate with Jerome before entering, so he did not have a reasonable belief that Jerome posed a threat. View "Weinmann v. McClone" on Justia Law

Childress claims that, upon completion of a prison‐sponsored reentry program at the Big Muddy River Correctional Center in Illinois, the instructor delivered a computer disk containing Childress’s resume to the property officer, who placed it in Childress’s property box. Childress later was discharged on mandatory supervised release, with a condition that he could not possess any computer‐related material. Following his release, a routine inspection of his living quarters revealed the envelope containing the computer disk. His release was revoked. After serving his extended sentence, Childress, acting pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed following review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915A. On reconsideration, the court determined that Childress was not a prisoner within the meaning of the PLRA but that his action should be dismissed on in forma pauperis review (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding dismissal premature. The complaint set forth sufficient facts to proceed against at least one defendant and Childress should have been granted the opportunity to amend his complaint to cure deficiencies in the remainder of his claims. The court failed to consider adequately Childress’s request to recruit counsel. View "Childress v. Walker" on Justia Law